Negotiating the Sacred II by Burns Coleman, Elizabeth & Suzette Fernandes-Dias, Maria
Negotiating the Sacred II
Blasphemy and Sacrilege in the Arts

Negotiating the Sacred II
Blasphemy and Sacrilege in the Arts
ELIZABETH BURNS COLEMAN AND  





Published by ANU E Press 
The Australian National University 
Canberra ACT 0200, Australia 
Email: anuepress@anu.edu.au
This title is also available online at:  http://epress.anu.edu.au/nts02 _citation.html
National Library of Australia 
Cataloguing-in-Publication entry 
Title: Negotiating the sacred 2 : blasphemy and sacrilege in the 
 arts / editors, Elizabeth Burns Coleman ; Maria Suzette 
 Fernandes-Dias.
ISBN: 9781921536267 (pbk.)  
 9781921536274 (pdf)
Subjects: Arts and religion. 
 Offenses against religion. 
 Blasphemy. 
 Sacrilege. 
 Religion and sociology.
Other Authors/Contributors: 
 Coleman, Elizabeth Burns, 1961-  
 Fernandes-Dias, Maria Suzette.
Dewey Number: 306.108
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a 
retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, 
photocopying or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.
Cover design by ANU E Press 
Cover photo by Lynne Broughton
Printed by University Printing Services, ANU




 xiAcknowledgements  
Introduction: Lines in the sand 1
Elizabeth Burns Coleman and Maria Suzette Fernandes-Dias
Section I: Understanding Blasphemy and Sacrilege 9
1. Blasphemy and sacrilege: A challenge to secularisation and theories  11 
 of the modern? 
David Nash
2. ‘The devil’s centres of operation’: English theatre and the charge  23 
 of blasphemy, 1698-1708
David Manning
3. Madonna and piano accordion: Disrupting the order of the world  37
Elizabeth Burns Coleman
4. Materialising the sacred  55
Dianne McGowan
Section II: Motivations for Artistic Blasphemy  67
5. Blasphemy and sacrilege in the novel of magic realism: Grass,  69 
 Bulgakov, and Rushdie
Peter Arnds
6. Les fees ont soif: Feminist, iconoclastic or blasphemous?  81
Maria-Suzette Fernandes-Dias
7. The body of Christ: Blasphemy as a necessary transgression?  93
Carolyn D’Cruz and Glenn D’Cruz
Section III: Reinterpreting Freedom of Expression  103
8. The monologue of liberalism and its imagination of the sacred in 105 
 minority cultures
Jasdev Singh Rai
9. Blasphemy in a pluralistic society  127
Jeremy Shearmur
vi
Section IV: Self-expression and Restriction  145
10. Blasphemy and the art of the political and devotional  147
Christopher Braddock
11. Negotiating the sacred body in Iranian cinema(s): National,  161 
 physical and cinematic embodiment in Majid Majidi’s Baran (2002) 
Michelle Langford





Negotiating the Sacred II
Contributors
Professor Peter Arnds
Peter Arnds teaches comparative literature and literary translation, as well as
German and Italian at Trinity College Dublin. He is the author of two books,
one on Wilhelm Raabe and Charles Dickens, and Representation, Subversion, and
Eugenics in Günter Grass’s The Tin Drum. He has published numerous articles
on comparative literature from the eighteenth to the twenty-first century as well
as on German and migrant literature.
Dr Christopher Braddock
Chris Braddock is an artist and academic. He is Associate Professor of Visual
Arts in the School of Art and Design at Auckland University of Technology and
Chair of the University’s St Paul St Gallery. His research interests span the
disciplines of art history, anthropology, and performance studies. He specialises
in different aspects of modern and contemporary art including the part object
in sculpture, performance, body art, and art and spirituality. In 2007 he was the
International Artist-in-Residence at Melbourne’s RMIT University and in 2004
he was the Arts Council of New Zealand toi Aotearoa Visual Arts Resident in
New York City on the International Studio and Curatorial Program.
Dr Elizabeth Burns Coleman
Elizabeth Burns Coleman is a postdoctoral fellow in the Schools of English,
Communications and Performance Studies and Philosophy and Bioethics at
Monash University. She holds a PhD in philosophy from The Australian National
University and has held a postdoctoral fellowship at the ANU's Centre for Cross
Cultural Research. She has taught philosophy of art at the ANU, moral and
political philosophy at La Trobe University, and philosophy of law at Wollongong
University. She is the author of Aboriginal Art, Identity and Appropriation (2005),
editor (with Kevin White) of Negotiating the Sacred: Blasphemy and Sacrilege in
a Multicultural Society (2006) and has published numerous articles on indigenous
art and cross cultural aesthetics. Her articles have appeared in the Journal of
Aesthetics and Art Criticism, the International Year Book of Aesthetics, and the
Journal of Political Philosophy.
Dr Glenn D’Cruz
Glenn D'Cruz is Senior Lecturer in drama, media and communication at Deakin
University. He is the author of Midnight's Orphans: Anglo-Indians in Post/Colonial




Carolyn D'Cruz is a lecturer in Gender Sexuality and Diversity Studies at La
Trobe University. She is the author of Identity Politics in Deconstruction:
Calculating with the Incalculable (Ashgate, 2008) and has published in
Contretemps: An Online Journal of Philosophy, Life Writing and Social Semiotics.
Dr Maria Suzette Fernandez-Dias
Dr Maria Suzette Fernandes-Dias is Assistant Director of UN, International and
Regional Organisations Section of the Commonwealth Department of Immigration
and Citizenship. Previously she coordinated scholarly and Research activities
at the Centre for Cross-Cultural Research, ANU. She holds a PhD in French
(postcolonial literature) from the University of Goa, India. She has taught
comparative literature, linguistics and francophone literature at the University
of Goa, and has worked as the educational and cultural coordinator of Alliance
Française de Goa, where she managed the AF Art Gallery. She has an edited
collection, Legacies of Slavery: Comparative Perspectives, (Cambridge Scholars
Publishing, 2007). Her literary awards include the Victor-Hugo Bicentenary
Award (2002), Ford Foundation Campus Diversity Award (1996), OHeraldo
Award for Children's literature (1989), and the Vidya Award (1995 and 1996).
Dr Caroline Josephs
Caroline Josephs is a free-lance educator, researcher, storyteller, writer, and
artist. Her doctoral thesis was on sacred oral storytelling from four cultures
(Yolngu Indigenous Australian, Zen Buddhist, Judaic, and Inuit).
Dr Michelle Langford
Michelle Langford is a lecturer in Film Studies in the School of English, Media
and Performing Arts at the University of New South Wales. She is the author
of Allegorical Images: Tableau, Time and Gesture in the Cinema of Werner Schroeter
(Intellect, 2006) and has published on Iranian cinema in the journal Camera
Obscura. Her current research focuses on the allegorical dimensions of Iranian
cinema.
David Manning
David Manning is in the final stages of his PhD in History at Clare College,
Cambridge. In a departure from the current historiography of blasphemy, his
dissertation, ‘Blasphemy in England, c.1660-1730’, develops a cultural history
of blasphemy as representation, exploring the nexus between conceptions and
perceived manifestations of blasphemy in a theological context. In 2007 he was
awarded second prize in the annual Pollard Prize of the Institute of Historical
Research, University of London.
viii
Negotiating the Sacred II
Dianne McGowan
Dianne McGowan is currently completing a PhD at the ANU. She holds two
undergraduate degrees from the ANU: a BSc (psychology major) and a BA
(anthropology major). Between graduating and her PhD research, she established
and managed an Asian art gallery in Sydney, Beowulf Galleries. She is published
in Negotiating the Sacred: Blasphemy and Sacrilege in a Multicultural Society
(Coleman and White (eds.) ANU E Press, 2006).
Dr David Nash
David Nash is Reader in History, Oxford Brookes University, UK. He is the author
of Secularism, Art and Freedom (1992), Blasphemy in Modern Britain 1789-present
(1999) and senior editor for the Journal for the Critical Study of Religion. In
addition to his historical expertise, he has had to draw upon legal studies,
criminology, literary and film studies, area studies and philosophy for
frameworks to explain blasphemy’s history and how and why the phenomenon
persists. His most recent book, Blasphemy in the Christian World (Oxford
University, Press 2007), surveys the history of the subject throughout the West
and speculates upon its future development. He has given verbal and written
evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on Religious Offences and has
been in considerable demand by the British media to talk upon the subject
(notably BBC Radio Four, TV Channel Four). He is an Executive Officer of the
Social History Society of Great Britain and a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society.
Dr Jasdev Singh Rai
Jasdev Singh Rai is a medical doctor and spokesperson for the UK-based Sikh
Human Rights Group. The organisation is based on the humanitarian aspects of
Sikh philosophy: pluralism, non-discrimination, human dignity and bio-ecology.
The group has branches in India, Canada, and the USA. The Sikh Human Rights
Group is engaged in community cohesion and diversity issues in the UK. It
conducts projects on transnationalism and human rights among other issues.
Dr Jeremy Shearmur
Jeremy Shearmur is Reader in Philosophy, ANU, and lectures in political, moral
and social philosophy. He worked for eight years as assistant to Professor Sir
Karl Popper, and is author of The Political Thought of Karl Popper, and Hayek
and After, both 1996, and was co-editor, with Piers Turner, of Karl Popper’s
After the Open Society, 2008. He has taught at the University of Edinburgh, the
University of Manchester, and at George Mason University, where he was a
Research Associate Professor. He was also Director of Studies of the Centre for





This collection evolved out a two-day conference called ‘Negotiating the Sacred:
Blasphemy and Sacrilege in the Arts’ held at the Centre for Cross Cultural
Research at The Australian National University in November 2005. We would
like to thank the ANU E Press board and the collection’s reviewers for their
suggestions and feedback which have helped shape and polish the collection.
Adam Art Gallery, Éditions Typo and Denise Boucher, kindly gave us for
permission for extensive quotations, and Cathy de Monchaux and the estate of
Ian Breakwell gave permission to reproduce images of their artwork. We would
also like to thank the staff of the Centre for Cross Cultural Research, Dr Kevin
White, and the many volunteers from around the ANU, for their contribution
to the success of the conference.
This is the second volume from a series of five conferences and edited
collections on the theme ‘Negotiating the Sacred’. The first conference,
Negotiating the Sacred: Blasphemy and Sacrilege in a Multicultural Society, was
held at the ANU’s Centre for Cross-Cultural Research in 2004, and published as
an edited collection by ANU E Press in 2006. Other conferences in the series
have included ‘Religion, Medicine and the Body’ (ANU, 2006), ‘Tolerance,





Lines in the Sand
Elizabeth Burns Coleman and Maria Suzette Fernandes-Dias
The sacrosanctity of religious dogmas and beliefs, stringent laws of repression
and codes of moral and ethical propriety have compelled artists to live and create
with occupational hazards like uncertain audience response, and accusations of
deliberate misinterpretation of cultural production looming over their heads. In
extreme cases, the battle between artistic iconoclasm and societal repression has
forced creators to put their life on the line in defence of liberal self-expression.
Perhaps we should not write in the past tense. On 2 November 2004, Dutch
film maker Theo van Gogh paid with his life for his supposedly offensive
depiction of Islam in his film, Submission which denounced violence against
women in Islamic societies. In February 2005, the ‘Världskulturmuséet’ (‘Museum
of World Culture’) in Göteborg, Sweden decided to remove the painting Scène
d’Amour by Louzla Darabi that was part of a temporary exhibition about
HIV/AIDS, and depicted a man and a woman having sexual intercourse. The
artist and the curator had received numerous death threats, some with the
postscript ‘learn from the Netherlands’, from Muslims enraged over the Koran
quotations that were featured in a corner of the painting. In September 2005,
Europe suffered the violent outbreak of public outrage from the Muslim world
(several dead, embassies burnt and international tension) when the Danish
newspaper Jyllands-Posten printed 12 cartoons of Mohammed.
These are dramatic cases in contemporary culture wars, yet the issue is not
merely about the relationship between Western artists and Islam. Banal use of
religious symbols continues to spark controversy as some of us believe that
excessively liberalised and interpretative use of religious symbols/icons/figures
in art, divests these representations of faith, of their sanctity, and, at times,
offends conventional piety. 1998 saw an unsuccessful private prosecution in
New Zealand after the Te Papa museum displayed Virgin in a Condom. Protesters
besieged the museum, and attacked the sculpture. In 2000, the Sensation
exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art in New York was picketed because of
its inclusion of a painting by Chris Ofili, The Holy Virgin Mary, which
incorporated carefully placed elephant dung. The Australian National Gallery
cancelled its display of the exhibition. In 2004, Oliver Stone’s movie, Alexander,
based on the life of the fourth century BC Macedonian king, evoked protests
from the Zoroastrian diaspora for the use of a Zoroastrian holy symbol, the
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Farohar. Behzti, a play by the British Sikh playwright Gurpreet Kaur Bhatti
became the centre of a major controversy in the United Kingdom in December
2004 when the opening night was disrupted by a riot at the Birmingham
Repertory theatre.
In A Short History of Blasphemy, Richard Webster suggested that Western
liberals and artists deploy the rhetoric of a holy war in defence of freedom of
expression just as readily as Muslims do in relation to their defence of Mohamed
and the Koran, and indeed, hold the doctrine of freedom of expression nearly
as sacred.1  Lines in the sand have thus been drawn between those wishing to
protect freedom of expression in the arts, and those who think blasphemy is
wrong, and should be suppressed. What is consistent in the liberal position is
that the ‘opponent’ is a ‘zealot’ or an intolerant moralising bigot seeking to
impose his or her particular version of the good upon us all.
In his discussion of the British debates over the place of blasphemy law in
Britain, Clive Unsworth sees a polarisation between those who see blasphemy
law as supporting the role of religion and religious values in society, and liberals
who object to blasphemy laws on the basis that the law’s object is to protect
some members of society from being offended, not merely by exposure to the
blasphemy, but through the knowledge that other people may be viewing the
material and not finding it offensive.2
The three events in Britain in the late twentieth century that re-ignited
debates over blasphemy involved ‘the insertion of elements of sexuality and
sexual deviancy into the religious narratives’.3 These events included the Gay
News case, Satanic Verses, and the refusal to license the video Visions of Ecstasy.
In the 1977 Gay News case, Mary Whitehouse successfully invoked British
blasphemy law against the editor of the paper, Denis Lemon, for the publication
of the poem ‘The Love that Dares to Speak its Name’ by James Kirkup. Lemon
was sentenced to nine months’ jail, suspended for 18 months, and Gay News
was fined £1000, with prosecution costs awarded against them. The decision
and the interpretation of the crime were upheld by a majority of the House of
Lords. Unsworth acknowledges that ‘it was not the case that the blasphemous
quality of Kirkup’s poem was dependent upon its homosexual content, and
indeed, supporters of the prosecution were anxious to maintain that the trial
was not about homosexuality but about the vilification of Christ’. Yet, for
Unsworth, the stated objection does not undermine their obvious bigotry: ‘in
the context of the wider belief system, the homosexual content of the poem
cannot have done other than to aggravate the blasphemy and render it exorbitant
in the eyes of those who so judged it’.4
This case started a vigorous campaign by artists and liberals to have the
blasphemy laws abolished, a campaign that resurfaced almost 12 years later in
2
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the wake of the Rushdie affair. The Satanic Verses, a bitter satire on Islam,
understandably gave serious offence in depicting Muhammad as ‘Mahound’, a
calculating opportunist and debauched sensualist, and giving the names of
Muhammad’s wives to prostitutes in a brothel.5
The last case, Visions of Ecstasy, a 1989 short film directed by Nigel Wingrove,
was refused certification by the British Board of Film Classification (BBFC) because
of scenes featuring a sexualised representation of Saint Teresa of Ávila caressing
the body of Jesus on the cross—scenes which could potentially make the film
liable to prosecution for blasphemy. As cutting the scenes would remove
approximately half of the film’s content, the board decided to refuse certification
altogether. In 1996, the distributor of Visions of Ecstasy took his case to the
European Court of Human Rights where the BBFC’s decision to reject certification
was upheld. The Court concluded that: ‘Freedom of expression constitutes one
of the essential foundations of a democratic society. As paragraph 2 of Article
10 expressly recognises, however, the exercise of that freedom carries with it
duties and responsibilities. Amongst them, in the context of religious beliefs,
may legitimately be included a duty to avoid as far as possible an expression
that is, in regard to objects of veneration, gratuitously offensive to others and
profanatory.’6  It is this that liberals are unable to accept.
One thing we may agree about is that the protection of religious sentiments
appears to be the legally accepted purpose of blasphemy law. Unsworth writes:
The crime of blasphemy is directed to the objective of protecting religious
believers from outrage to their feelings from relevantly offensive material
being in circulation, in the interests of a social value of maintaining
respect for a sense of reverence of the sacred, so that it has to do with
the social status of religion. It is the tenuous and intangible nature of
the harm against which the offence protects that causes especial outrage
to liberal exponents of the pre-eminent value of freedom of expression.7
We might be wary of Unsworth’s portrayal of the issue in terms of the nature
of the offence as a kind of prurient attitude towards sexuality. It may be the
case that Mary Whitehouse was seeking to uphold moral sexual values. Yet, in
A Brief History of Blasphemy, Webster reminds us that both Christian polemicists
and Western orientalists for centuries ‘sought to denigrate Islam by attributing
to it a fantastic, disreputable or demonic sexuality’.8  According to Webster,
the Muslim objection to the use of sex within the Satanic Verses was not to sex
itself, but to the use of obscenity as a form of vilification.
On the picture Unsworth presents, the conservative position on blasphemy
is to uphold moral (sexual) values in society, and the liberal position is the
standard position against legal moralism, that ‘offence’ is not a justified basis
for the state to interfere with freedom of expression.
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According to Caslon Analytics, an Australian research consultancy, voices
decrying blasphemy against art have been inspired by ‘overseas models, with
local provocateurs, zealots and “concerned citizens” emulating excitement in
London, New York or other cultural centres’.9 The consultancy suggests that
the protests have seldom sustained media attention or support of major religious
groups or community leaders and have encountered a largely indifferent
audience. This characterisation belittles those protesting against blasphemy in
Australia as fringe groups, whose position is not worth considering, but it is
true that, within Australia, the accusation of blasphemy does not immediately
give rise to widespread public ire. Despite the very public claim made by Justice
Harper, Supreme Court of Victoria, when refusing to grant an injunction to
prevent the opening of Andres Serano’s Piss Christ at the National Gallery of
Victoria (Pell v Council of Trustees of the National Gallery of Victoria) that as a
multicultural and tolerant society, Australia ‘need not bother with blasphemous
libel’, the work was vandalised on two different occasions in two weeks,
compelling the gallery to close the exhibition to prevent further assaults against
its staff. The technicalities that quashed the injunction (‘a civil court will not
exercise criminal jurisdiction and will not restrain what may or may not be a
legal act by using a civil remedy such as an injunction’10 ) and defences of the
freedom of expression were not sufficiently potent to quell the passions that the
image aroused in some members of the public and, in others, perceptions of an
infringement of decency and good taste.
Webster suggests that blasphemy laws may have come to be considered
obsolete because ‘respect for the figure of Jesus and for Christianity in general
has been inculcated so widely, even among non-believers, that the restraints of
good taste have generally made the restraints of law all but redundant’.11  He
argues that it would be considered ‘an unpardonable breach of good taste’ for
a sceptic or a non-believer to blaspheme in front of a believer, and that this
amounts to an internalisation of the sacredness of Christian religion.12  It is not
the case, however, that the same respect would automatically be extended to
other religious groups within our communities. He speculates that it is because
of such internalised repression that ‘the role of artists, poets, novelists and
film-makers as ‘agents’ of blasphemy has become so important in the twentieth
century’.13
Our aim in this book is to move beyond these portrayals of debates over
blasphemy as a contest between fundamentalism or legal moralism and liberal
freedoms and to re-examine the nature of the offence. To cut through the
entrenched positions about blasphemy and freedom of expression, it is necessary
to recognise that freedom of expression is a political right. The protection of this
right does not mean that all acts of blasphemy are morally permissible or
acceptable. Legal permissibility and moral acceptability are different, and one
4
Negotiating the Sacred II
may have a political liberty to do something that is morally wrong. Moreover,
the condemnation of repressive acts of violence in response to blasphemy is not
incompatible with the condemnation of gratuitous disrespect of religious symbols
and offence to others. There is a debate to be had, of course, about whether
offence should be taken seriously morally, and whether offence is the correct
characterisation of the wrong involved. The perspective of the religious persons
may differ from that of those who do not share their belief. For legal philosopher
Joel Feinberg’s ‘profound offence’, the ‘wrong’ involved is not, or not merely,
that someone has been offended; it is that they are offended because the act is
wrong.14  In such cases, mere knowledge of the act is sufficient to cause offence.
The reason why religious beliefs are particularly susceptible to this form of
offence is that they contain a sacral element that is missing from other strongly
held beliefs.15  (It does not follow from this that religious beliefs are the only
form of belief that might be considered important in this regard, as the issue
concerns the centrality of a belief to a person’s life.)
Focusing on ‘fundamentalism’, or ‘zealots’ or ‘legal moralism’ blinds us to
the broader social context. This debate is not merely about the role of Christianity
in our society, but the place of religion in a multicultural society with numerous
religious groups. Issues surrounding the rights of minority cultures, in particular
indigenous cultures, to recognition and respect have raised new questions about
the contemporariness of the construct of blasphemy and sacrilege. Controversies
over the aesthetic representation of the sacred, the exhibition of the sacred as
art, and the public display of sacrilegious or blasphemous works, have ignited
heated debates and have invited us to reflect on binaries like ‘artistic and religious
sensibilities’, ‘tolerance and philistinism’, ‘the sacred and the profane’,
‘deification and vilification’, and to reconsider what actually amounts to
blasphemy and sacrilege in the present day context of multicultural
cosmopolitanism and political secularism.
Although blasphemy is traditionally defined as ‘a contemptuous or profane
act, utterance, or writing concerning God or a sacred entity’, ‘the act of claiming
for oneself the attributes and rights of God’ or ‘an irreverent or impious act,
attitude, or utterance in regard to something considered inviolable or sacrosanct’,
the construct has extended itself to the domain of the secular, to include concepts
like the desecration or flagrant disrespect of ‘civil religion’ and mythologies of
nationalism and identity. Sacrilege is conventionally defined as the transgression
against the virtue of religion in terms of ‘violation of a sacred place’, ‘irreverent
treatment of sacred things’, ‘defilement of honour of a “sacred” person’, and it
is not always clear where the line between blasphemy and sacrilege lies.
While the writers in this collection have approached the question of
blasphemy and sacrilege very differently, the usages reflect many of the issues
in negotiating the sacred in the arts, and, indeed, highlight how varied these
5
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issues may be. In our first chapter, Nash observes that in ancient and early
Christian periods, blasphemy involved physical attacks on religious artefacts
with the intent to damage the religious ‘currency’ of the religion so attacked.
In contrast, medieval and early modern accounts of blasphemers see them as
wilful heretics indulging their own pride, an ‘active commission whereby doubts
or errant opinions were actively vocalised’. David Manning, like Nash, sees
blasphemy as primarily a crime within the Christian tradition, and contrasts the
contemporary interpretation of blasphemy as an offence of people’s sensibilities
with an older interpretation of blasphemy as an offence to God. Coleman develops
a broad interpretation of blasphemy as a failure to display the homage appropriate
to what is represented by an image or symbol in order to extend the concept
into cross-cultural settings, and to understand what is objectionable about
aesthetically appreciating some indigenous religious objects. McGowan, in
contrast, understands the placement of sacred objects in a gallery context not
as blasphemy, but as a form of re-sacralisation. Both Coleman’s and McGowan’s
cross-cultural interpretations would be rejected by Rai, who argues that Western
academics fail to appreciate that there is no clear distinction between the sacred
and the profane in Indic thought. As editors, we have not attempted to impose
a concept of blasphemy or sacrilege; in contemporary debates such words count
as markers of dispute over meanings, contexts, and uses. Our purpose is to
highlight and explore these different uses, and to try to find a way to understand
and negotiate differences between values. The sacred may be presented as an
absolute, but may also be negotiated. Negotiation may mean discussion leading
to some kind of agreement or settlement, but it may also mean to clear or pass
an obstacle.
The justifications for artistic freedom in relation to blasphemy include the
claim that art can, or should, be considered an autonomous practice that should
be judged in terms of aesthetic merit; that the artists’ intention, for instance to
make a political comment or to break down barriers, justifies blasphemy, and
that complete freedom of expression is necessary for the creation of art. The first
argument involves the idea that literary genres, galleries, theatres and other
forms of secular, public ‘space’ provide a context that allows us to recognise
that what is occurring is ‘a representation’, and enable a specifically aesthetic
form of interpretation. Many artists assume that such ‘spaces’ establish the
framework for an interpretation and appreciation that is autonomous, and distinct
from moral and religious evaluation.
As we grapple with the task of articulating how artists strive against
ideological and religious sanctions to affirm the ‘dissenting voice’ and affirm its
ability to ‘enable people to question and assess the validity of dominant social
norms and their institutionalisation’,16  we are also conscious of the means by
which some achieve this without raising the ire of religious authorities, and
alienating others within our societies.
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The book is divided into four sections. The first provides four different
accounts of blasphemy and sacrilege in the arts and in relation to religious
artefacts that we may find displayed as arts. The second section is concerned
with the motivations that artists may have in deploying blasphemous images.
The third looks at two very different interpretations of freedom of expression,
and the fourth is concerned with how artists express themselves from within
religious traditions and despite restrictions.
In an age where politicians still use the oldest gimmick of justifying their
oppressive acts as answers to a divine calling and align their motives to religiously
sanctioned agendas, art continues to provide the transgressive space for
subverting dominant ideological discourses. However, despite their emancipatory
power, artists and their art occupy a liminal space wherein the contemporary
socio-political climate of hegemonically-induced extremism and increased
communal and religious sensitivity and intolerance, limit individual freedom of
expression. Artistic articulation of individual conviction without the intention
to offend can still potentially cause unrest. In a world that is becoming
increasingly pluralistic and multicultural, it is necessary to step beyond the
simplistic assertion that free speech should override religious sensitivities and
to facilitate a discourse that will encourage a negotiation of definitions of
blasphemy or sacrilege and a sensitisation of religious sensibilities, and limit the
abusive deployment of freedom of expression. Artistic sophistication and layering
of meaning with its ‘virtues’ of ambiguity, openness, and indeterminacy that
prevent a single, blatant and overt interpretation of a creation as sacrilegious or
blasphemous, presents one such means of reconciling potential conflict. Enabling
and creating an environment of tolerance that is conducive to intellectual debate
and not offence, is yet another. Respect for the religious and cultural sentiments
of others is of the utmost importance, for, it is only in a society that respects
difference that a forum for negotiation can evolve and the lines in the sand can
fade.
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Section I
Understanding Blasphemy and Sacrilege
The first four essays in this collection express a sense of bewilderment about
accusations of blasphemy and sacrilege, and seek to understand the motivations
behind them. In our first essay, historian David Nash suggests that in
contemporary Western societies, blasphemy ‘is back with a vengeance’ and
‘offers to trail blaze a path for religion and religious responses to become the
cornerstone of the new politics of cultural identity’. However, he argues, we
have no adequate theoretical models for understanding the place of religion in
our societies. The rise of accusations of blasphemy, he suggests, is proof of the
falsity of the secularisation thesis that modernity would bring about a lessening
of religious feeling and greater tolerance. Claims of blasphemy seem to be
increasing in Western societies. Assumptions that the process of liberalisation
and secularisation would lead to the disappearance or privatisation of religion,
and the disappearance of blasphemy as a crime, have been misplaced.
Accordingly, secularisation theory does not provide a theoretical framework
through which we can understand the changes occurring in our society. Rather,
he suggests, that blasphemy is more than a transgressive activity. It is a place,
he writes, ‘where identities were forged and communities debated issues about
public order’.
David Manning explores the evolution of the charge of blasphemy in England.
During the reign of the last two Stuart monarchs, the English society was a
deeply religious society and vexed by a perceived rise in immorality and
irreligion. To the pious majority, licentious behaviour was at best a scourge on
the respectability of society and at worst a threat to the very salvation of the
nation. In 1698, Jeremy Collier’s A short view of the immorality and profaneness
of the English stage, sparked a debate in which the most zealous tracts and sermons
demonised the theatres and accused some plays and actors of blasphemy. The
investigation touches upon the nexus between theology and morality, the
perceived complicity of audiences, and the conception of malicious intention
and interpretation, to present a view of blasphemy that was more than a
one-dimensional notion of intolerability. According to Manning, would-be
reformers such as Tillotson, Collier, and Bedford perceived the nature of the
wrong as the language used in theatre: it was not good or edifying. The context
of performance, within a play on a stage, which might be considered by
contemporary audiences as the means by which we distinguish between art and
life, did not change the nature of the language. Manning concludes that belief
in a providential God, coupled with conventional theology, may render seemingly
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innocuous plays and facile passages blasphemous and as a tangible threat to the
nation.
Order and purity are themes that arise in our third chapter. Elizabeth Burns
Coleman explores the concept of blasphemy in terms of a metaphysical
relationship between the symbol and what it represents, and as a form of
cognitive response to an image that places us in a certain relationship to it. These
theories suggest that very different assumptions are made about the nature of a
symbol to those generally found in the arts. Coleman discusses a seemingly
innocuous poster for the 1998 Adelaide Arts Festival depicting a Madonna with
a piano accordion and the objections that many indigenous peoples have to the
display of their sacred objects within a gallery context. Coleman argues that
these innocuous cases, which display no intentional or explicit attack against
religion, are similar in terms of the lack of honour or respect shown to a symbol.
From this, she argues that the concept of honour or respect is central to
developing a cross-cultural concept of blasphemy. She argues that our
comprehension of the meaning of symbols is shown by our actions in response
to them. Our physical responses to symbols are a form of labelling, or
understanding, that show us to be in a certain kind of relationship with them.
Concerns about the proper use of sacred images, and about the contexts in which
they appear, are concerns that we show appropriate respect through our
behaviour.
Former curator and gallery director, Dianne McGowan tries to encompass
the shifting nature of the concept of sacredness in a secular market economy
oriented society; what was once sacred is now housed in art museums or
decorating private homes or reproduced or appropriated. She analyses two
paintings, Da Vinci’s The Last Supper and a Tibetan Buddhist thangka, titled
Buddha Sakyamuni, painted between 1050-1100. Both paintings were conceived
for religious spaces and depict religious scenes. However, the thangka, on being
consecrated by a Lama, ceased to be an object and became a living deity. The
Last Supper on the other hand was not consecrated, but its presence in a holy
precinct verifies its sacredness. McGowan argues that the gallery context does
not desecrate, but creates a sacred space for viewing religious and sacred art.
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Blasphemy and sacrilege: A challenge
to secularisation and theories of
the modern?
David Nash
In the penultimate episode of the recent beloved BBC science fiction series Dr
Who the massed ranks of the Daleks made a long awaited re-appearance. In doing
so they demonstrated a developed conception of amoral violence and the
justification for it in a conception of blasphemy. When confronted by the
possibility that they might contain human DNA, the Daleks considered this to
be a suggestion that was potentially blasphemous. This is arguably a quite
significant cultural moment for the confidence that underpinned our modernist
vision of civilisation. The Daleks after all were created in the early 1960s,
arguably the highpoint of post-war confidence in humanity’s capacity to sort
out social and economic problems. At this time, the Dalek was literally a
modernist dustbin into which all that was unsavoury in human interaction was
consigned. Yet the Daleks have returned to a world that has (since they’ve been
gone) seen the concepts of ‘ethnic cleansing’, ‘collateral damage’, ‘hate crime’
and ‘The War on Terror’ emerge. The violent and unsavoury material consigned
to the bin is climbing out to recolonise a world once thought confidently civilised.
Moreover, it is concepts like blasphemy and other species of violent attack upon
identity that potentially provides for the emergence of a more confrontational
and violent world.
Discourses of blasphemy that might lead to its detection and indeed committal
are back with a vengeance and offer to trail blaze a path for religion and religious
responses. They are also seeking to become the highway leading towards the
new politics of cultural identity. Moreover, discourses of blasphemy are invading
culture itself to become something of a catch-all term that allows individuals to
display frustration and to place distance and difference between themselves and
others. Most of us in the West have considered religious and cultural tolerance
to be an intrinsic and cherished part of the modernist dream. The modern world’s
communications technology seems to present an inescapable power that should
transcend hatred, anger and misunderstanding. These days we can share our
innermost thoughts and feelings with other people without facing or interacting
with them. The internet has made this possible, fostering the growth of our own
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personal world of interests and adding apparent authority and validity to ever
divergent opinions. Today we have an information society that is potentially
overloaded with both facts and opinion. But, strangely, this ‘opinion rich’ society
has become a society that has never seen individuals and groups more in conflict.
Freedom of expression and its development
The reaction to alien views in contemporary worlds and the historic past has
quite often been termed blasphemy. In some respects it is easy to say that the
outpourings of others deserve consideration and recognition whether or not
their discourses or statements are coherent. But history reminds us that we must
confront the consequences of the freedom that the modern world has given us.
While those who fought for the extension of forms of democracy in the post-war
world would celebrate the downfall of spurious and enslaving authority, the
gap that this loss of authority left was large and threatening. Indeed, we should
remember that there are important reasons for describing this situation as a gap.
This became plain in a significant range of cultural discourses that talked about
the ‘end’ of such reassuring concepts as civilisation, history, and, of course, the
modernist project. Such discourses looked back at supposed species of tyranny
and constraint that had apparently been transcended but scarcely, if at all, looked
forward to a world of potential liberation and open ended expression. For the
optimistic, and those who never gave a second thought to the fact that they
themselves were empowered by culture, the future represented a wealth of
opportunities. Clearly, empowerment was precisely the key to this so-called
liberation. Those who had benefited from the material consequences of the
modernist project, for example, through education, or through access to the
public sphere and the media had simultaneously the wish, the means, and the
ability to express themselves and to influence others. Paradoxically, the
breakdown of confidence in these same mechanisms left others without such
forms of liberation or expression. Moreover, this also contributed to their
long-term loss of confidence in their own empowerment through the
opportunities offered by the West.
The breakdown of this confidence emphasises how far we have grown deeply
accustomed to writing an especially Whig, socio-democratic progressivist style
history of both religion and rights in the West. A pejorative attitude to religion
was also often present in modernisation theory which considered superstition
and forms of belief to belong to primitive epochs and that these represented a
phase through which human development passed.1 Traditionally, Whig religious
history has told us that religious tolerance has developed in Western nation
states as a consequence of these states conceding species of human rights. This
concession of human rights often went hand in hand with these states
surrendering stewardship and authority over the ideological makeup of their
citizen’s moral and mental lives. Generally speaking, this stewardship was
12
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considered to be of a religio-moral nature and its withering away within this
historical model of progress was often linked to the sociological theory of
secularisation. In one branch of this theory, offered substantially in the 1960s
by the then influential work of Peter Berger, the supposed authority of religion
in the areas of behavioural morality, education and welfare were deemed to have
been broken by developments within the post-war world.2  Such developments
had arguably been at work since the Enlightenment. Teleological notions of
society’s development from Hegel, Marx, Weber, Elias and Foucault envisaged
the marginalisation of religion into various components. Whether this was
brought about by revolution (Hegel/Marx), greater specialisation (Weber), civility
(Elias), or the growth of the subjectively empowered self (Foucault), all theories
predicted its potential demise.
A brief reflection over the last paragraph will alert readers to how old
fashioned the secularisation paradigm sketched actually looks — yet systematic
discrediting of its assumptions and conclusions is still required. Interestingly,
the modernisation and peaceful transition model of religious change has a
stunning longevity and some commentators have noted the capacity for such
accounts to overwrite conflict models.3  In his examination of the archaeological
evidence of religious violence from the classical world, Eberhard Saur examined
how the archaeological processes of excavation and restoration are capable of
denying the phenomenon of iconoclasm. In discussing the public display and
portrayal of one statue (the statue of Mithras from Ostia), Saur notes that its
archaeological value is too often considered through its carefully restored state.
In this, the mutilation of the statue has been forgotten and similar evidence of
destruction, so Saur argues, has been neglected or ignored. A factor that obscures
the history of religious conflict still further is what Saur describes as a trend
within archaeological explanations of change to adopt gradualist models of
‘acculturation’. Acculturation models argue for a much more gradual interleaving
of cultures based around peaceful contact, mutual sharing of technology and
cultural achievements — all opposed to ideas of conquest and cultural
imperialism. Interestingly, this bears a striking resemblance to modern
perceptions of the functioning and purpose of religious/multicultural tolerance.
Of still greater concern is Saur’s suggestion that the advocates of ‘acculturation’
theses of change are apt to describe destructive conflict models of change as old
fashioned and shaped by discredited nineteenth century paradigms.4
Similarly, the Reformation was regularly described as a linear unstoppable
process which came fundamentally to alter the social and religious makeup of
the West. In this we are persuaded that the building blocks of modernism
(constructed by More and Erasmus) were firmly in place before Marx, Hegel,
Weber, and even Nietzsche put pen to paper. Likewise, the triumph of the
Newtonian rational universe noted in the history of science and even within the
histories of gambling and probability portrays a modernisation motif which
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explains rationality as the triumphant explanatory framework around which
the universe turns.5  No longer did the turn of the dice or the shape of natural
phenomena or laws display the divine will but instead could be explained
through natural laws or the secular notion of probability.
Saur reminds us how archeological models that display destruction and
iconcoclasm are worth taking with us in any study of secularisation as a
consensual linear and modernising history. Attacks upon religious images
represent a significant portion of blasphemy’s early history. Blasphemy in the
ancient and early Christian periods most frequently comes down to the historian
as the written record of individual acts of outrage. Like many other crimes, there
must also have been a dark figure of iconoclastic acts against religious material
culture that have subsequently left no trace. The wilful and calculated destruction
of religious artefacts or buildings displayed an intent to damage the religious
‘currency’ of the religion so attacked. Evidence from the ancient world strongly
suggests that monotheistic religions took the lead in iconoclastic practices and
the identification of other religions as anathema. Pre-Christian Rome had been
indulgent to both empire-wide and local deities and archaeologists have seen
the widespread existence of some cults as tangible evidence of this. Individual
deities were chosen for their usefulness and augmented existing belief systems
rather than displaced them. It was monotheistic religions that set themselves
against this equilibrium.6
The creation of a single autonomous religious truth and route to salvation
provides the obvious explanation as to why this was clearly the case. When
Pharaoh Akhenaten adopted monotheism in ancient Egypt the destruction of
rival deities was a logical and inevitable consequence of this choice. Judaism
similarly had scriptural precedent for violent action against pagan deities,
although some of these examples were aimed at religious usurpation or the
Israelites ‘straying’ from the true God. After Christianity’s arrival, the trend was
continued further by Islam’s adoption of iconoclastic practices. As Islam spread
East its iconoclasm left its mark upon the Buddhist shrines and idols of India.
Later Christianity also regarded pagan relics and practices to be capable of
routinely contaminating the lives of true believers. The systematic nature of
Christian iconoclasm can be contrasted with the haphazard and inconclusive
actions of Roman predecessors. Sauer suggests that the Emperor Aurelian’s
capture of Palmyra resulted in half-hearted and piecemeal destruction of local
sacred places and, perhaps, even represented a tolerance or respect for the deities
of the defeated city.7
In sum, the linear models of secularisation producing and being sustained
by tolerance and rationality from the Enlightenment to the dawn of modernisation
deserve to be qualified if not wholly questioned. Models of acculturation, of
which secularisation is surely one, can be shown to have overshadowed models
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of conflict and episodic reaction. Similarly the post-Enlightenment ‘invention’
of religious tolerance ignores the relative tolerance that existed within some
early civilisations.
Blasphemy and the framing of secularisation
One relic of modernisation and Whig history that still has lingered longer than
most is the theory of secularisation, although the secularisation theory which
strove to have a dominant place in the history and sociology of religion has now
retreated somewhat in the face of a number of intellectual and theoretical
challenges, particularly from historians. If the theory of secularisiation no longer
claims to offer an overarching explanation of the last millennium of Christianity’s
history, it can at least point to its description of general trends in belief and
outlook as maintaining its validity. Secularisation theory, in various forms,
suggests that the modern world is more secular than the pre-modern, and this
in turn more secular than the medieval. It points to a whole host of indicators
that have altered mankind’s perception of the world and how it functions. These
include the arrival of scientific beliefs to replace belief in providence, the transfer
of education, welfare and medicine into the secular sphere and, lastly, the end
of mass religious attendance accompanied by the retreat of religion from public
life.8  Moreover, secularisation’s theoretical account of the historical past suggests
that episodes such as the Reformation, the rise of Protestantism and the
Enlightenment constitute milestones towards the creation of this secular society.
The high watermark of confidence in the theory of secularisation occurred a
generation ago, but it remains arguable that modern society is overall more
secular than previous epochs.
However, blasphemy’s history significantly contests the certainty and
inevitability of this view of historical progress and offers a significantly different
chronology for religious history. Certainly, it may be possible to argue that
blasphemy itself represents a ‘secularisation’ of the concept of heresy. Heretics
were quite regularly cast as victims of their errors that entered their minds
unwittingly. Most medieval and early modern accounts of blasphemers see them
as wilful individuals indulging their own pride. The investigations of early
modern Germany, France and Switzerland would lend credibility to this view.9
The offence of blasphemy became one of active commission whereby doubts or
errant opinions were actively vocalised within the earshot of others. In contrast
to heresy, blasphemy was increasingly considered to be a lapse of discipline
rather than sincere religious error. Many medieval European cases display
individuals as drunk or angry at some slight providence had wrought upon
them. Others attacked the honour of God in anger against the ill fortune he had
bestowed upon them, frequently at the gambling table.10
Nonetheless, other assumptions of the secularisation account of religion’s
supposedly waning importance do not fit with blasphemy’s very different
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history. The Reformation, far from diluting the sacred, shifted the focus to
scripture and the Bible. New light is also shed on this through noting how
mediaeval conceptions of sin and shame equally had their later Protestant
counterparts.11 The Enlightenment, it might be argued, brought philosophical
and later artistic questioning of the sacred and its place in society. This would
fit with the history of the offence in England where French Revolution ideals
were later replaced by arguments about free speech, individualism, and the
removal of religion to the private sphere. Nonetheless, such a triumph was not
linear, nor was it remotely complete since the link between church and state in
England was never overthrown.
Secularisation theory itself has also never been comfortable in measuring
Christianity’s vibrancy within the realm of the private sphere. While it prefers
to see privatisation as the story’s conclusion, recent history has shown the sacred
as capable of being mobilised from this area with a rapidity that would astonish
the previous generation. In Britain at the end of the twentieth century and into
the new millennium, isolationist agendas have sought to protect both Britain
and its component nations from the European super state arguing for ‘opt outs’
in issues around obscenity and morality. In 1996, for example, a case reached
the European Court in which the film maker Nigel Wingrove appealed against
the refusal of the British Board of Film Classification to award an exhibition
certificate on the grounds it breached his freedom of expression. The court
eventually found in favour of the British government allowing it the margin of
appreciation, a means by which important cultural areas that might be covered
by overarching European Union Law would be allowed to opt out from this.
Britain thus was allowed to keep a working legal concept of blasphemy alive.
More damning evidence still comes from America, where an institutionalised
cleavage between Church and State did not remove the concept of blasphemy
from this society. Nor did the Constitution actively secularise American society,
forcing religion into the private sphere. Religion has become a central part of
American politics and has developed a rhetoric which increasingly attempts to
define the state as secular rather than neutral, and is therefore able to describe
secular stances and world views as unconstitutional if practiced by the
government.12  Even where it might be claimed that religion was successfully
privatised, the conclusions we might draw from the evidence do not support
components of the secularisation thesis. Religion becoming a matter for the
private conscience occurred at precisely the same time as knowledge of the law
and access to it became a real possibility for more individuals in the West.
Secularisation theorists argued that tolerance would be bred by greater contact
between individuals, and that globalisation would homogenise religious outlooks
and lessen differences between faiths and groups. In some respects the ecumenical
agendas of Western churches in the 1960s and 1970s represents a good example
of this, as does the modernisation agenda of Vatican II. Similarly, the arrival of
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scientific beliefs to replace beliefs in providence, and the aforementioned
secularisation of education, welfare and medicine, accompanied the retreat of
religion from public life.13 This confidence has not been borne out by the
evidence of the late twentieth century that has seen individuals reach for
blasphemy as a tool capable of preventing the erosion of the sacred. For some
individuals and groups, defending religion has rejuvenated nationalism in the
face of the twin agendas of globalisation and, in particular, pan-European systems
of morals and justice.
In England, blasphemy cases as far apart as the 1880s, the 1930s, the 1970s
and the 1990s, all contained a fear of continental influences contaminating
‘sacred’ English morals. The case against Nigel Wingrove’s film Visions of Ecstasy
allowed the United Kingdom to maintain the Common Law of blasphemous libel
as an element of its culturally distinct identity, similarly Mary Whitehouse had
invoked the sacred nature of British morality in her campaign to exclude Jens
Jurgen Thorsen’s Sex Life of Christ from being shot in England in 1977. In
accepting these as legal and policy decisions, English fears of the dangerous and
foreign were enshrined in and influenced legal decisions.14  Elements of these
fears were evident in the cases against G.W. Foote in 1883, where the relevant
newspaper’s blasphemy could be shown to be directly influenced by French
prototypes. In the 1930s Britain also witnessed an attempt to extend the
blasphemy law as a means of excluding ‘foreign’ Jewish freethinkers and their
ability to undermine the morals of the British Empire. Although this Bill passed
a first reading in Parliament, the government moved swiftly to prevent it
becoming law. The early 1990s saw the Salman Rushdie affair persuade some to
see blasphemy as a multicultural issue. One of the arguments used was the
suggestion that Britain’s tolerance of other religions and cultures was a sham
unless the law could be mobilised to protect the religious sensibilities of all.
Early twentieth century America also witnessed a number of panics associated
with the dangerous spirituality and anti-religious views of recent immigrants.
In the immediate First World War period, a Lithuanian, Michael Mockus, stood
trial for blasphemy and, upon conviction, the judge made clear reference to the
potentially dangerous views held by immigrants. Mockus linked Christianity
with class and economic oppression and argued that religion was essentially a
conspiracy against the workers of the world.15  Seventeenth century America
had seen individual states operate their own penal codes, but latter day America
also witnessed the use of blasphemy as a tool for the defence of local communities
and their morals. The early twentieth century in particular saw American States
pursuing blasphemers within their local and state jurisdictions (recognisably
similar to early modern Geneva, Zurich or Venice) only to see these attempts to
prosecute and convict quashed by federal law.16  Nonetheless, individual
communities have for some years now been able to operate their own local
standards of decency in defiance of Federal law’s long standing desire for equality
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of practice.17 Thus, secularisation theory clearly does not offer any valuable
framework to explain blasphemy’s history and in particular its persistence.
Moreover, it is possible to go further and argue that blasphemy’s own history
itself provided important material for a wider history of the sacred. Its persistence
and its current relevance supply vital evidence of the survival of the sacred —
not simply as a spiritual legacy but as a vital component of beliefs about
nationalism and wider religious identity.
Many of our models (especially theoretical ones) concerning long term
continuity and change offer inadequate explanations of blasphemy. The
phenomenon itself does not readily fit with theories associated with
modernisation and change. Following such models and their cultural intentions
leads us to ask why blasphemy was not eradicated through the Enlightenment’s
search for freedom of belief and expression. If theories about the inevitable
demise of religion were true, it could be expected that the crime of blasphemy
would have been swept away by the eighteenth and nineteenth century
revolutions in America and Europe, or fallen into desuetude in the more organic
constitutions of Britain and its former English-speaking empire. In the
non-English speaking world, the imposition of supposedly enlightened laws
from the mother country ironed out local differences to provide what some have
seen as an enduring solution.18 The survival of blasphemy as a crime, and as
an accusation, also offers a temptation to suggest that blasphemy as a cultural
phenomenon may suit a more dystopian view of the West in crisis. Those Western
critics who were (and are) suspicious of the Enlightenment, and its supposed
empowerment of the individual, are the important figures here. Foucault, Derrida
and the postmodernists not only regard this empowerment to be a sham but also
are likely see the supposed authority of Enlightenment truth as a collection of
controls whose ultimate explanatory cohesion disintegrates before them.
Blasphemy, identity and exploration
Blasphemy was, and is, more than a transgressionary activity. Its long history
suggests that controversies about blasphemy are places where definitions of the
universe and its working are debated; places where identities are forged and
where communities debate issues about public order. All these lead us to a
history away from the certainties offered by secularisation narratives. Blasphemy
always reminded us that the relationship between individuals and the sacred
were very often problematic. Secularisation theorists always spoke about ideas
of collective, normal, and everyday belief, thereby homogenising both the
experience of belief and the definitions that historians and sociologists would
give to it. Blasphemy’s illumination of conflict models and incidents showed
that belief was capable of ebbing and flowing and appearing at pressure points
in the interactions of individuals and societies. In this, the inevitable triumph
of the secular over the sacred looks a far-fetched suggestion. Even if secularisation
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theorists did have some justification in arguing that religion would become less
important, it remains a teleological theory of progress and continual
enlightenment. But the religion supposedly supplanted by reason was not by
any means destroyed or damaged beyond repair, and secularisation theorists
failed to pay much attention to the residues and legacies that Christianity left
in the West.
Artists who explore and contemplate the West’s myths, stories and cultural
legacy became the people who rescued religion from its appointed status on the
periphery of experience. What motivates artistic consideration of the sacred,
and why artists as diverse as Andres Serrano, Bettina Rheims, Tracey Emin and
Tania Kovats have quarried the sacred for inspiration, are important questions.
While these artists themselves may have lucid, exciting and informative answers,
the wider ‘influence’ of the sacred needs to form exploration of the fuller context
in this area.19  In this respect, it is valuable to ask how far this art reflects a
re-discovery or re-orientation around the sacred imagery of the past, or a simple
acknowledgement of religion’s enthralling nature as one of the West’s strongest
and most compelling ‘stories’. In this, it has not been for many of these artists
a re-evangelisation of life, or necessarily a quest for spiritual longing, but has
equally sometimes been spawned by the simple curiosity of those brought up
with secular outlooks.
This interest means that investigations of popular culture and media studies
will inevitably be drawn to the sporadic appearance of the sacred in popular
culture. In a sense, each particular media can be said to have its fifteen minutes
in the spotlight. Irving Welsh showed the power of disreputable images of the
almighty to shock in the context of the modern novel. His Granton Star Cause
depicted a profane and drunken deity and was the last controversy Mary
Whitehouse, Britain’s premier twentieth-century critic of media morality, was
involved in before her death. Madonna’s sense of melodrama almost inevitably
took her in the direction of the sacred long before she thought of actually being
crucified on stage. In 2006, her ‘Confessions’ tour played with Catholic motifs
and extended her belief that suffering and crucifixes could be ‘made sexy’. Even
culturally conservative British comedy, which always wishes it was more
subversive than it ever manages to be, produced a publication with religious
offensiveness as a keynote feature. The British comedian Rik Mayal’s recent
autobiography contained a picture of himself beatified and described as ‘better
than God’. All these are in danger of demonstrating a de facto cheapening and
ubiquitousness of the sacred while noting the rediscovery of religion’s powers
to shock. Yet equating these with outright blasphemy brings problems of
intention when, for example, Maddona had embarked on a quest to entertain
as much as to problematise or inform her audience about religion and the sacred.
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In particular, we might note how images and portrayals of Christ on film
have caused especial problems of interpretation sometimes leading to accusations
of blasphemy. Of greater concern have been the attempts to humanise Christ
which, in some eyes, appeared to be an assault upon the idea of his divinity —
a constant struggle in such depictions. Dennis Potter’s Son of Man portrayed a
Christ at war with himself and sceptical of the divine nature of his own destiny.
Similarly, Scorsese’s Last Temptation gave critics, both hostile and sympathetic,
an opportunity to air the sheer variety of interpretation to which the gospel
story, and its depiction, could be subjected. Yet, conclusions from this area were
not readily transferable to other blasphemous instances. Films, and their
subsequent greater availability on video, are capable of multiple consumption
and re-consumption in the quest for favourable or unfavourable meanings.20
But the engagement of artists and writers with the religious has provided the
opportunity for religious world views to challenge ownership of these cultural
ideas and have asked the searching question of whether the ideas of the religious
belong to society as a whole. The protests against everything from Last
Temptation of Christ to Jerry Springer the Opera have given religious individuals
the opportunity to bring arguments about the sacred and its inviolability back
to the public sphere. In this they are aided by agendas which promote social
inclusiveness and the urge to marginalise differences of opinion and viewpoints
in the more consensually driven societies of the new millennium.
These are all conundrums and challenges to artists and thinkers. In such a
climate, it is scarcely surprising that a cultural phenomenon so capable of
controversy should excite and fascinate the artistic mind used to sifting and
redefining the problem areas of civilisation. In the end, we should protect such
rights and imperatives since they offer a blueprint for possible change against
regimes of abject quietism and stasis. This is necessary because all culture —
religious or secular — is capable of development and change. Whether we really
can provide an equality of public space for the religious and those who would
denounce it to re-enter the public sphere is a difficult question for us to answer.
Ironically, societies faced by these dilemmas will have to decide how far they
can tolerate a conflict model between the religious and the free speech advocate
in the name of so-called consensus.
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‘The devil’s centres of operation’:1
English theatre and the charge of
blasphemy, 1698-1708
David Manning
The dominant notion of blasphemy in Britain today is built upon a perception
of what is offensive to the Christian religion. Derived from common law and
fashioned by the dynamics of public opinion, this view has been employed to
powerful effect in the Gay News trial of 1977 and, most recently, in charges
against the BBC broadcast of Jerry Springer the Opera in 2005.2  It would appear
that the exclusively religious conception of blasphemy as a sin against God,
punishable by God or His intermediaries, has been displaced by a more secular,
politicised view which focuses on the relationship between human agents. The
paradigm created by a broadly secular western democracy invariably places
artistic representations of the sacred within a polarised debate between religious
sensibilities and freedom of expression. In such a context, the need to negotiate
the sacred becomes imperative to maintaining a modus vivendi. Practically, a
model of upholding individual rights without risking a breach of the peace is
one to be defended. However, if our intellectual discussions of the sacred become
limited by such a framework, then we restrict our understanding of beliefs that
are not similar to our own. It should be clarified that there are other, more
profoundly religious, perceptions of blasphemy, and to conflate them with the
notion dominant in Britain threatens the potential for us to negotiate the sacred
successfully. By using an historical case study, this chapter will explore an
exclusively religious context to blasphemy and, in so doing, reveal what might
cause a devotedly religious individual to make the charge of blasphemy. Here,
the application of history becomes particularly useful, because we can escape
immediate bias that the charge of blasphemy is only made by cranks or fanatics,
as well as preconceptions concerning the right of freedom of expression.3  Let
us, then, consider the reaction of pious Christians to the activities of the theatre,
within the context of a devoutly Christian society.
Blasphemous theatres and plays
The only legislation ever passed with Royal Assent against blasphemy in England
was the Blasphemy Act of 1698.4  Political wrangling had limited the scope of
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the Act to a denunciation of anti-trinitarian conceptions of God; however, it was
sold to the public as a realisation of King William III’s personal commitment to
‘discourage profaneness and immorality’.5 The necessity of this presentation
was borne out of a belief among growing numbers of Protestants that England
was plagued by immorality and vice on a scale that risked divine punishment.
At this time, England was a devoutly Christian society, and a belief in God’s
providence was virtually universal. Indeed, all major events were interpreted
providentially and nationwide fasts were often instigated by the regime to
appease the Almighty in times of perceived crisis. Furthermore, the most pious
individuals believed that God shaped the very nature of human happiness and
misery.6 Those seized by the belief that vice plagued the nation had to look no
further than the earthquake of 1692 for confirmation: God was angry. For zealous
reformers, one of the most public and institutionalised centres of vice was the
playhouse; for it had a ‘natural and unavoidable tendency to that which [was]
sinful and unlawful’.7  Unlike the tavern or the whore-house, the theatre
stimulated the mind as well as the body. It could promote many different vices
to a diverse audience, who shared the experience together in place and time.8
The playhouse was not simply a venue where vice was represented and then
imitated by vulnerable members of the audience;9  it was a place where
playwright, player and audience met to collude in sin. Given that the state had
seemingly failed to provide adequate direction on the matter, it was therefore
timely that the pious clergyman Jeremy Collier published A short view of the
immorality and profaneness of the English stage in 1698.10
Collier’s work proved popular as most upstanding Christians would have
probably acknowledged that some stages, particularly those at the annual
Bartholomew Fair, attracted disreputable characters and promoted vices such
as profane swearing, mocking of religion, lewdness and drunkenness.11  As well
as attacking these vices, however, Collier posited a much more unpalatable
argument that the theatre as an institution was fundamentally evil. Within the
pages of his substantial book he exposed specific plays as immoral, profane, and
blasphemous; furthermore, he lambasted audience appreciation of these plays
as tantamount to worshipping the Devil.12 The ensuing controversy, which has
become known to literary scholars as ‘the stage debate’, questioned the very
existence of the playhouse in a godly society, and served as a searing indictment
of past and contemporary regimes for their failure to define and condemn
blasphemy in all its forms.
In 1698, there were two professional, permanent theatres in London, one in
Drury Lane and the other in Lincoln’s Inn Fields, and they were attended by a
wide cross-section of society.13 The Drury Lane theatre was known as the
‘Royal’, being patronised by the monarch, and its actors assumed the title of
‘His Majesties Servants’. The idea that these playhouses could harbour evil was
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seen by many contemporaries as preposterous. While there was general support
for Collier’s call to reform the stage, few reformers endorsed his specific charges
of profanity and blasphemy. By 1699 it became clear that parliament would not
sanction any reform of the theatre, and support for the cause gradually waned.
Indeed, most contemporaries would have probably forgotten all about Collier’s
charges of blasphemy had it not been for another providential act of God, and
an astonishing historical accident.
On the evening of 26 November 1703, a great storm hit England which caused
widespread damage and thousands of deaths.14 The event was universally
acknowledged by the nation’s Protestants as a sign of God’s wrath. To mark the
severity of the situation, Queen Anne declared that a general fast be observed
as public penance on 19 January 1704. Amidst the national distress, it was
reported that a group of actors had only days after the storm performed a version
of Shakespeare’s The Tempest.15 The failure of the playhouse to cancel this
production in the aftermath of the storm caused pious campaigners once again
to take up the pen and attack the stage, this time with a clear mandate from the
Almighty. Collier quickly published a short, cheap summation of A short view
which, along with a number of other zealous anti-stage publications, were bought
and distributed in significant numbers as part of a massive propaganda campaign
by the newly formed Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge (SPCK).
In the following months, two prominent journalists, John Tutchin and Daniel
Defoe, joined the fray by attacking the stage in their respective publications:
The Observator and A Review. Two years later, the zealous clergyman Arthur
Bedford capitalised on the momentum of the renewed campaign and published
The evil and danger of stage-plays which claimed to list approximately 1400
examples of ‘swearing, cursing and blasphemy’ in plays of the previous two
years alone.16  Despite the ideological differences that would have existed
between them, Collier, Bedford, Tutchin, and Defoe shared a common bond by
stressing the profanity and blasphemy of the theatres, re-igniting the belief that
playhouses were the ‘Devil’s centres of operation’.17 The rest of this chapter
will investigate why these men considered certain plays to be blasphemous. It
will be shown that, far from a one-dimensional notion of offensiveness, the
charge of blasphemy articulated complex and deeply held theological anxieties.
A religious critique of dramatic language
The interpretations that our anti-stage writers placed on dramatic texts might
well appear facile or even absurd to modern readers and so, before turning to
the evidence, we need to understand the way in which they would have
approached play scripts. In proving specific plays guilty of blasphemy, it would
appear that to men such as Collier, textual and/or dramatic context was a complete
irrelevance. To explain why intelligent men could neglect the fundamental
significance of context, most literary scholars have concurred with Aubrey
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Williams that the clash between Collier and the playwrights was principally the
result of opposing philosophical theories concerning the separation between life
and art. This explanation cast Collier as a staunch defender of the Platonic notion
that representation is a copy of reality, while placing the playwrights in an
opposing Aristotelian camp which stressed that representation is merely a symbol
of mental states that has no direct connection with reality. A number of
playwrights did construct replies to Collier from an Aristotelian perspective;18
however, I would argue that this evidence has guided scholars to make certain
assumptions about Collier’s position without considering the fact that he was a
devout clergyman. Indeed, it would be almost inconceivable that Collier’s method
was not religiously inspired.
Before A short view was published, John Tillotson, the then Archbishop of
Canterbury, delivered a sermon against the stage based upon Ephesians 4:29:
‘Let no corrupt communication proceed out of your mouth, but that which is
good to the use of edifying, that it may minister grace unto the hearers’.19  In
preaching that ‘corrupt communication was evidence of a corrupt and impure
heart’,20 Tillotson affirmed the decree of scripture to be absolute and he
seemingly drew upon Augustinian theology to connect evil deeds to an evil
will.21 The implications for the stage were clear: in discerning between good
and evil acts, context was an irrelevance. The significance of this judgment was
fully acknowledged by Collier in the pages of A short view and in similar fashion
Bedford stated that, ‘whatever is a sin when spoken in another place is as much
a sin when spoken in the play-house’.22 Thus, any word or words could be
legitimately censured, no matter what the context, if the accuser could
convincingly argue that they were wicked. It seems evident, therefore, that it
was an acute religious sensitivity to the word of God, rather than crude literalism
or Platonic theory that formed the central component of our anti-stage writers’
concerns. To appreciate their position fully, all intellectual preconceptions
regarding the legitimacy of context and the separation between life and art need
to be set aside. With this interpretative framework established we can now
consider what caused our anti-stage writers to charge plays with blasphemy.
Both Collier and Bedford were often explicit about identifying certain words
in play scripts as blasphemous; but the words were also understood within the
wider category of profanity. For example, in A short view, Collier devoted a
chapter to ‘the profaneness of the stage’, which was subdivided into two sections:
‘cursing and swearing’ and ‘abuse of religion’. The former was acknowledged
as being the most prevalent, while the latter, though less common, was perceived
as the more dangerous, principally because sometimes it did not ‘stop short of
blasphemy’.23  Profane swearing, such as ‘e Gad’ or ‘Lard’,24  was quickly
covered to give prominence to offences that were deemed blasphemous. It should,
therefore, be stressed that swearing against God or any form of general
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irreverence towards God or Christianity, while contemptible and profane, was
not actually viewed as blasphemy. Upon reading the anti-stage writings of the
period, it can be shown that evidence used to prove plays guilty of blasphemy
clustered around two central themes: corrupting the idea of God’s providence
and the use of demonic language.
The perceived attack upon God’s providence
Shortly after the storm, Collier wrote that during the notorious production of
The Tempest the ‘audience were pleased to clap at an unusual length of pleasure
and approbation’ at the mention of chimneys being blown down.25 The accuracy
of this claim is suspect,26  yet it demonstrates how the providential judgement
of the storm had increased religious sensitivity to matters of timing and position
vis-à-vis both action and reaction. In this instance, the subject matter of the play
was broadly irrelevant, for it was completely superseded by the failure of the
playhouse, the actors and the audience to act appropriately in the wake of God’s
divine judgement. The production of the play in question would most likely
have been unrecognisable to audiences today. The play was probably one of
two radical adaptations of Shakespeare’s original work, which included
significant alterations to the script and a good dose of devilish foolery and
bawdyness.27  Nevertheless, it would appear that it was the mere fact that a
‘mock tempest’28  had been played soon after the real, divinely sanctioned
tempest that caused charges of profanity and blasphemy. Indeed, when the day
of national penance arrived, the Bishop of Oxford told the Lords gathered at
Westminster Abbey that the playing of The Tempest shortly after the storm was
an ‘unprecedented piece of Profaneness’ that was an ‘affront to God, unparalleled
by any civilized nation’.29 The reaction to the playing of The Tempest was
certainly exceptional but for our anti-stage writers it was just one example among
many that demonstrated not just a disregard for God’s providence, but a
fundamental corruption of it. As Collier put it, the players and playwrights had
‘attempted as it were to scale the sky, and attack the seat of omnipotence: they
have blasphemed the attributes of God, ridiculed his providence’.30 To ignore
the providential acts of the Almighty was represented by anti-stage critics as a
terrible attack upon God, mocking His powers as if He did not exist.
In Sir John Vanbrugh’s play, The Relapse, the character Young Fashion
schemes to seduce his brother’s fiancée in order to secure her substantial dowry.
Upon devising a workable ploy with his accomplice, Fashion declares,
‘providence thou see’st at last, takes care of men of merit’.31  Collier was so
incensed by these words that he singled them out as ‘plain blasphemy’ and ‘an
eruption of hell with a witness’.32 The charge of blasphemy was acknowledged
and taken seriously, for it was one that playwrights did much to discredit. In
defending his work, Vanbrugh stated: ‘every body knows the word providence
in common discourse goes for fortune and yet no one ever thought it blasphemy
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to say, fortune’s blind, or fortune favours fools’.33  Michael Cordner has
suggested that Collier’s allegation of blasphemy was predominantly levelled in
reaction to a playwright’s failure to construct pious sentences from a common
religious vocabulary.34 This interpretation of literary literalism seems rather
one-dimensional. It should be noted that acts of providence were believed to be
instances of God’s omnipresent governance, which were designed to protect the
good and give warning and punishment to the wicked.35 The slightest suggestion
that God could smile upon wicked men would have been seen by Collier as
impossible, and not only an affront to the providential workings of God, but a
sign of devilish pride.
In another example, Collier denounced the following words from Thomas
D’Urfey’s version of Don Quixote as ‘directly blaspheming the Creation, and a
Satyr upon God Almighty’:36
Providence that form’d the Fair
In such a charm Skin,
Their Outside made his only Care,
And never look’d within.37
In this passage, the last two lines communicate the blasphemy because they were
seen as giving rise to the suggestion that God’s providence was only concerned
with the outward and superficial. The idea that God did not care for a person’s
soul would clearly render much of the Christian faith meaningless. The seemingly
innocuous passage from Don Quixote, to the hyper-sensitive reader, was
tantamount to an open denial of the truth of God’s working in the world. It
would appear that the charge of blasphemy allowed Collier to bypass lengthy
explanation and communicate the true wickedness of the passage to less astute
persons or those believing the words to be harmless. Blasphemy was a highly
evocative term; contemporary readers would have been well aware of God’s
terrible punishment of blasphemies related in the Bible.38 While it seemed
unbelievable that such a passage could be wicked, the fact that a clergyman
labelled them as blasphemous would have meant that they could not be assumed
harmless with a clear conscience.
In his newspaper, The Observator, Tutchin attacked an adaptation of
Shakespeare’s Macbeth which had also been performed shortly after the Storm.39
Contrary to the reaction against The Tempest, Tutchin’s grievance lay squarely
on the content of the play. He believed that the occult, evil forces prevalent in
the text of the play were presented as indistinguishable from God’s providential
powers, perverting the unique and infinitely good character of God.40  As it has
been shown, the fictional status of the characters was no excuse; real people
were still saying the words in the script and those words existed in print. God
alone was providential and so, according to Tutchin, the play was proof that
the actors were ‘impious and blasphemous wretches’ who had ‘ridiculed God’s
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Amazing and Stupendous Judgment’ of the Great Storm. The severity with
which Tutchin viewed this transgression against God’s providence was made
clear when he concluded that, ‘this is a sad omen of our [the nation’s] hasty
destruction’.41  It is, therefore, evident that the charge of blasphemy
communicated a very grave sin indeed.
Invoking devils
Many anti-stage writers expressed a belief that the playhouse was the Devil’s
domain. The origin of this belief dated back to the writings of the influential
second-century Christian Tertullian, who reported on an instance where a woman
attended a Roman theatre and became possessed by a devil.42  I have yet to come
across any reports of early eighteenth-century audiences being overcome by
such forces and even actors who directly invoked the Devil were not explicitly
described as being possessed, though their words were often denounced as
blasphemous. Indeed, the evidence used to censure plays as blasphemous appears
to have relied heavily on quotations that explicitly referred to devils and
damnation. Such language was not uncommon in plays of the period, being used
metaphorically and more readily as alternative modes of expression to taking
God’s name in vain. The plays in question, however, rarely contained
anti-religious themes, and most contemporaries would have deemed the language
fairly innocuous once set in context. Nevertheless, phrases which, for example,
appeared to represent acts of swearing by ‘death and the Devil’43  were plucked
out of scripts by men such as Bedford and denounced with vitriol as instances
of ‘unparalleled blasphemy’.44  For anti-stage critics, to mention demons in
swearing, cursing, or just an exclamation was evidence of actually calling upon
the forces of darkness. Before turning to the evidence, it would be useful to
establish the conceptual relationship between words that invoked devils, the
charge of blasphemy, and the notion that the theatre was demonic.
In The evil and danger of stage-plays, Bedford stated in no uncertain terms
that blasphemy was ‘a sin of that heinous nature, which the damned in Hell are
guilty of, and which makes them incapable of recovery’.45  At first glance, this
belief seems to be forged from an inaccurate reading of Matthew 12:31: ‘All
manner of sin and blasphemy shall be forgiven unto me: but the blasphemy
against the Holy Ghost shall not be forgiven unto men’,46  whereby Bedford
gives no consideration to the scriptural differentiation between pardonable and
unpardonable blasphemy. It transpires, however, that Bedford’s perception of
blasphemy shows remarkable similarities to the doctrine put forward by St.
Thomas Aquinas: to speak any sort blasphemy was a mortal sin which rendered
the utterer damned and those that were damned also blasphemed, to show their
hatred of the punishments inflicted upon them.47  Invoking devils was, therefore,
an example of the latter case (for who but the damned could possibly utter such
words). Put plainly, it was believed that only the damned could call upon devils
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and such an act was blasphemous because it demonstrated that the sinner, even
in the grip of God’s divinely sanctioned punishment, continued to defy the
Almighty. Collier similarly concluded that the profanity of the stage was ‘the
language of the damned’48  and that to pay to watch such sin was to ‘make a
contribution for blasphemy, and raise a tax for the government below?’49  In
demonological theory, the damned were understood to be controlled by devils.50
Therefore, actors who revealed themselves to be damned by their blasphemies,
could be construed as the devil’s agents and consequently to attend the theatre
was, as Tutchin put it, to ‘buy vice at the Devil’s shop’.51
In A short view, Collier attacked John Dryden’s version of Amphitryon 52  for
furnishing Jupiter with the omnipotence of God. To Collier, this was ‘blasphemy
on the top of the letter, without any trouble of inference, or construction’.53
The representation of heathen gods on stage could have been seen as idolatrous
and a violation of God’s first commandment. Yet, in stating that the ‘cover of
an idol is too thin a pretence to screen the blasphemy’,54  Collier hinted that the
sin of blasphemy was of an even greater magnitude. In this case, it would appear
that the notion of blasphemy went well beyond blurring the mythos of the ancient
gods with the ethos of the one true (Christian) God. Early Christian Fathers such
as Tertullian had claimed that Roman gods were in fact devils and for men such
as Collier, who were knowledgeable of and believed in such early Christian
writings, this view continued to hold credibility.55  Implicit in Collier’s treatment,
Jupiter was neither simply a representation of a mythical figure nor a potential
religious idol, but a devil. In light of Collier’s belief in the conceptual relationship
between blasphemy and the demonic, it would appear that the charge of
blasphemy articulated a belief that Dryden had sought to award omnipotent
powers to a devil, thus subverting the differentiation between good and evil
and laying waste to God’s truth.
In giving examples of the ‘blasphemous’ expressions of the stage, Tutchin
turned to the words of Vanbrugh’s Provok’d Wife: ‘Satan and his equipage;
woman tempted me, lust weakened me, and so the Devil overcame me, as fell
Adam, so fell I’.56  It would appear that the words that evoked the charge of
blasphemy were ‘the Devil overcame me’, as they could have been construed as
an open admission of a compact with the Devil. Such a view is confirmed when
Tutchin later went on to censure the phrase ‘hail powers beneath!’ from John
Corny’s version of Metamorphosis.57  Bedford denounced similar passages from
other plays that displayed a relationship between human and devil, such as the
invocation ‘to the Devil, so she bring no children’, from the anonymous play
The roving husband reclaim’d.58  On occasion, Bedford perused this interpretation
with a zeal that seems positively ludicrous to the modern reader. For example,
he condemned the phrase as ‘a devil a wit’ from the play The northern lass, which
he annotated ‘i.e. no wit’.59  For Bedford, these words constituted praise to the
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devil, which he believed was the ‘highest blasphemy that mortals can invent’.60
It seems clear that the meticulousness and fervour of Bedford’s interpretation
was but a genuine reflection of his fear of God’s wrath and an attempt to
implement what he believed to be God’s wishes as directed by Scripture, earlier
Christian writings and above all else God’s unmitigated providential warning.
It has been shown that our anti-stage writers genuinely believed that the
blasphemies of the theatre denigrated the truth of God’s workings in the world
and advanced the position of devils. In both method and substance, this view
was supported by a combination of Scripture, early Christian writings and the
work of eminent Christian theologians. Significantly, Tutchin, Bedford and
Collier were not considered cranks and their views held significant credibility
in the period of heightened theological anxiety after the storm of 1703. To these
men, the godly reformation required to stave off further divine punishment
simply could not be completed unless the theatre was drastically reformed. In
the final section of this chapter I want to return to the issue of negotiating the
sacred and reflect upon how our anti-stage writers sought to apply their examples
of blasphemy to affect actual reform.
The plight of God-fearing Christians
First of all, it must be stressed that, for pious English Protestants, the notion of
the sacred extended well beyond a collection of discrete beliefs, words, actions
or objects.61  In general terms the sanctity of God’s truth was universally accepted
and so playwrights, audiences and anti-stage writers all worked within, and
agreed upon, the same religious paradigm. This chapter has shown that the act
of negotiating the sacred in the stage debate was not complicated by questions
concerning the nature of the sacred or how it should be accommodated, but
rather how sensitively providence should be interpreted and how vigorously
God’s truth should be maintained and protected. It has already been noted that
our anti-stage campaigners sought more forceful and comprehensive reform than
did the governing regime, and yet God’s providential intervention of 1703 made
it impossible for the administration wholly to dismiss the claims of our writers.
Consequently, it would appear that in a state that held the sanctity of God’s
truth as its governing paradigm, the correct interpretation of God’s will rested
exclusively on His perceived intermediaries (i.e. the Monarch and her Bishops).
Yet, in times of crisis, the paradigm also allowed for a circumvention of the
authority of the Church and the law because God was ultimately the arbiter.62
The main strategy employed by reformers against immorality and lower-level
profanity was to appeal to magistrates to be more effective in the punishment
of the wicked.63 Yet, it is notable that this approach was not adopted by Collier,
Tutchin and Bedford. The main reason for this was probably pragmatic: it would
have been futile to appeal for state intervention against words that the state did
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not recognise as sinful.64  However, I would suggest that the unique way in
which our anti-stage writers conceived of the theatre as the devil’s domain also
significantly influenced their approach. Their consistent reference to the theatre
as the ‘Devil’s chapel’, or the ‘Devil’s engine’, or the ‘Devil’s shop’65  took the
literal observations of the early Christian Fathers and re-interpreted them afresh
for the eighteenth century by playing upon contemporary fears about the
prevalence of evil and socio-religious concerns among reformers that the theatre
had become anti-church. Importantly, the labels of theatre as the Devil’s ‘chapel’,
‘engine’ or ‘shop’ also indicate how our anti-stage writers believed that the sins
of the theatre were perpetuated. When the writings of our anti-stage writers are
taken in the round, it becomes clear that the main target of the campaign was
not the sinful playwrights and actors, but rather potential theatre goers and
people of influence. It was believed that the effectual reform of the playhouse
lay with the source of the problem — the audience. Collier’s view that the
audience were complicit has already been noted above, and Defoe was under no
illusion that the ‘Errors of the Stage, lie all in the Auditory’ for the actors were
but their ‘Humble Servants’.66  Indeed, it was the audience’s attendance, money
and applause that supplied the Devil with his congregation and ensured that
God’s truth continued to be denied. The outrage created by such evil
‘competition’ and the extent to which the charge of blasphemy exposed
fundamental and dangerous untruths is evident in a satirical poem by Daniel
Defoe, which was published on occasion of a new theatre being built at the
Haymarket in 1705. An extract of the poem reads as follows:
View but our Stately Pile, the columns stand,
Like some Great Council Chamber of the Land:
When Strangers view the Beauty and the State,
As they pass by, they ask what Church is that?
Thinking a Nation, so Devout as we,
Ne’r build such Domes, but to some Deity;
But when the Salt Assembly once they View,
What Gods they Worship, how Blaspheme the True;
How Vice’s Champions, Uncontrol’d within,
Roul in the very Excrements of Sin:
The Horrid Emblems so Exact appear,
That Hell’s an Ass, to what’s Transacted here.67
The primary approach of our anti-stage writers was, therefore, to appeal to the
Christian conscience of the potential theatre goer, thus bypassing the worldly
restrictions of politics and law and asking each individual to scrutinise their
actions more closely.
The polemical claims of Collier, Tutchin and Bedford formed a desperate
attempt to expose the wickedness of the stage. Citing play passages as
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blasphemous was crucial to the argument that the words in particular were
indeed fundamentally evil. Inflammatory passages attacking God’s providence
and invoking Devils were of little significance in isolation; but if they were
proved blasphemous, then anti-stage writers hoped that audiences would be
forced to accept that plays were evil and risked provoking God’s wrath. With
no earthly, objective judge, such issues were intractable and, for the victimised
playwrights and no doubt many humble audience members, it was actually men
such as Collier who were guilty of blasphemy by seeing wickedness where there
was none. As one eminent playwright put it: ‘where the expression is
unblameable in its own clear and genuine signification, he [Collier] enters into
himself like the evil spirit, he possesses the innocent phrase, and makes it bellow
forth his own blasphemies’.68  After His intervention in 1703, God did not
venture to give any further clarification on the matter and with His apparent
acquiescence, the heat of the stage debate subsided. The SPCK propaganda
campaign wound down in 1708 drawing to a close any serious chance of theatre
reform on the basis of its profanity and blasphemy.
Acknowledging modern providentialism
In conclusion, it has been shown that for pious English Christians of but three
centuries ago, the charge of blasphemy was a very grave one indeed.
Conceptually, blasphemy was conceived as a form of profanity that ranged from
cursing through to an inversion of God and the Devil. Extreme blasphemies
sought to subvert some of the most fundamental Christian truths, and were
denounced as irredeemable sins. Practically, it has been demonstrated how a
belief in a providential God, coupled with relatively conventional theology,
rendered seemingly innocuous plays and facile passages blasphemous and thus
a tangible threat to the whole nation.
This chapter has shown how the meaning of art can be construed from an
exclusively religious point of view. As a result, we should perhaps be more
ready to acknowledge that for those who believe in a providential God and
active devils, philosophical theories of representation and/or political rights of
freedom of expression pale into insignificance. A strong belief in providentialism
is certainly in evidence in many countries throughout the world and we need
only look to the Evangelical Christian lobby in the USA or the Islamic regime
under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Iran to see the vitality and influence
of such beliefs. To assume that all charges of blasphemy against art are limited
to notions of offensiveness between human agents, even within the West,
significantly limits our understanding of how profoundly religious individuals
and societies conceive of the world they live in. To devout believers defending
the sacred is a matter of life and death.
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3
Madonna and piano accordion:
Disrupting the order of the world1
Elizabeth Burns Coleman
In 1997, a poster depicting an icon of the Madonna playing a piano accordion
was produced to promote the Adelaide Arts Festival. The Madonna was depicted
enthroned against a background that was recognisably of the park that extends
from the Adelaide Arts Centre to the Torrens River, with one of the major
cathedrals in the background. She was surrounded by outlines of gods from
other religions, including Buddha, Ganesh, and an Aboriginal Wandjina. The
style of presentation was recognisably Middle Eastern, a point emphasised by
the gold mosaic frame, and the ‘Greek’ lettering of the announcement of the
event and its main sponsor, Telstra. It appeared, by all publicity standards, to
be a fantastic poster. It was beautiful, and it was rich with connotative association
that made it appropriate for the festival. Adelaide is known as ‘The city of
churches’, so the poster was very specifically appropriate to the Adelaide arts
festival, as opposed to an arts festival in some other place. A third feature of the
poster that made it so good was that the image of the Madonna with an accordion
is inclusive of what may be considered a form of high art as well as popular
culture. Moreover, the image was inclusive of different religious and community
groups and the art of different cultures and, as such, reflected and celebrated a
multicultural recognition of the value of the arts across different cultures.
However, within weeks, the poster was withdrawn from circulation by the
Festival organisation because the Greek Orthodox Church had complained it
was an inappropriate and offensive use of one of their icons.
Since 1978, the Zuni people of Mexico have been demanding the repatriation
of their war gods, or Ahauutas, from museums around the world, including the
Smithsonian. Their case involves two issues: first, in Zuni eyes the Ahauutas are
communal property and by definition, it is claimed, consider their ownership
by museums not ownership but theft. The second issue is one that concerns us
here. According to James Clifford, ‘Zuni vehemently object to the display of
these figures (terrifying and of great sacred force) as “art”. They are the only
traditional objects singled out for this objection’.2 This same kind of issue may
arise in relation to the display of replicas of sacred objects. In 1975, an ethnologist
at the National Museum of Canada wrote to the director suggesting the removal
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of Iroquoian false face masks on the basis that ‘The Iroquois consider the masks
highly sacred and even “dangerous” objects that should be viewed only at the
time of curing rituals’.3 The masks were removed five years later, but a proposal
to replace them with fibreglass casts of the original was objected to by the Grand
Council of Hodenosaunee (or Iroquois Confederacy). The Council denied the
existence of a distinction between ritually and commercially carved masks and
forbade the exhibition of any masks. It also forbade all forms of reproduction,
and the distribution of any information about them.4
Both the poster and the display of indigenous artefacts appear to be completely
innocuous. The poster did not defile, ridicule or attack Mary or the Church, and
the display of the Zuni war god, and the Iroquois false face masks, was simply
that — their display. So the objections expressed by the Orthodox Church and
the Zuni are mysterious. It is hard to understand why they are objecting, let
alone why we might care about their objections. Both cases challenge important
values we hold. One case confronts the value of freedom of expression. The
second confronts the value of knowledge and the practice of collection for the
purposes of study, public education and aesthetic appreciation.
I will argue these two cases are similar, and that this similarity shares features
in common with blasphemy, despite the fact that it is not obvious that either of
these cases are instances of blasphemy. The attempt to understand what is
‘wrong’, that is, to grasp what appears to be mysterious in both these cases, will
provide us with a better understanding of blasphemy. The structure of this
chapter will be as follows. In the first part, I address the idea that these cases
are dissimilar, because they involve a symbol on the one hand, and an object on
the other. I argue that there is no clear distinction between an object and a
symbol. I will also address the concern that the intention to blaspheme, or to
offend, is a necessary element of blasphemy. In the third part of the chapter I
will draw out some of the important features of these icons and beliefs about
their connection to the order of the universe in order to show how we might
understand these cases to be connected to each other, and to blasphemy.
Definitions of blasphemy
In contrast to the delicacy with which the Adelaide Arts Festival treated Orthodox
sensibilities in relation to the poster including an image of the Virgin Mary, the
National Gallery of Victoria displayed no such misgivings about the display of
Andres Serrano’s controversial photograph, Piss Christ, which showed an image
of a crucifix immersed in the artist’s urine, as part of the Melbourne City Festival
in 1998. This image might be considered paradigmatic as a case of blasphemy.
Various Christian churches sought the removal of the image from public display,
and after the negotiations with the gallery and government proved fruitless, the
Catholic Archbishop sought a legal injunction against the gallery displaying the
image, on the grounds that it was blasphemous, indecent and obscene at law.
38
Negotiating the Sacred II
According to Anthony Fisher and Hayden Ramsey, the Archbishop’s action was
supported by the leaders of other Christian churches, as well as the Jewish and
Muslim communities.5
Justice Harper of the Supreme Court of Victoria commented in his refusal of
the application for the injunction that the photograph ‘of itself’ might be seen
as ‘inoffensive’,6  on the grounds that it was beautiful, and showed the crucified
Christ in a golden light; the knowledge that the image was created by immersing
a crucifix in urine is clearly connected to sacrilege. Sacrilege is the violation of
sacred things, and blasphemy, according to Fisher and Ramsey, may be defined
as speaking against God or the sacred or ridiculing things consecrated to God
or held sacred.7  However, as Fisher and Ramsey point out: ‘most sacrileges do
imply blasphemy in the narrower sense of ridiculing the sacred’.8 Yet, it might
be argued, a plastic crucifix is not a sacred object, at least in any legalist
theological sense. A plastic crucifix has not been dedicated or consecrated, or,
as is done with church bells, baptised. But a plastic crucifix is a symbol; it
represents the sacred. Hence, we should not think that there is a clear distinction
between the use of an object, and the use of a symbol.
However, these ‘innocuous’ cases do not appear to be cases of blasphemy,
because there does not seem to be any involvement of a deliberate offence.
Deliberate offence, that is, intentional offence, is intrinsic to some definitions of
blasphemy. For instance, Roy Perret defines blasphemy as ‘an illocutionary act
which is a function of the agent’s complex intention. In the case of a blasphemous
speech act, the speaker intends that the hearer should come to believe something
through the recognition of the speaker’s intention that the hearer do this’.9
Perret supports this intentional interpretation of blasphemy as theologically
correct with a quotation from Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologica:
…a man failing to advert to the blasphemous nature of his words, and
this may happen through his being moved suddenly by his passion so
as to break out into words suggested by his imagination, without heeding
to the meaning of the words: this is a venial sin, and is not blasphemy
so called. (Summa Theologica II,ii,13)
This definition suggests that neither kind of case I mentioned, of the display of
the Zuni war gods or of the use of the icon, could be considered cases of
blasphemy. Neither obviously involves the intention to offend, or a propositional
content that the speaker intended the hearer to come to believe.
The Piss Christ example is much more clearly a case of blasphemy than the
cases I described in the introduction to my chapter because it appears to involve
intention. It is also interesting that apologists for Serrano, and Serrano himself,
appealed to the artist’s intention in order to argue that it was not blasphemous.
Fisher and Ramsay reported that, as the scandal progressed, the artist repudiated
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his earlier claim that his art is simply colourful and deliberately shocking, and
asserted that, instead of intending to scandalise, ‘his goal all along had been to
increase the devotion of his fellow Christians by helping them identify better
with Christ in his pain, suffering an humiliation’.10
In contrast to the definition of blasphemy in terms of intentional offence,
Frank J. Hoffman understands blasphemy to be a family of concepts that may
be explicated by determining what the religious points are in each case, and
determining what social practices exist for homage and desecration in each
case.11  Hoffman’s culturally relative account is consistent with Fisher and
Ramsay’s position that objects symbolising mysteries ‘can only be understood
in the context of the religious culture and history of practice from which they
emerge’.12  Hoffman argues, against Perret, that there is no single perspective
from which to define blasphemy. He points out that blasphemy, like obscenity,
is often dependent partly on the attitude of the hearer or recipient. He illustrates
this point with an ‘amusing’ story:
Suppose, for example, that there is a pet parrot who is capable of uttering
a perverse litany impugning the religious focal points of the ‘great
religions’ of the world. Now, just as the parrot has completed impugning
the God of Christianity along with the rest, Aunt Millie, being a
frightfully devout (and easily scandalised) Christian lady, indignantly
rushes in from the kitchen with the carving knife, ready to lop off the
poor parrot’s head. Feathers fly, and in the wink of an eye, the badly
mangled parrot has sung his (black) swan-song. Aunt Millie is unlikely
to be repentant at the thought that the parrot did not intend to
blaspheme.13
Despite this unpleasant picture of the people who make claims that something
is blasphemous as the kind of people who would kill parrots, it does seem
arbitrary to insist on a strictly intentional definition of blasphemy, supported
by an appeal to religious authority. Given that we are dealing with a phenomenon
of offence that has broad agreement across different religions, and is of concern
in relation to political issues such as how we should relate to other people’s
religious beliefs in a multicultural society, we require a less culturally specific,
and less religiously specific, definition than the intentional account given by
Perret.
But even if intention should not appear as part of the definition of blasphemy,
Aunt Millie’s lack of appreciation of the parrot’s lack of intent is also significant.
If intention matters, it may not be the case that it defines whether something was
blasphemous, but the level of culpability. We might appeal to the doctrine of
double effect: it might be thought that the blasphemy might be permissible, or
at least more acceptable, if the blasphemy is the ‘unintended side effect’ of a
good intention, such as the liberation of mixed up human beings from the tyranny
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of apostles of purity, or the education of the general population of the suffering
of Christ. In suggesting this use of the doctrine of double effect, I suggest that
intention may play a different role from that argued by Perret. Rather than a
definition of the act, intention may play a role in our understanding of the moral
significance of the act. Similarly, while thinking killing someone is wrong prima
facie, we distinguish between different acts on the basis of the killer’s intention.
For instance, we distinguish between calculated murder, crimes of passion,
manslaughter, reckless disregard of other people’s safety, killing in war, and
justifiable self defence. These distinctions rely at least in part on the intentions
of the killer. Similarly, in cases of blasphemy, we may refer to cases where we
think it justified (such as the exposure of hypocrisy in the Church, or the
exploration of sincere, but heretical, belief) and ‘gratuitous’ acts of offensive
behaviour.14
Fisher and Ramsay appear to agree with Hoffman that the cultural context
within which the objects are created provides conventional and appropriate
responses for how artists may depict certain images, and for what may count as
blasphemy. Their argument that Serrano’s Piss Christ is unacceptable depends
on a conventional account of what it means to immerse a crucifix in urine. It
‘can only be a profanation according to the standards of the culture and religion
of which it is an artefact, and photographing it and displaying such a deed can
only be a blasphemy in that culture’.15
This may be made as a stronger, universal claim about defilement. In her
classic text Purity and Danger, Mary Douglas makes some general, and widely
accepted as important, observations about the nature of defilement and its relation
to the manner in which we comprehend the world, and organise our societies.16
However, the attempt to maintain purity and to avoid defilement should not be
seen as a desire that is necessarily totalitarian or fundamentalist. It is something
that is part of everyday consciousness. Dirt, she claims, is matter out of place.
The coffee in my cup is clean, but if I spill it on clothes, I am dirty. According
to Douglas, ‘dirt is essentially disorder…Eliminating it is not a negative
movement, but a positive effort to organise the environment’.17  And she claims
that this is not only true of Western secular societies:
If this is so with our separating, tidying and purifying, we should
interpret primitive purification and prophylaxis in the same light…rituals
of purity and impurity create unity in experience. So far from being
aberrations from the central project of religion, they are positive
contributions to atonement. By their means, symbolic patterns are worked
out and publicly displayed. Within these patterns disparate elements
are related and disparate experience is given meaning.18
According to Douglas, the categorisation of purity and danger is a major
structuring organisation of our society — representing social hierarchy,
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differentiating between groups within and between societies and cultures, but
also of structuring our relationship with other people in our societies — and
extends beyond human life to the order of the cosmos. We fit into a broader
pattern of relationships. Keeping the purity rules therefore maintains a pattern
or order to the world. If Douglas is correct, the concept of defilement and purity
will be central to all societies, as well as all religions.
In summary, it appears that blasphemy is connected to sacrilege, as what we
do with objects, and how we represent them may both involve defilement. The
idea of defilement is cross-cultural, and not merely associated with fundamentalist
or totalitarian religions. Our intentions do not define whether something is
blasphemous, as what counts as the defilement of an object or symbol is
dependent on socially agreed norms. It is still not clear, however, that the
Madonna and piano accordion is an act of defilement, or that the display of a
Zuni god is an example of such contempt. This is what makes them such
interesting cases. There is nothing clearly offensive about them. In order to
explore what is wrong with such acts, or at least what is perceived to be wrong
about such acts, I explore the cognitive content involved in recognising certain
kinds of symbols.
Rules of depiction and the order of the world
The connection between how we may represent a symbol, and how we should
respond to one, are linked in Christian tradition. To explain this connection, let
me first address the depiction of Mary, and how she may be depicted in icons.
Then let me turn to how she is used within religious worship.
Mary holds a special place within Greek Orthodox worship. She was
Theotokos. The title, Theotokos, does not simply mean ‘Mother of God’, but more
precisely ‘the one who gave birth to the One who is God’.19  According to John
of Damascus, ‘The name [Theotokos] in truth signifies the one subsistence and
the two natures and the modes of generation of our Lord Jesus Christ’.20  As
‘the one who gave birth to the One who is God’, she is represented not only as
human, but also as divine.21 Within the Western Church, Mary was not
considered divine, but as being conferred a special grace by God: she was free
from original sin.22
As Theotokos, Mary, as well as her icon, was the legitimate subject of Orthodox
veneration, but under challenge from iconoclasts, the nature of this veneration
needed clarification. Because of her status, Mary has a special place in the
distinction between the adoration, latreia, which was reserved for God, and
reverence, douleia. Thomas Aquinas thought this distinction did not do full
justice to the special position of the Theotokos: she was less than God, but more
than an ordinary human being and more than any saint; therefore, she was not
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entitled to lateria, but she was entitled to more than dulia. She was entitled to
hyerdulia. 23
While many contemporary artists may consider the signifier as distinct from
the signified, that is, the mental concept may be considered distinct from the
material aspect in which it is represented, no similar distinction is made in
relation to icons in the Orthodox tradition. Within the Orthodox tradition, the
arbitrary nature of the relationship between icon as a symbol and what it
represents is denied. In the icon, the image and the idea are inseparable.24
George Galavaris writes,
Based on Neo-Platonic theories, the icon is thought basically a mystery,
a vehicle for divine power and grace, a means of God’s knowledge. It is
not merely a symbol of the archetype, but the represented becomes
present through the icon. The Council of Nicea of 787 declared that at
the adoration of the icon of Christ the faithful should say, ‘this is Christ
the Son of God’…The icon participates in the holiness of the
represented.25
Accordingly, the honour displayed to the icon is not directed toward the material
object, but to what it represents. It seems that by exploring Platonic ideas we
might understand one way in which an image may be understood as a means of
spiritual knowledge, and how an image may be considered to participate in a
supernatural world.
Plato’s understanding of art rests on idealistic assumptions that are first
outlined by the Pythagoreans. According to Liberato Santoro-Brienza, for the
Pythagoreans, art is a ‘therapy of the soul and the body, as a path to attunement
with the secret harmony of the universe, and as a key to decode the order of
reality’.26 The Pythagoreans believed that the entire universe is ruled by
mathematical laws and the connection between the cosmic order, numerical
proportions and musical harmony provided a conception of beauty in terms of
order, measure, proportion and harmony.27  Similarly, for Plato, the ground of
reality is presupposed by any human activity, and guides artistic activity.
Empirical reality is a copy of the true reality that is constituted by perfect forms,
and the artist imitates empirical reality.28  It follows from this that the arts are
inevitably deceptive, as they are twice removed from reality, yet the artist may
also be elevated, by inspiration, into the realms of divine harmony.29
Philosophers of the Middle Ages developed and elaborated on Greek
philosophy, but abandoned the Platonic assumption that art is fundamentally
mimetic of empirical reality. Plotinus wrote: ‘The arts do not simply copy visible
objects, but reach out to principles of nature; the arts provide much themselves,
for they can add where there is deficiency; they can do so since in themselves
they possess beauty’.30  Art, on this understanding, is superior to nature. God
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was thought of as the supreme artist: the whole cosmos is a work of art, and the
artist was conceived of as a kind of creator, emulating God’s activity. The artist’s
task was to transform matter into form, and nature into spirit: it was the
spiritualisation of matter.31 The arts, therefore, have a cognitive, rather than
expressive, character; they involve the recognition and recreation of divine
order, and art works also enable others to understand the world, as artists
produce tokens and symbols of divine perfection.32
From this discussion of Medieval conceptions of beauty, Santoro-Brienza
reconstructs a picture of what is involved in the experience of beautiful things:
In the presence of beauty, our senses perceive sensory properties that
stimulate and gratify the sensory functions. Furthermore, in their
immediate apprehension of physical properties, the sensory experiences
lead to an intellectual insight into the structure, order, and form of the
object, so that the intellect is, in turn, stimulated and gratified by an
intuitive grasp of the form… In the harmonious correspondence of the
object to all our faculties and, in turn, all our faculties to the object, our
senses, intellect, our will are satisfied and result in a condition of
delight…The aesthetic experience is, in other words, a harmonious and
unifying experience of immediate and intuitive fusion in which subject
and object cannot be separated and distinguished. That experience is
akin to the experience of love, both physical and spiritual, and of deep
reflection, prayer, and the anticipated beatific vision.33
In the experience of an image, therefore, we may participate in the nature of the
universe and experience unity with it.
In Medieval thought, everything participates, in various degrees, with the
perfection of being and, because of this, the different entities share a fundamental
trait or a kind of unity. Santoro-Brienza states: ‘It is in the light of this principle
that we fully understand the Medieval preoccupation with symbolism in general
and the conviction that everything is linked to everything else…being in general
is one, true good.’34  However, the Platonic idea that the arts could be deceptive,
and fail in this task of spiritualising matter, remained important. Augustine
argued that works of art must be partially false insofar as they are the result of
imaginative fiction.35 There is a dual moral aspect to artistic production. Beauty
may align the will and the intellect in desire for and recognition of the form,
but it may also mislead. Symbols, therefore, must be reproduced correctly, as
they have a devotional purpose.
Within the Greek Orthodox tradition, the liturgical arts are one of the ways
in which man becomes divine by grace, and the icon is one of these arts. The
prototype of the image belongs to the corrupt world, but its transcendental
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quality can be expressed by the fixation of the type from all that is ephemeral.
‘This’, Galavaris states,
is why icons cannot be painted according to the imagination of the artists
or a living model. The relationship between the prototype and the image
would have been lost. For this reason the icon-painter uses
manuals…which describe the iconographic scenes and colours to be
used. But the use of manuals alone does not guarantee the painting of
the sacred image. The painter must himself be “illuminated”.36
In the Painter’s Manual, Dionysius of Fourna tells his pupils that they must not
‘carry out this work haphazardly, but with the fear of God and with the
veneration due to a sacred task’.37 The technical skill is only part of this task,
as the icon painter is engaged in a work that externalises spiritual reality. The
true iconographer is engaged in a work of prayer, so that what he creates stems
both from holy tradition and the artist’s own experience of the work of grace.38
The painting of an icon, therefore, may be seen as a form of meditation, and
the manifestation of ‘the other’ that that subject ‘participates in’, or makes
manifest. Its contemplation is a means of revelation, and provides a means for
an audience to engage with this other. The icon used for the poster of the
Adelaide Arts Festival is obviously of Mary. I believe that one may safely assume
that the painter of the Madonna with a piano accordion was not using a manual.
Moreover, I assume that the painter of the Madonna with a piano accordion was
not illuminated, let alone offering each stroke of the brush in prayer. The
Madonna is out of context — the syntax of the painting is wrong. She is
generalised, a symbol of a religious art form among other symbols of religious
art. She does not require veneration; she is one among many religious figures.
Given this context, we may understand why this image may be considered to
be connected to blasphemy, as blasphemy is connected to honour due to the
divine or sacred, and the poster subverts or misrepresents what the Greek
Orthodox Church takes to be the nature of the icon, and of Mary.
But can we, through this discussion, also understand a religious tradition
that is alien to us, such as the Zuni reaction to the display of their war god?
There are obvious, and serious, difficulties. One is that the entire Platonic
tradition of associating beauty and art is dissimilar to many indigenous
conceptions of beauty, and the role of beauty in the production of indigenous
artefacts. The anthropological evidence from other cultures, and common sense,
should stop us from generalising across cultures on the role of aesthetic
experience here.
Yet there are some aspects of many indigenous claims and Platonic thought
about the metaphysical nature of representations that appear to be similar. One
is the association of the object with what it represents in such a way that it makes
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little sense to say that something is ‘a representation’. For instance, I have heard
it said that when Maori see images of the ancestors, they do not view or respond
to the image as a representation, but respond to the image by greeting the
ancestors. The idea that the image and what is represented, or the concept and
image, cannot be separated appears to be common to many indigenous concepts
of religious objects and to Orthodox understandings of icons. I do not mean to
imply that Greek Orthodox metaphysics of symbols are the same as indigenous
ones (the Eastern metaphysics of icons is not even the same as the metaphysics
of the Western Christian church); rather, my point is that the Orthodox and
some indigenous metaphysics of symbols may be contrasted to an understanding
of a symbol as a ‘mere’ symbol. Another aspect of this similarity that appears
highly significant in the current discussion is the normative aspects of behaviour
that follow from the metaphysical aspects of the symbol, as religious traditions
involve norms about how an object may be treated, as well as how it may be
produced.
There are norms of behaviour for relating to religious objects, and these
norms express the relationship we have with them. For instance, the icon does
not merely represent Mary; the image and the idea are considered inseparable.
Because of this metaphysical relationship, the honour that is due to the icon is
hyerdulia. The acknowledgment within a ritual or religious context is physical.
A priest may kiss the icon in recognition. People light candles to the Virgin,
cross themselves and genuflect. Similarly, there are norms of remorse in response
to blasphemy: the tearing and rending of garments.39  Again we find there are
norms of responses to indigenous religious objects. The Maori may greet certain
objects. Other objects, such as the false face masks of the Iroquios, should not
be viewed except within certain contexts.
The norms of acknowledgment are not empty gestures, but are elements of
cognition and classification. Nelson Goodman calls these gestures labels. He
writes: ‘Nods of agreement or dissent, salutes, bows, pointings, serve as labels…
The same is true of such activities in response to music as foot- and
finger-tappings, head-boppings, and various other motions. That these are called
forth by the music, while the conductor’s gestures call it forth, does not affect
their status as labels; for labels may be used to record or to prescribe —
“strawberry”, “raspberry”, “lemon”, and “lime” may tell us what is in or what
to put in the several containers.’40 The significance of our responses to music,
Goodman thinks, is their role in analysing, organising and registering what we
hear.41
This relationship between action and concept formation is also held by
philosophers who are opposed to a rationalistic understanding of language. D.
Z. Phillips draws this point out in his discussion of Wittgenstein and religious
observance. I will come back to a discussion of religious observance shortly; for
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the present I wish to focus on the connection between action and categorisation.
According to Wittgenstein, religion is a language game, and its basis is not in
conceptual understanding but in our responses to certain symbols and sensory
experiences. For Wittgenstein, ‘primitive reactions’, that is, our reactions to
pain, colours or sounds, are fundamental to language development. The reactions
of jumping with fright, calling colours light or dark or sounds loud or soft,
crying out in pain or expressing shock at the pain of others are fundamental to
the development of concepts. Wittgenstein wrote: ‘The origin and the primitive
form of the language-game is a reaction; only from this can the more complicated
forms grow. Language…is a refinement; “in the beginning was the deed”.42
Douglas’s account of dirt avoidance similarly links sensory impression and
the recognition of categories that are expressed in labelling gestures, and explains
the process by which those categories are developed and are involved in the
recognition of value. Douglas states: ‘perceiving is not a matter of passively
allowing an organ — say of sight or hearing — to receive a ready-made
impression from without…As perceivers we select from all the stimuli falling
on our senses only those which interest us, and our interests are governed by a
pattern-making tendency, sometimes called schema…’.43 These schemas are
learned, first as response, and then named. These names act as labels. Douglas
writes: ‘Their names then affect the way [sensory impressions] are perceived
next time: once labelled they are more speedily slotted into pigeon-holes in
future.’44  Dirt provides an example of how these categories are ordered into a
normative pattern of schema. Dirt is a residual category, that which is rejected
from our pattern or scheme of classifications — it is out of place.
There is a broader generalisation that may be drawn from these observations
that actions are cognitive labels. If actions are cognitive labels, then in making
certain physical responses to religious images we are classifying or categorising
them. But in failing to respond, we may be failing to categorise or to acknowledge
the honour that is due to something as well. Let me give you an example of a
non-religious, conventional response to emphasise this point about the
withholding of a gesture as a display of a lack of respect. After a musical
performance, it is conventionally accepted that clapping hands is an appropriate
form of acknowledgment of the performers’ skill. Withholding this gesture, or
clapping weakly, is a way of expressing dislike. For the performer, a lack of
applause must be devastating.
The difference between this kind of labelling of music and the conventional
ways in which we pay respect to something and the form of ritualistic response
that can be seen in acts of devotion, is that in acts of devotion we also recognise
a hierarchy of value and the relationship between the object and observer.
Ritualistic or normative responses are not merely the recognition and classification
of icons and other religious subjects; they acknowledge a relationship between
47
Madonna and piano accordion: Disrupting the order of the world
ourselves and what we have classified or recognised through the gesture, and
to withhold the gesture may be considered a form of disrespect, or a failure to
apprehend its meaning. The Zuni demand their war gods returned because they
should not be looked at. Clifford tells us that they are considered terrifying
images of great power; as is appropriate to an image of war. Moreover, we can
imagine that the properties used to present these gods exemplify the terror of
war. It is not surprising to find people averting their gaze at certain horrors, or
thinking it would be inappropriate to look upon certain things, such as the
horror of war, with the same disinterested appreciation with which they gaze
at art.
Even if gazing upon objects such as sacred masks was ‘an appropriate’
response, indigenous groups might well resent their display. The Grand Council
of Hodenosaunee for instance, has a policy of forbidding the display of medicine
masks that makes a connection between respect for the masks, and the well-being
of the community. The policy states:
The exhibition of masks by museums does not serve to enlighten the
public regarding the culture of Hodenesaunee, as such an exhibition
violates the intended purpose of the mask and contributes to the
desecration of the sacred image.45
A claim about the relationship between the ‘order’ of communities and the
treatment of the objects is made explicit. Ruth Phillips reports: ‘The statement
requests the return of masks to the ‘proper caretakers among the Hodenosaunee’
because ‘it is only through these actions that the traditional culture will remain
strong and peace be restored to our communities’.46
This involves a further element of these rules about how we represent, and
acknowledge images or objects that is important in respect to how we
comprehend what might be wrong with the failure to show respect, at least from
the believer’s perspective. This may concern the role of such acts in upholding
or maintaining the order of the universe. Douglas refers to this as a primitive
world view, but it might also be thought of in terms of God’s providence. This
perspective seems alien to contemporary, secular scholars, and is thought to be
based on mistaken beliefs about the metaphysical relationship between humans
and the world in which they live, and the nature of causation. However, as I
will argue in the next section, we need not accept either belief, and yet still
behave in certain ways that acknowledge respect for certain kinds of
representations.
The order of the universe
Douglas characterises what she calls ‘the primitive world view’ as a man-centred
universe: ‘A primitive world view looks out on a universe which is personal in
several different senses. Physical forces are thought of as interwoven with the
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lives of persons. Things are not completely distinguished from persons and
persons are not completely distinguished from their physical environment. The
universe…discerns the social order and intervenes to uphold it’.47 This is
because the transforming energy of the universe is ‘threaded onto the lives of
individuals so that nothing happens in the way of storms, sickness, blights or
droughts except in virtue of these personal links’.48 The universe is capable of
discerning disorder in social relations and social codes, such as whether partners
in sexual relationships are related within prohibited degrees, or whether a person
has murdered a fellow tribesman or a stranger, and an individual’s hidden
emotions.49 There is a connection between the individual and the world in terms
of an order in the world, but this order needs to be maintained. It requires
maintenance through the maintenance of purity rules, but also in terms of the
structure of relationships.
Such ideas are also found in the history of Western religious thought. We
find a similar pattern of thought expressed in the speech Shakespeare gives
Ulysses in Troilus and Cressida. The order of the universe includes the orbits of
the planets to the season to the offices and custom of societies. When this becomes
unbalanced, and when things are not in their order, chaos and calamity follow.
What maintains the cosmic order for the Elizabethan is the recognition of degree
or value, and the maintenance of social order. Each person and thing has its
place, and its place must be recognised and acknowledged.50
It would be tempting for a non-believer to interpret the need to maintain
order as simply a false understanding of the nature of the universe and of the
causal relations in it. In particular, it might be thought, the causal understanding
of the relationship between failing to show respect to a symbol and social or
natural calamity is false. But, we need not think that a belief in a simple causal
relationship is at work here, and this may be the wrong way to understand the
nature of religious beliefs and gestures of acknowledgment.
Phillips thinks that we do not need to believe in the order of reality as a chain
of being, or to hold a particular metaphysical idea about pictures, to think we
would be concerned about doing certain things to images. He agrees with Searle
that one of the most powerful aspect’s of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty is its attack
on the philosophical tradition ‘according to which all our meaningful activities
must be the product of some inner theory…Wittgenstein points out that for a
great deal of our behaviour, we just do it’.51 The explanations should be
considered not to be theories explicitly held, but as means of explicating what
is believed after the act has taken place.
He supports this with an empirical experiment, inspired by the idea of ‘acting
out’ a wish suggested by H. O. Mounce.52  Mounce supposed that it would be
hard for almost anyone to comply with a request that they stick pins into the
eyes of a drawing of their mother; but supposing one did do it, and shortly after
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one’s mother developed an affliction in the eye and was in danger of going blind,
then it would be difficult to resist the feeling, if only momentarily, that there
was some connection between the two events. Phillips tested this by asking a
group of 40 students whether they would be prepared to stick pins in the eyes
of a drawing of their mother, and whether, if their mother developed an affliction
in the eye, they would feel guilt. Fifteen of the students said that they would
have no difficulty sticking a pin in the eye of the drawing, and if their mother
subsequently became ill, they would not feel guilt. Their explanation was that
‘it was only a picture’, and that there could be no causal connection between
the two events. The remaining students said that they would not stick pins in
the picture, but that if they did, they would feel guilt if their mother
subsequently developed an affliction of the eye. But, Phillips suggests, the
students who said this were not positing a causal connection when they said
they would feel there was a connection between the two events: ‘[What] they
meant was something like this: they felt that sticking pins in the picture reduces
serious possibilities to a game; it plays around with things. When the affliction
occurs, an internal relation between “playing around” and the event makes the
guilt understandable.’53  Phillips concludes from this that it is not the case that
the students would refuse to stick pins in a drawing of their mother as a
consequence of beliefs about the causal connections between the drawing and
the outcome, but that a primitive moral response occurs and that people, if asked
to reflect on their response, may reply this way.54
There must be some explanation of why most people would not stick pins
into an image of their mother. Douglas’s explanation of ‘the primitive world
view’ in terms of explicit beliefs about an order of the world that needs to be
maintained if chaos and misfortune are to be avoided is one way of understanding
this connection. But the explanation does not address why Phillips’s students
would not stick pins in the eyes of a picture of their mother. Moreover, if
Douglas’s account of this world view could cover all responses to blasphemy,
we would expect the primary response to blasphemy to be fear, rather than
offence or distress.
Yet the fact that most people, and it seems even people without religious
beliefs, would not stick pins into a drawing of their mother can be accounted
for in terms of what people hold dear to them, and the respect in which they
hold their mothers. This is consistent with Douglas’s broader claim about the
association between sensory impressions, schema, and values, and Goodman’s
general claims about our responses being a part of the process of cognition. In
recognising something to be an image of ‘our mother’, we classify such images
under a general concept that determines our relationship to it.
An icon of the Virgin Mary may similarly be treated with respect, simply
because she is held dear. Non-religious people should not consider such
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sentiments to be alien to them. When a non-religious person tears up a
photograph of a person they once loved, their act is one of anger and disrespect;
when they refuse to stick pins in the eyes of an image of their mother, or would
feel momentary guilt if something later happened to their mother, they also are
refusing to treat images as ‘mere pictures’. Similarly, we may turn away from
representations of war in horror, even if we know they are fictional. Our
responses to the image may be understood as recognition of the meaning or
content of the image, its value, and an expression of our relationship with it.
Blasphemy and homage
My interest in this chapter has been to attempt to gain some kind of insight into
what is ‘wrong’ with the seemingly innocent acts of depicting images without
following the rules of their depiction, as in the image of a Madonna with a piano
accordion, and of viewing depictions of gods and indigenous sacred objects
within a museum context. I have attempted to provide as sympathetic account
of these claims and of the religious symbols involved as possible. Because I am
an atheist, I have not been concerned with an assessment of the truth or adequacy
of these ideas, but with their explication, in an attempt to understand a different
perspective. Nor has my objective been to provide a moral argument in support
of or against claims that these acts are actually wrong. My objective has been
to explore whether there is, as my initial intuition suggested, some similarity
between seemingly very different acts, and blasphemy.
My conclusion is that the claims that objects should not be displayed in
museums and that certain images are inappropriate are connected through the
idea that neither act displays an appropriate act of homage or respect to what is
represented by the object or symbol. This feature of homage is also central to
the concept of blasphemy, if blasphemy is defined as showing contempt for God
and religious matters through one’s words, thoughts and actions. There is, of
course, a difference between the acts of showing contempt of other people’s
beliefs or of particular beliefs and values, as may occur in intentional blasphemy,
withholding acknowledgment (for example, refusing to applaud a performance),
and failing to acknowledge because you do not ‘understand’ what something
is. In this third case, absolutely ‘nothing goes on’ in our heads when we do not
genuflect or acknowledge a religious meaning. There is no cognitive process.
Just as a parrot may blaspheme without intent, a person may blaspheme without
any recognition of value. Just as there are people who would kill a parrot for
blaspheming, there are people who would stick pins into the image of their
mother, and who cannot understand the perspective of people who would refuse
to do this to an image of their mother. Their mistake is to treat images as ‘mere’
symbols.
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This chapter illustrates the shifting meanings of sacred/religious objects, in
particular the recent phenomenon of sacred/religious into fine art commodities.
This process, however, may lead to concerns about the new ways in which
religious objects are valued. It is often suggested that this process of secularisation
and commodification is a failure to respect the people who created it, and in
some way presents a harm to the object itself.
According to the Oxford definition, the sacred belongs to the consecrated
and the religious; to dedicated objects or purpose; and, objects or persons
affiliated with a deity/god or venerated as holy.1 The aim of this chapter is to
reflect on what has made an object sacred in the past, and perhaps discover a
basis to explain what makes an object sacred in today’s predominantly secular
world. I have selected two religious paintings. Both mark crucial transformative
events. One is drawn from Christianity, the Last Supper by Leonardo da Vinci.
The other is a Tibetan Buddhist thangka (painting) of Buddha Shakyamuni. 2  I
have chosen these two images to juxtapose their sacredness and how they have
changed, been re-written or appropriated over time. They are also well-known
representations, requiring no introduction.3  Numerous copies and similar
illustrations are on exhibit in art museums and decorate private homes.
I argue that the meaning and value of religious objects is not rigid, but is
fluid and open to modification or re-writing, irrespective of governing norms.
Both the Last Supper and Buddha Shakyamuni paintings originated within a
religious context but have since been appropriated into the Western fine art
scene.4  At the same time as the meaning and value of objects is re-written,
however, I argue that the museum context provides a reverential context for
their appreciation. These objects have been formed and shaped from physical
materials, yet appear to be invested with another ‘meta’-materiality. This
something is beyond the tactility of pigment, cloth, wood or bronze. It reaches




Leonardo da Vinci began the Last Supper in 1495, on the refectory wall of the
Sta Maria della Grazie, a Dominican convent in Milan. Leonardo’s innovation
was capturing the moment when Jesus announces that someone at the table will
betray him this night.5 The revelatory moment is realistically portrayed by
Leonardo, capturing a wave of emotions — such as surprise, angst, anger, sorrow,
and denial. It took Leonardo twelve years to complete this masterpiece, which
has since been continuously restored and reproduced. The Buddha Shakyamuni
thangka is estimated to have been painted between 1050 and 1100. In this
painting, the Buddha’s right hand is touching the earth, calling the earth to bear
witness to his enlightenment.6 Shakyamuni is attended by two standing
bodhisattvas, the bodhisattva of compassion, Avalokitesvara, and the future
Buddha, Maitreya.7 There are two seated monks above the bodhisattvas. On
the top row stand seven past-Buddhas and another version of Maitreya. The
five dhyana or directional Buddhas sit along the bottom.8 This was a significant
painting when it was executed and today is a highly prized item within a private
Western collection.
Both paintings were commissioned. Ludovico il Moro, Duke of Milan,
employed Leonardo to paint, sculpt and design various works, the Last Supper
among them. We know the thangka was commissioned because these details are
written in red Tibetan dbu med script on the back.9 The name of the donor is
not recorded. The Last Supper is large, 460 by 880 cm, and was painted directly
onto a wall. The thangka is 47 by 32 centimetres and was painted on cloth, with
supporting textile mountings and dowel rods at both ends. This construction
permitted it to be rolled up and transported or stored.
The themes in the two paintings were not unusual. The Last Supper was
created as a fresco in the dining room of a convent. The painting depicts a supper
in progress — breaking bread, sharing olives and wine — an everyday practice.
On a religious level, it is at this supper that Jesus initiates his disciples into the
Christian ritual practice of the Holy Eucharist — the consecration of bread and
wine into body and blood.10 The thangka, on the other hand, was a stupa
furnishing for the eleventh century Tibetan lama and translator Gos Lotsava.11
A stupa is an architectural hollow bell-shaped vessel in which are placed highly
valued items considered worthy to be remembrance offerings.12 These offerings
are not travelling companions on an afterlife journey such as is the Egyptian
practice, but sacred objects offered in appreciation of the person now departed.
Even though both these were conceived for religious spaces and depict religious
scenes, only the Tibetan painting was consecrated. A lama ritually opens-the-eyes
of a thangka by painting them in, thereby transforming it from a representation
into a potent living deity.13  I have not found a reference to the Last Supper
being consecrated.
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Sacred meaning
Research on the sacred is hampered by the ‘injudicious’ use of the term ‘sacred’,
which is too often conflated with the term ‘religious’. Peter Fingesten states
categorically that ‘religious’ and ‘sacred’ art are ‘neither synonymous nor
interchangeable…[and] these terms should be applied henceforth with greatest
discrimination in order to avoid confusion’.14  Fingesten defined ‘sacred’ art as
objects and symbols, which conformed to religious law and were consecrated
by prayers, rites or rituals. This would include altars, vessels, vestments,
architecture, sculpture and paintings, whereas, ‘religious’ art is produced outside
of religious restrictions.15  Such a definition would mean that the thangka would
be categorised as sacred art, because it was not only consecrated but executed
according to religious conventions. The Last Supper, however, would be
designated religious art, because it was Leonardo’s expression, he constructed
the scene and the actors’ reactions. It was not a reproduction of an officially
sanctioned painting, rather, Leonardo used everyday practice as his inspiration.
The thangka is not simply an idol but enjoys a status equivalent to Greek or
Russian Orthodox icons.16 They are sacred manifestations. According to Jackson
and Jackson, thangkas were a crucial medium by which the ‘ideals of Buddhism
were evoked and brought alive. A sacred painting was for the Tibetan a physical
support — in other words an embodiment — of enlightenment’. They also note
that the simple Buddha Shakyamuni image was commonly commissioned for
accumulating merit towards spiritual advancement.17
Wandering Buddhist teachers made use of the portability of thangkas to
illustrate and inculcate religious messages for the nomadic illiterate population.18
The pictures told familiar stories, in the same manner as the stained glass
windows, paintings and sculptures of the Christian church. The wrath of God
unleashed upon the fallen sinner or the innocence of a lamb protected by the
shepherd was silently impressed upon a significantly illiterate population. They
were visual reminders of how to conduct their lives properly, under the
omnipresence of an all-seeing God. The angelic forms of heaven and the horrors
of purgatory were all pictured — graphic reminders that life’s actions were
judged at death.
Both paintings, therefore, had a specific religious purpose, and it might be
argued that this purpose ‘fixes’ the meaning or significance of the object, in
contrast to the meaning or significance it has as fine art, in which it is considered
primarily as an object with aesthetic and historical value, but also,
problematically, a commodity to be bought and sold. Yet, we find such objects





While the depth of understanding of the spiritual world represented by a thangka
or the church windows may have differed between the illiterate and the
aristocracy, the elite also used their access to resources to highlight their higher
spiritual position and access to the sacred. For example, in Florence during the
1400s it was common practice for churches to sell altar naming rights. Prominent
families would engage prestigious artists to create new altars or altar pieces. Nor
was it necessary for a client to commission an artist. Open market stalls sold
sculptures, paintings and elaborate wooden altars. Contemporary sources of the
day describe these objects as fine art — beautiful but expensive. This ready-made
market also catered for bulk purchases, evidenced by the payment of import
duties for 30 statues of Madonna entering Rome in 1450.19
At the time the Last Supper was being painted there were Christian authorities
who were condemning painterly extravagance because they claimed the
worshipper was being distracted by the skills of the artist.20  In 1494 Girolamo
Savonarola decries the contemporary painterly figures in churches. In his words,
they ‘are with such artifice, adornment and virtuosity that they block the light
of God and true contemplation; people do not consider God, but only the artifice
of the figures’.21 The unpretentious images spelt out their message by repeating
familiar iconography, symbols and colour systems, which the uneducated
understood. In contrast, many popular artists of the Renaissance wanted to
display their skills and their patrons wanted to sponsor art as a display of their
power, wealth and prestige.22  For example, Leonardo painted the il Moro family
crest above the Last Supper, to remind the religious fraternity of the wealth and
beneficence of the il Moro family. Likewise, as already noted, a common purpose
for commissioning a thangka was to gain merit. Quite often the donor was
represented as a small figure sitting respectfully in the lower right hand corner.23
The needs of the wealthy and supplicants created a demand for images of Jesus
and Shakyamuni respectively.
Arthur Danto notes that art is constantly validated and revaluated by its
activity in the marketplace, either as an original or as a copy.24  Public
presentation and discourse, whether exhibitions, catalogues, advertisements or
tourist souvenirs, such as posters and postcards, negotiates a consensual view
of an objects’ fitness to be recognised and appreciated as art. This process of
reproduction fuels the desire for art as a collector’s item and commodity. Put
crudely, the greater the recognition/reputation, the greater the desire to own.25
The reproduction of images also contributes to a process in which the object is
considered of value in itself, and the image becomes recognised and adapted in
other images.
While access to the Last Supper remains restricted, Andre Malraux notes that
its readily available reproductions has ensured that it is entered into our own
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personal lexicon, even though we may never visit Milan to see the original.26
Any member of today’s general public would be able to recall many images that
they have never set eyes on. The profusion of printed material, television,
computers and other technological advances has expanded public access to visual
images. With sufficient fame, the image becomes ‘iconic’.
In the same fashion as the image of Sakyamuni has become essentialised as
the historic Buddha, the depiction of the Last Supper by Leonardo is accepted
as the authoritative depiction of that Biblical event. However, the recent clean
and repair by restoration artist Pinin Brambilla Barcilon highlights questions
about the authenticity of the Last Supper as we know it today. Just two
generations after the Last Supper was completed, it was declared that the painting
was already ruined and in need of repainting.27  In 1652 a doorway had been
cut into the centre of the Last Supper wall, destroying part of the lower portion,
which included Jesus’ feet. Thankfully, the early popularity of the painting had
spawned copies and they were used as models for later restorations.
There has been a constant reproduction over centuries. Today’s artists have
used the Last Supper to incorporate new socio-political configurations, such as
race and gender. Such uses may be controversial. Recently, the Last Supper was
used as a template for a fashion advertisement. It caused an outcry in France
and Italy, where it was first released and was subsequently banned. A French
judge ruled that the display was a ‘gratuitous and aggressive act of intrusion in
people’s innermost belief’. The posters were ordered down. The prosecuting
lawyer stated ‘when you touch on sacred things you create an unbearable moral
violence which is a danger to our children’. In response, the defence argued that
‘the work is a photograph based on a painting, not the bible…It is a way of
showing the place of women in society today, which is a reflection of our
changing values’.28
Christina Toren, reports on the appropriation of Leonardo’s Last Supper by
the Fijians.29  She notes that Jesus and his twelve apostles, as illustrated in the
Last Supper, represent the same traditional social spacing as the Fijian chiefs.
Both parties sit above the general public. Both parties share a ritual repast.30
With the introduction of Christianity, the Last Supper has opened a space by
which the sacredness and authority of the ancestors through the hereditary
chiefs remains potent. Many carpet reproductions of the Last Supper hang in
Fijian churches. They were brought back from Lebanon by young Fijian
servicemen serving under the United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon. The
fact that the carpet is contemporary and is a product from the Holy Lands




The sacralisation of the aesthetic gaze
The availability of reproductions of the Last Supper has made it ‘portable’ and,
as such, it has crossed cultural borders. The portability of thangkas guaranteed
that they could be easily stored rather than destroyed. Further, because thangkas
were consecrated, their disposal could only be by ritualised burning.32  Plainly,
the thangka of Buddha Shakyamuni has suffered sacrilege in the sense that it
must have been looted from the stupa in which it was originally deposited. The
looting may have been by rival monastery centuries ago, or a fortune seeker
yesterday. Since then, the thangka has crossed national boundaries and has
become a possession in a Western art collection.
Unlike the familiar sacredness of Christian imagery it has taken the West
some time to become familiar with Tibetan art and to understand its sacred
nature. Tibetan images reflected Catholic missionary thought and were considered
the Devil’s idols. In 1676, the first Western traveller to Lhasa, Jesuit Father
Grueber wrote ‘that our Religion had been here to fore profeffed in this place’.
But the Devil ‘hath had the malice to transfer and usurp all the other mysteries
of our faith to his own worship’.33  Missionaries were still promoting this concept
into the early twentieth century. The 1903-04 British expedition into Tibet, led
by Major Younghusband witnessed over 400 official mule loads of objects leaving
Tibet (not including personal souvenirs).34  Many of the Tibetan objects were
settled behind glass vitrines in museums or in curio cabinets in private homes,
occasionally appearing in the market place or auction house. During the early
1900s, few Westerners would have thought of the thangkas as sacred.
The contemporary world market is preoccupied with age and worth, whether
it is the church, museum or collector valuing their material assets. Museums and
collectors show little interest in collecting modern thangkas by Tibetan Masters
no matter how traditional they may appear.35  Further, contemporary Tibetan
painters are not encouraged within their own communities to be innovative or
employ contemporary Western styles. This is not a case of potential sacrilege
but a political attempt by the diasporic Tibetan community to appear as the
authentic agents of the sacred wisdom of Tibet’s lost traditions.36  Jean-Hubert
Martin writes: ‘Religious art is valued when it is ancient, and there is general
recognition that it engendered humanity’s greatest masterpieces.’ He adds that
contemporary works are not thought of as authentic because ‘of the nostalgia
for a time before’.37 There is a sense in the Tibetan aesthetic art world that age
reflects the quality of sacredness.
However, the rarefying of Tibetan material culture by Western collecting
and exhibiting negotiates another performance space. The very nature of a
museum implies that objects have been detached from their original contexts.38
The thangka is re-imagined and re-written, not as an object of sacred worship
but as a fine art object precious to Western art tastes.39  According to Stephen
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Greenblatt, museum objects can be thought of not so much as material artifacts
but as visual memory, or memorial.40 The objects are then reduced to tokens
of immortality, the relics of a lost past or monuments to the frailty of cultures.41
In museums, fine art historians, expressing values concerning ‘art-for-art’s
sake’ set about coding the ‘real’ value of the object. In an interview, the veteran
Tibetan art curator, Pratapaditya Pal, speaks of the connection between economic
value and its aesthetic qualities. He states that ‘my primary goal is to establish
a yardstick for beauty in Himalayan art. After all, the price of an object is
generally determined by its aesthetic quality’.42  Ivan Gaskell comments that
the collecting emphasis on aesthetics and art history discourse has
decontextualised the objects, reducing them to collectibles. He states that such
discourse is a ‘very effective means of expunging the sacred qualities of
objects’.43  However, I contend that museums have not necessarily expunged
but add a new exterior gloss by relating to the object with Western values. The
cynic might consider this the addition of a purely economic value. The Tibetan
art on view in museums are curated as aesthetic masterpieces. Many of these
items are borrowed from private lenders and therefore are still in the marketplace.
As such, it could be said that Western collecting aesthetics has forged a new
Holy Trinity of ‘authenticated masterpiece’ equals ‘good investment’ equals
‘sacredness’.
We need not be this cynical. Museum ‘aesthetic’ values and the nature of
something as ‘sacred’ may not be incompatible. Ivan Gaskell also notes that
aesthetic qualities are often allied with the sacred. John Huntington is of the
same opinion when he writes: ‘The exceptional artworks gathered here reflect
the religious practices that lead to this compassionate, illuminated state of being,
as well as the myriad aesthetic expressions of its attainment.’44  Present day
museums exhibit to the general public a more acceptable version of the sacred
— non-threatening and non-religious.45 Yet, museums have continued the
church tradition of lighting the pilgrim’s path. Along the way, intensified
pin-spots of light in a subdued space announce the next masterpiece. By
presenting their artworks in an outer silence and under intensified light, the
museum removes sensory distractions, thereby intensifying sensorial experiences,
the precursor of sacred experiences.46  Art philosopher Karsten Harris writes:
‘Stepping into a museum or a concert hall we enter an aesthetic church, a sublime
and rather chilly necropolis, stretching back across time…What needs preserving
does so precisely because it has lost its place in our world and must therefore
be given a special place.’47
Prolific publishing of affordable books has opened the world of art to the
general public. The art historian can describe and interpret a painting for the
uninitiated, however, they cannot experience the painting for the viewer. All
artwork needs spectators to decipher and interpret meaning.48  Images need the
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human gaze to give them voice and pre-eminence over other artworks. The
power of the object is created and deployed by the gaze. As such, the image is
appropriated by the social operation of seeing.49  David Freedberg writes that
the power of images ‘cannot be thought of apart from the desires, needs,
projections, and learned expectations of their viewers’.50  David Morgan calls
this ‘the sacred gaze’. He stresses that the sacred gaze ‘designates the particular
configuration of ideas and attitudes, and customs that informs a religious act of
seeing as it occurs within a given cultural and historical setting’.51  He contends
that the sacred gaze is ruled by protocols that demand a particular performance
and response from the viewer. I would argue that it is only in the last 50 years
that the general public has learned to fix the Western constructed sacred gaze
onto Tibetan thangkas, whereas the Last Supper had long been fixed by the
sacred gaze. It was an important stop on the ‘Grand Tour’ of Europe.52
Conclusion
It is commonplace within some disciplines to suggest that changes of value and
meaning are ethically problematic. This is considered to be a particular problem
for sacred objects.
By juxtaposing the two paintings, I believe that I have been able to isolate
certain aspects of what makes manifest an object’s sacredness to audiences at
particular points in time and in specific contexts. Aspects such as religious
subject, physical setting such as a church or museum, painted by a master,
nostalgia, age, aesthetics and monetary values, all appear to have varying roles
in constructing, maintaining or denying an object’s sacredness. However, I still
believe that the essential ingredient still resides in the paintings themselves.
They appear to have the ability to bridge civilisations and mediate between
history and mutable traditions. The paintings condense multiple messages and
convey these to the senses in a way that language cannot.53 They appear to be
vehicles with the capacity to configure spiritual power.54 The Last Supper and
Buddha Shakyamuni reach out and materialise something greater than the physical
materials that went into making them; a resonance that has outlived their makers
and their original audiences; and a resonance that has overcome restorations,
reproduction and relocation. Today’s commodity-orientated world has enhanced
the power of these paintings by exposing them to even greater audiences. Buddha
Shakyamuni and the Last Supper rest in our museum-without-walls lexicon
categorised and stored as both sacred and valuable.
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Motivations for Artistic Blasphemy
The second section explores uses of ‘blasphemy’ against secular and religious
sacred symbols as forms of political protest, or as a force of liberation. ‘The
sacred’ may be understood as a hierarchical structure of symbols that constrain
thought through maintaining stereotypes and social systems of values. In this
sense, what is sacred may be understood in both secular or religious terms, and
its transgression as a means of undermining this hierarchy. This liberating force
is widely accepted by theorists. Herbert Marcuse hails art as a liberating
experience of ‘aesthetic sublimation’ that ‘removes the audience from immediate
engagement with reality’ and ‘subverts the institutionalization of instrumental
reason’.1  In his 1993 book, Blasphemy, David Lawton opines that blasphemy in
the arts is healthy because it ‘often registers the irruption of a new reading
community’2  and marks such a community’s rite of passage. The issue of
blasphemy normally arises in a community that is divided, and it generally arises
because the community is divided. The arts provide a transgressive context in
which artists can challenge established social structures and ideological agendas.
Even moderate voices, those less inclined to celebrate or condone all forms of
blasphemy seem prepared to accept this role.
Peter Arnds, a literary critic, examines some of the most influential books of
the twentieth century and their subversive use of blasphemy and sacrilege in
order to attack the serious official discourse of totalitarian governments and
preserve the spirit of democracy at times when it is threatened or even disappears.
His project hinges on the philosophical dichotomy between rationalism and
irrationalism, that pivotal conflict within modernity and its enfants terribles —
Nazism, Stalinism, and Colonialism. Grass’s The Tin Drum is an allegorical critique
of the Nazi ideology of race and eugenics. Grass’s most blasphemous scenes are
levied against the Church in Germany, specifically its silence during the Nazi
period. Bulgakov’s The Master and Margarita is a grotesque retelling of Christ’s
ascent to Golgotha and his execution, written during the dark era of the Stalinist
purges. To Arnds, it is a ‘novel about the evils of Stalin’s Russia and as such a
monument to the indestructibility of art’ which ‘revives what the Nazis had
tried to eradicate as degenerate’. Both novels parody God and install Satan as
the central figure. Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children is secular blasphemy — it
subverts the official view of Indian history as a success story, reinstalls ‘low’
culture over ‘high’ culture, and elevates the marginalised over those at the
centres of power. As in Grass’s novel, the subversion of an official discourse is
achieved specifically through the sacrilegious conflation of important historical
events with the banality of the protagonist’s private life and through a revival
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of myth and irrationalism suppressed by the new state, under Nehru’s politics
of secularisation. In Satanic Verses, Rushdie indulges in what Arnds calls ‘the
blasphemous mixing of religious icons’. The mixing of Islamic elements with
Hinduism earned Rushdie the ire of both communities, including a fatwa from
the former.
In the next chapter in this section, Fernandes-Dias explores the controversy
surrounding Les fees ont soif (1978), a play which is considered in the literary
and in the cultural paradigm as a prominent marker of the post Quiet Revolution
assertion of the feminine identity and the social rupture from religious dogmatism
in Québec. Les fees ont soif roused controversy and was banned because of its
polemical attacks on the Québécoise society, the Church, marriage as an
institution, the judiciary and its blasphemous depiction of the Holy Virgin. In
Fernandes-Dias’s essay, the theatrical stage becomes a transgressive space where
the Holy Virgin, the Housewife and the Whore can explore the oppressive
analogies in their exalted or banalised or denigrated roles and voice their profane
polemical attacks on the existing social hierarchy that has subjugated and stifled
them from being more than just their socially accorded functions.
The third chapter in this section reminds us that blasphemy need not be
considered an attack on religion, but can occur within a religious tradition with
the emergence of new interpretations. Carolyn D’Cruz and Glen D’Cruz argue
that the film The Temptation of Christ is not so much a critique of religion, as an
exploration of what it meant for God to give the world his son as a human.
Instead of emphasising the divine element of Christ, this film emphasises his
humanity. Here, blasphemy is devotional rather than antagonistic. The chapter
shows that a religion cannot be defined by its orthodoxy, and that orthodoxy
must always be partial. Blasphemy is the means by which religions evolve.
Endnotes
1  H. Marcuse, 1978, The Aesthetic Dimension, Boston: Beacon Press, p. 7.
2  David Lawton, 1993, Blasphemy, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, p. 139.
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5
Blasphemy and sacrilege in the novel
of magic realism: Grass, Bulgakov,
and Rushdie
Peter Arnds
Fortunately, at times in which the right to freedom of speech is threatened, there
are artists who remind us of that right. In the face of those telling us that we
ought to stand united behind our political leaders and who want to blacklist
unpatriotic academics, in the face of these, we ought to brandish certain books.
Books full of blasphemy and sacrilege reminding us that at times of political and
religious monologism, we need to hear conflicting voices in order to preserve
the spirit of liberalism. Mikhail Bakhtin’s theory of heteroglossia still enforces
this message. According to the Russian critic, in the comic modern novel,
heteroglossia is ‘parodic and aimed sharply and polemically at the official
languages of its given time’.1  Bakhtin challenges the tyranny of unitary
languages of regimes founded on religious, national, cultural, racial, or even
linguistic monologues. What are some of these liberal, liberating books that
make the principle of heteroglossia their own in order to subvert political and
religious monologism? To demonstrate how blasphemy and sacrilege are used
to attack secular and religious ideologies, this article will take a closer look at
three world-renowned authors and their texts: Grass’s The Tin Drum, Bulgakov’s
The Master and Margarita, and Salman Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children.
Grass
John Irving once called Grass’s The Tin Drum the greatest novel by a living
author. To this day, Grass’s book remains one of the most important works of
literature for the construction of postwar German identity. As a writer, Grass
traditionally sides with the oppressed, with society’s marginalised figures. His
novel is, among other things, a literary treatment of the Nazi ideology of race
and eugenics, resulting in the persecution of asocials as ‘life unworthy of life’,
their extermination in psychiatric institutions in the Third Reich, and their
marginalisation in the Adenauer period. Grass’s Tin Drum is the story of Oskar
Matzerath who refuses to grow up during the Nazi regime. Oskar literally stops
growing at the age of three and through his child-like actions of drumming and
screaming glass to pieces, protests against the adult world that surrounds him.
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After the war, he transforms from a child who does not want to grow into a
grotesquely deformed dwarf, whose hump is symbolic of Germany’s ugliness,
of the burden of history that Germany carries upon its shoulders. The Tin Drum
reflects all those paradigms of the carnival with its potential of blasphemy and
sacrilege that Bakhtin outlines in his monumental study Rabelais and his World.
All three authors, Grass, Rabelais, and Bakhtin, react through their works to the
oppressive regimes of their times, the rule of Charles V in Rabelais, Stalinist
Russia in Bakhtin, and the Third Reich in Grass. For Rabelais, Bakhtin, and Grass,
the spirit of carnival with its emphasis on the grotesque signifies the symbolic
destruction of authority and official culture and the assertion of popular renewal.
A fascinating parallel between Bakhtin and Grass, one that makes it impossible
to read The Tin Drum without thinking of the Russian critic, is that both writers
critique the official discourse of a regime that appropriates folk culture for its
oppressive politics and for rejecting and killing undesirable individuals. While
Bakhtin uses theory, the theory of blasphemy to attack Stalinism, Grass attacks
German conservatism more directly through fiction. While for obvious reasons,
the more muted criticism of Stalinism by people like Bakhtin and the Russian
novelist Mikhail Bulgakov was levelled entirely at the State, Grass’s most
blasphemous scenes are levelled against the Church in Germany, specifically
against its silence during the Nazi period.
The difference between aboriginal peoples and pagan societies, which manage
to wed the forces of chaos with the forces of order, and Christianity, which
started separating these two principles by distinguishing between Jesus and
Satan, becomes interesting within the context of Grass’s novel, which reflects
this pagan union of the Apollonian and Dionysian sphere. It does this by merging
in Oskar Matzerath the figures of Jesus and Satan, of victim and fascist. Oskar
can never be just one: the dividing line of any dialectic is blurred in this book
and, like all archetypal tricksters, Oskar finds himself on the threshold between
two domains. The trickster's typical location in European culture is the
marketplace, and as Bakhtin tells us in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance,
this was the place in which curses, profanities, and oaths reigned.2 While the
sacred was reserved for the church, the profane reigned outside of church,
primarily in the marketplace. Pro-fanum translates into ‘before the temple’. In
early modern European culture, the grotesque became most visible in the
marketplace, a place not only of multicultural interaction but also a venue for
all sorts of groups that later became increasingly segregated from society: gypsies,
transient musicians, exotics of doubtful origin, freed slaves, midgets and giants.3
Yet with the formation of the bourgeois class, socially inferior classes in
marketplaces and fairs increasingly became the ‘object of the respectable gaze’4
by which the bourgeois class was able to confirm its own superiority.
Particularly, the slave from the colonies, the dwarf, and the pig were displayed
and celebrated at the fair because of their low status. Alongside with their
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segregation within the forming nation-state, slaves and dwarves then became
increasingly banished from church.5  Oskar’s presence in church is in itself a
violation of the sacred realm through the profanity of his grotesque body and
all his body stands for, as opposed to one of his counter images, the classical
body of the athlete on the cross, who is flexing his muscles and expanding his
chest over the main altar of the Danzig Sacred Heart Church. In addition, Oskar
repeatedly violates this physical division between the sacred and the profane
by taking profane language and actions into church. As a culture of shame and
guilt, Germany in the 1950s had its areas of silence — the Nazi crimes, the
Holocaust and euthanasia. A central moment of breaking this silence about the
Holocaust, in which Oskar accuses the church, that sacred domain opposed to
the grotesque, of its passivity in the face of Nazi atrocities, occurs when he gives
the Jesus figure his drum and tells him to use it, as a way of protesting against
what is happening on the political stage at the same time. This is a double
disruption of the sacred, both in the sense that Germans in the 1950s did not
want to hear about the Holocaust and the war, and in locality, the desecration
of the sacred ground.
The Catholic Church in particular is the target of Grass’s satire. As Günter
Lewy has shown, the Catholic Church silently supported the Final Solution,
while it followed the general public in its outcry against the practice of
euthanasia.6 The main reason for the Catholic Church's protest against euthanasia
was that here Germans were killed while the Final Solution targeted the Jews,
who had killed Jesus Christ.7  In 1939, Archbishop Gröber argued that because
the Jews had killed God, Christianity was not to be regarded as a product of the
Jews but was ‘in the most intimate union with the Germanic spirit’.8 This
appropriation by the German church of Jesus into its own ranks is reflected in
Grass’s Aryanisation of the Jesus figure à la Leni Riefenstahl. Grass’s church
scenes exhibit some of the most offensive passages in the book by conflating
sacred images with what Bakhtin calls the material bodily lower stratum, as
Catholicism never ceases to inspire Oskar with blasphemy. In picaresque fashion,
Oskar mutters commentaries on the Mass while moving his bowels, he equates
Jesus with his philandering father Jan Bronski, he touches the little Jesus figure’s
penis, his watering can, as he calls it, thus giving himself a massive erection,
and he sits on the Virgin Mary’s thigh. In the marketplace, Bakhtin argues, ‘the
most improper and sinful oaths were those invoking the body of the Lord and
its various parts, and these were precisely the oaths most frequently used’.9
Oskar’s drumming, and especially the drumsticks, belong to a series of phallic
symbols. Being dactyls like the Tom Thumb figure himself that Oskar is partly
modelled on, these are grotesque images of potency that contrast starkly with
Jesus’s own flaccid penis as a symbol of the church’s political impotence. These
carnivalesque images subvert the authority of the church, conflating the theme
of the Holocaust with folk humour.
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Oskar’s blasphemies turn into crime when he steals nativity figures from
numerous churches. In these later church scenes, Oskar uncrowns the church
Jesus by adopting his name as the leader of a street gang and by sawing him off
along with the other two figures, John the Baptist and the Virgin Mary. He has
his ‘disciples’, the gangsters named the Dusters, perform Catholic rituals such
as genuflections by the holy-water font or enact an impromptu Mass and invoke
the ite missa sunt, a line that was also the object of derision in the medieval Feast
of Fools, where it was converted into the threefold braying of an ass performed
by the priest.10 We can see to what extent Grass’s book from 1959 is steeped
in these early cultural traditions of Europe. In synchrony with other tricksters
who muddy high gods and ‘are made in and for a world of imperfections’, in
which they ‘do not wish away or deny what seems low, dirty, and imperfect’,11
Oskar’s blasphemies in church challenge religious idealism and indict the church’s
silence towards the Nazis’ practice of euthanasia, of the killing of the physically
and mentally degenerate, of doing away with what seemed to them low, dirty,
and imperfect. This union between the church and the totalitarian state is
explicitly addressed in Grass’s equation of the classical body of Jesus and the
perfect Aryan body, the athletes of the 1936 Olympics and Jesus’s blue eyes,
and the equation of the holy cross and the swastika. Oskar questions Jesus as a
culture-hero and concludes that he, Oskar, is a more genuine Jesus than the
other, for at least Oskar drums resistance to the Nazis with his tin drum. His
actions seem to imply the question: Where was God during the Holocaust? Where
were Jesus’s miracles then? Moreover, Oskar’s second form of protest, his desire
to scream glass to pieces in church, could be read as a form of protest against
the broken glass during Reich Crystal Night and the church’s silence.
Bulgakov
Grass’s book is part of a tightly woven fabric of texts that are steeped in the
tradition of the Menippean satire. The revival of this genre in the twentieth
century, whether in Russia or Germany, has the function of social criticism. It
is subversive, blasphemous and sacrilegious literature that forms a carnivalesque
counter-culture to the seriousness of any officialdom. Bakhtin wrote his book
on Rabelais with this intention and he did for literary theory what Mikhail
Bulgakov’s The Master and Margarita did in fiction. The publication of both
books was delayed for many years due to the censorship under Stalinism.
Bakhtin’s dissertation on which his book is based was not completed until 1940,
he did not receive his degree until 1951, and the book was not published until
1965. Bulgakov’s novel experienced a similar publication history: it was started
in 1928 but was not published until 1966, 26 years after his death, as a censored
version in a Moscow journal. Mikhail Bulgakov’s The Master and Margarita is
a novel of grotesque, fantastic realism written during the dark era of the Stalinist
purges, a novel about the evils of Stalin’s Russia and, as such, a monument to
72
Negotiating the Sacred II
the indestructibility of art much like Grass’s novel, which also revives what the
Nazis had tried to eradicate as degenerate. Bulgakov’s satire, too, lends itself to
a Bakhtinian interpretation with its concept of the carnival as a temporary
liberation from the prevailing truth and from the established order. Like Grass’s
novel, The Master and Margarita was itself influenced by Rabelais. Bulgakov’s
novel is about the fate of a novel about Pontius Pilate and Jesus Christ, written
by the protagonist, the Master. It blends a retelling of Christ’s ascent to Golgotha
and his execution with the incredible events surrounding a visit by Woland,
Satan, the central trickster figure in this text, and his minions, to the Moscow
of Stalinism. The presence of Jesus, Ieshua, as a character of a novel was
unthinkable for the atheist Stalinist era. This is very different from Grass’s kind
of blasphemy, a blasphemy within and directed against the Church. Bulgakov’s
novel abounds if not in blasphemy then in a sort of secular sacrilege targeted at
the state and the absence of any church. In the two central figures, the Master
and Pontius Pilate, we obtain the two positions of the persecuted artist and the
tyrant. The Master is to an extent a self-portrait of Bulgakov and his difficulties
as a writer under Stalin. Stalin can be discerned both in the figure of Pontius
Pilate, who condemns innocent people to death, and Woland, the Devil. The
novel shares with Grass’s The Tin Drum the installation of a vagrant Jesus figure,
who in both cases has to carry the burden imposed upon him by the crimes of
a totalitarian regime, its cowardice, betrayals, and murders. That Oskar Matzerath
increasingly identifies with Jesus at the end of Grass’s novel indicates that he
is the victim of the crimes of humanity par excellence and, like Bulgakov, Grass
intends to remind us that the story of Jesus continues to have metaphorical
relevance for our own day, that there will always be a Pontius Pilate who ends
up crucifying a Jesus.
Bulgakov’s novel can quite literally be characterised as a work of magic
realism. It engages in mock uncrownings of officially respected figures from the
world of literature and theatre and makes fun of the mysterious disappearance
of Moscow inhabitants, a common phenomenon under Stalinism. The unreality
of the totalitarian regime, which Hannah Arendt has described as a ‘superior
realism’ surrounding these regimes, may be the reason why some artists respond
to these times with works of magic realism.12  Mikhail Bulgakov, for fear of
retribution, never talks openly about Stalinism but refers to it as witchcraft:
‘And it was two years ago that inexplicable things began happening…people
started disappearing without a trace. Once, on a day off, a policeman appeared,
summoned the second lodger (whose name has been lost) into the front hall, and
said that he had been asked to come down to the police station for a minute in
order to sign something. The lodger told Anfisa…he would be back in ten
minutes…Not only did he not return in ten minutes, he never returned at all…it
was witchcraft pure and simple, and …as everyone knows, once witchcraft gets
started, there is no stopping it’.13 One of the most famous lines from this novel
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— ‘once witchcraft is started, there is no stopping it’ — expresses
totalitarianism’s self-consuming racism, the never-ending process of having to
find enemies. It is passages like this one that mark moments in the text where,
due to the conflation of reality with surrealism, the term ‘magic realism’ becomes
justified in the highest degree. Evidently, at times of extreme censorship only
metaphorical language can save the artist from persecution; hence the magic
realist novel can be a tool to express and attack the politics of totalitarian regimes.
What this novel describes as witchcraft and fantasy, was, however, a grim reality
that had nothing to do with magic. The novel displays a rediscovery of the
iconography of Hell, which had gone missing in the bourgeois age, that joyful
hell, of which Bakhtin speaks, to be found in medieval carnival and in Rabelais.
Griboedov House, for example, the primary hangout for the Muscovite literary
world and for Woland and his devils is such a hell. Particularly its famous
restaurant, in which Woland gives his satanic ball, with its incredibly loud jazz
band and the laughter that roars through its vaults is the main carnival locus
which parades beauty and ugliness, life and death, and is reminiscent of Grass’s
restaurant, the Onion Cellar and its own jazz band. In Grass’s Onion Cellar,
Germans are taught to mourn by crying over onions. In both novels jazz has a
liberating function from oppression. In The Tin Drum, Oskar disperses a Nazi
party rally from inside a rostrum by drumming to the rhythm of a Charleston,
‘Jimmy the Tiger’, which has the power to dissolve the uniformity of the saluting
Volkskörper, the folk body. In accordance with Cornel West’s thoughts in his
recent book Democracy Matters on the potential of jazz and blues to resist the
stifling of democracy and to give tragicomic hope in the face of racism, Oskar’s
music temporarily dissolves the rigidity of the Sieg-Heil salute, a central symbol
of the Nazi race ideology. Similarly, the jazz in Bulgakov’s Griboedov House
can be read as a carnivalesque form of resistance to the Puritanism of Stalinism.
Like The Tin Drum, The Master and Margarita parodies God, installs Satan
as a central figure, is intertextual with Goethe (Faust in Bulgakov, the Goethean
Bildungsroman in Grass), conflates the rational with the irrational, pits irrational
elements against the rationalist party monologue, cosmopolitanism with
nationalism. Bulgakov’s devil Woland, for example, is described as a polyglot
foreigner. In both novels, the idea of cosmopolitanism clashes with the politics
of rootedness. Primarily, however, Bulgakov’s novel fulfils what Bakhtin saw
in Dostoevsky’s novels, their polyphony, heteroglossia, a never-ending dialogue
in opposition to the monologism of Stalinism, a novel that is open-ended,
unfinalised. In a key moment, in the Master’s novel within the novel, he has
Yeshua save Pilate from eternal damnation, thus guaranteeing the persistence
of a dialogue between irrationalism in the form of faith (Jesus) and reason (Pilate,
Stalin). This union between rationalism and irrationalism also comes about in
The Tin Drum, where Oskar advocates a union between the Apollonian and the
Dionysian principles borrowed from Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy. It seems that
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these two European novels finally attempt to achieve to mend the central split
that goes through the cultural history of modernity, that split between reason
and unreason that emerges from the Enlightenment.
Rushdie
While Grass writes against the political abuse of folk culture in Nazi Germany,
Bulgakov writes against the suppression of the Christian myth following the
Communist revolution. In both books, myth is disentangled from the grasp of
ideological abuse. This also happens in Rushdie’s books, both in Midnight’s
Children and Satanic Verses. As Grass’s The Tin Drum draws on previous texts,
it becomes the palimpsest for later texts. Salman Rushdie openly admitted to
having been influenced by Grass.14 The parallels between these two authors
are legion. While Grass juxtaposes Germans and Poles, one of Rushdie’s central
themes is the relationship between Muslims and Hindus. The works of both
writers display a high degree of intertextuality and heterogeneity and both have
provoked strong reactions from the people who do not agree with their use of
blasphemy and sacrilege, although arguably conservative reactions to Grass’s
The Tin Drum in places like Bavaria in the early 1960s and Oklahoma in the
mid-1990s fade in comparison with the fatwa which Khomeini placed on Rushdie
after the publication of The Satanic Verses in 1989. One of the most interesting
connections between The Tin Drum and Midnight’s Children is their fantastic
realism, their revival of the picaresque tradition. Most of Rushdie’s characters
display the kind of homelessness of which Bakhtin speaks, the dubious origin
of the picaro, that great blasphemer in world literature. We realise to what extent
the picaro himself stems from an intercultural archetype that transcends Europe,
the mythological trickster, whose central function is to criticise society from its
margins. As tricksters, Oskar Matzerath and Saleem Sinai, the hero of Midnight’s
Children, have in common that they are equipped with magic weapons allowing
them to commit deeds of blasphemy and sacrilege. What is Oskar’s scream, by
which he destroys the glass in churches, is Saleem’s extremely sensitive nose
that allows him to smell the thoughts of people. As tricksters, they are
marginalised, figures on the threshold, and find themselves in what the
anthropologist Victor Turner has called a zone of liminality.15  It is precisely
from their liminal position that they are able to levy acts of blasphemy criticising
official ideologies, the times in which they live. Both stand on the threshold
between two historical ages, Nazism and post-war Germany on the one hand,
India as a British colony and postcolonial India on the other. Both texts revolve
around the Stunde Null, the zero hour of the nation state, 1945 in Germany and
1947, the day of Indian Independence. 1945 marks the date when Oskar is
transformed into a grotesquely misshapen dwarf, while precisely at the stroke
of midnight preceding Indian independence, Rushdie’s protagonist Saleem Sinai
is born together with the other thousand midnight children. What moves these
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two novels into close proximity is the grotesque body of the protagonist and
their grotesque, sacrilegious representation of history. While Oskar’s hump is
a symbol of German guilt that he carries on his shoulders and while his deformity
also reflects the ugliness of Germany after 1945, Saleem Sinai, whose
physiognomy resembles that of the Hindu Elephant God Ganesha, carries the
very shape of the Indian subcontinent in his face, as his teacher Zagallo points
out with his Peruvian accent:
‘Sons of baboons! Thees object here’ — a tug on my nose — ‘thees is
human geography!’ ‘How sir where sir what sir?’ Zagallo is laughing
now. ‘You don’t see?’he guffaws. ‘In the face of thees ugly ape you don’t
see the whole map of India?’ ‘Yes sir no sir you show us sir!’ ‘See here
— the Decan peninsula hanging down!’ Again ouchmynose. ‘Sir sir if
that’s the map of India what are the stains sir?’ It is Glandy Keith Colaco
feeling bold. Sniggers, titters from my fellows. And Zagallo, taking the
question in his stride: ‘These stains,’ he cries, ‘are Pakistan! Thees
birthmark on the right ear is the East Wing; and thees horrible stained
left cheek, the West! Remember, stupid boys: Pakistan ees a stain on the
face of India!’ ‘Ho ho,’ the class laughs, ‘Absolute master joke, sir!’ But
now my nose has had enough; staging its own, unprompted revolt against
the grasping thumb-and-forefinger, it unleashes a weapon of its own…a
large blob of shining goo emerges from the left nostril, to plop into Mr
Zagallo’s palm. Fat Perce Fishwala yells, ‘Lookit that, sir! The drip from
his nose, sir! Is that supposed to be Ceylon?’16
The text abounds in ‘images of the grotesque body draining into the world’
which serve ‘a Menippean vision of renewal and progress’ that is ‘referentially
directed towards the qualities of Indian society that Rushdie valorises: pluralism,
democracy, hybridity, and change’ and they satirically attack the ‘forces in
modern India and Pakistan that deny those principles: fundamentalism,
despotism, purity, and stasis’.17
The representation of history in Midnight’s Children is steeped as much in
folk culture as that of The Tin Drum. In a conversation that Grass and Rushdie
had in the mid-1980s, they both admitted to each other that their use of the
fantastic and of the fairy-tale world stems from their cultures’ individual literary
heritage. While Rushdie emphasises the importance of the Arabian Nights for
his novel, of the stories of A Thousand and One Nights, Grass’s literature is deeply
rooted in the German Baroque and Romantic tradition, the picaresque novel and
the fairy tales. Like Grass, who destabilises the mendacity of post-fascist
rationalism, Rushdie attempts to subvert the official view of Indian history as a
success story, as what Nietzsche called ‘monumental history’, the history of
India’s great leaders.18  Against this monumental vision of India’s history,
Rushdie offers his critical view of history. The story of Saleem Sinai is the story
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of India’s common people. Like Grass, Rushdie thus reinstalls ‘low’ culture over
‘high’ culture, elevates the marginalised over those at the centres of power. The
subversion of an official discourse is, in both cases, achieved specifically through
the sacrilegious conflation of important historical events with the banality of
the protagonist’s private life and through a revival of myth and irrationalism
suppressed by both new states, both under Adenauer’s politics of rationalism
and Nehru’s secularisation. In order to show how ludicrous the concept of the
Stunde Null, the zero hour, this sort of tabula rasa made of Nazism or colonialism,
really is, Rushdie recycles a central scene from Grass, the Onion Cellar episode,
which resurfaces as Mumbai’s ‘Midnite Confidential Club’. Both authors want
to bring back the past and understand that nothing will disappear, everything
will come back. What is catharsis through onions in Grass corresponds to
Rushdie’s chutney, the sweetsour ‘chutney of memory’.
Preserving the past is a concern in all three books. Rushdie’s image of the
pickling factory that Saleem works in is a fitting motif for this chutneyfication
of history and the narrator compares his thirty chapters with pickle jars in which
the past is preserved. Grass, Bulgakov, and Rushdie engage in myth in order to
preserve the past and a cultural heritage that the great rulers of their countries
threaten either to manipulate or to suppress. Grass offers his vision of myth and
folk culture in opposition to the Nazis’ ideological manipulation of myth and
folk culture and the spirit of rationalism under Adenauer. By way of parody,
Bulgakov reinstalls central icons of the Christian myth in opposition to Stalin’s
imposed atheism. Rushdie writes in opposition to Jawaharlal Nehru and his
daughter Indira Gandhi’s suppression of Hindu and Muslim traditionalism for
the sake of their monumental vision of history that focuses on the great leaders
but not on the people. In Midnight’s Children, he revives Hindu myth, for
example, in the character of the Widow who drains all hope from the 1001
children born at the stroke of midnight of 15 August 1947, the day of Indian
Independence from colonial rule. This figure can serve as a pars pro toto to
demonstrate that this novel is a work of magic realism, for, at a realistic level,
the Widow symbolises Indira Gandhi and her rule of terror during the Emergency
period (1975–77), while at the level of myth, she is made to resemble the evil
goddess Kali, who is often represented ‘with protruding tongue, garland of
skulls, and hands holding weapons and severed heads, stark naked upon the
prostrate body of her beloved consort Shiva’.19
This revival of Hinduism becomes even more problematic in The Satanic
Verses where, in truly satirical manner, elements are shamelessly mixed, in this
case the blasphemous mixing of religious icons. When the Muslim Gibreel, one
of the two central characters, enters the film world, one of his first roles is to
play the Hindu god Ganesha, with elephant trunk and large ears. Later, he
metamorphises into Hanuman, the monkey king from the epic Ramayana.
Rushdie’s deconstruction of the dictatorial politics of the Indian film industry
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reminds us of Grass’s and Bulgakov’s parody of monological prose like the
Bildungsroman of German Classicism and Socialist Realism, but among the greatest
offences is Rushdie’s mixing Islam with Hinduism.
In conclusion, one could argue that the literature of magic realism attacks
primarily the official discourses of the church and the state. In this satirical
literature, which is steeped in earlier European traditions such as the menippean
satire or the picaresque novel, blasphemy and sacrilege, the rupturing of the
sacred realm (church and state) through the profane (pro-fanum), are levelled
against the Church’s and the State’s mechanisms of oppression. If we believe
with Horkheimer and Adorno in the dialectic of Enlightenment, this implies that
reason can become oppressive, that rationalism can reach a point at which it
perverts into irrationalism, which no doubt it did under totalitarian rule. In the
fiction of magic realism, Western rationalism becomes the target of satirical
representations of irrationalism. What Deleuze and Guattari have, in their book
Mille Plateaux, called the arborescence of Western societies, the deep roots of
their teleologies and their territorialism, is being subverted through what they
call the rhizome, the shallow roots associated with deterritorialisation, nomadism,
and homelessness, for which tricksters, picaros, and other literary nomads are
literary representations. In this body of literature, the official world is always
being subverted through modes of the rhizome. We encounter these two realms,
Deleuze’s arborescence versus rhizomatics, in authors like Grass, Irving, Rushdie,
Tournier, Garcia Marquez, but also in Bruce Chatwin’s Songlines, to add an
example from Australia, where the rhizomatic world of the indigenous peoples
clashes with Western racism and its arborescence. As jazz and blues are part of
the rhizomatic world giving tragicomic hope to African Americans so are the
songlines, that intricate web of dreaming paths as the manifestation of an ancient
nomadic culture. The trickster and the picaro are the great wanderers and
blasphemers of the mythological and fictional world challenging the Gods, the
rulers, and the sedentary bourgeois who hold still in the face of misrule. A
question that remains is: Who will write the great heteroglot novel that parodies
the Bush era and America’s foreign policy? To date it has not yet been produced.
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Les fees ont soif: Feminist, iconoclastic
or blasphemous?
Maria-Suzette Fernandes-Dias
In his 1993 book, Blasphemy, David Lawton is of the opinion that blasphemy in
the arts is healthy because it ‘often registers the irruption of a new reading
community’1  and marks such a community’s rite of passage. Women’s writing
has been an important site of blasphemy in the twentieth century. Blasphemy
has provided a formerly marginalised group with a medium though which to
assert its rights against an existing social and cultural order that abhors
transformation and resists it. It does this by wielding the power of religious
constructs about the sacrosanctity of dogmas and beliefs, the naturalness of civil
codes of ethical and moral propriety, and the necessity of judicial provisions
like repressive censorship and blasphemy laws. This chapter examines a literary
scandal that marked Quebec’s rupture from traditionalism and religious
institutionalism, and the emergence of its post-Quiet Revolution feminine identity.
The scandal of Les fees ont soif erupted in 1978 — more than a decade after
the Quiet Revolution (1960–66) and Quebec’s rejection of traditionalist spiritual
values, classical education, church-controlled and inspired social welfare
institutions and its rural, agricultural heritage, and its assertion of a new
Quebecois identity. Feminine emancipation was still in its embryonic stage. The
Catholic Church, despite its waning political clout, exercised nevertheless,
considerable influence on the behaviour of women.2  A decade of secular outlook
had not been long enough to dismantle traditional constructs about the role of
women and centuries of cultural and social conditioning about male superiority,
or to undo the imposing omnipresence of retrograde patriarchal ideologies in
newly established secular institutions. Frustration, coupled with the emergence
of a second wave of feminism in Western Europe and the USA, catalysed the
surfacing of an almost militant and utopian feminist movement in Quebec. In
1976, Quebec witnessed the emergence of L’Autre Parole, a publication by women
who identified themselves as Catholics and feminists and asked for the
de-gendering of religious practices and discourses to include the presence and
the voice of women. Louky Bersianik’s l’Eugelionne, published the same year,
parodies sacred male writings, especially the Bible and the writings and theories
of Freud and Lacan, satirically denoted as Saint Siegfried and
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Saint-Jacques-Linquant. L’Eugelionne challenges, deflates, and deconstructs
androcentric ideology, its sexist discourse and practices, its misogynist reality,
and its harmful dichotomies.
Owing to its representational power to encompass physical and sexual
difference within the existing patriarchal discourse and to deconstruct negative
myths and images, theatre provided feminist collectives with a transgressive
and performative space in which to pursue their quest for a female identity.
Well known examples of this feminist iconoclastic fervour are plays like Si
Cendrillon pouvait mourir (If Cindrella could die) (1975) and La Nef des sorcières
(A Clash of Symbols) (1976), which directly attack stereotype female role models.
Quebec decries blasphemy
On 16 May, 1978, the Arts Council of Montreal informed the director of the
Théâtre du Nouveau-Monde, Jean-Louis Roux, about their decision not to fund
Les fees ont soif. The president of the council publicly called this play ‘a piece
of shit’, ‘trash’ and challenged local newspapers to publish three pages of its
script. The day after this declaration, La Presse published an extract of the play
and by the end of the month, the editor of Devoir, Michel Roy, called for a censor.
By June, the debate over the play mobilised public opinion, igniting another
Querelle de Tartuffe.3 While rehearsals continued, organisations such as the
Association of Theatre Directors, the Human Rights League, Quebecois Writers’
Union, and the International Institute of Theatre filed petitions against a potential
censor. The only female member of the Council, Mme Thérèse Lamarche resigned
in protest against the council’s decision. On 11 November, when the play was
advertised to be staged, the battle seemed won. However, the crusade had just
begun. The play premiered on 25 November amidst protests by the extreme
right, with reparation vigils organised by the Archdiocese of Montreal and
congregations even picketing the theatre en masse to recite the rosary while the
play was being performed. Three days later, the Archbishop of Quebec, Mgr.
Paul Grégoire, denounced the play for its vulgarity and its frivolous portrayal
of the Holy Virgin as ‘a puppet, an invention of male domination, a figment
responsible for the alienation of women’.4
A judicial imbroglio ensued. Following a plea lodged by Emile Colas on behalf
of Young Canadians for Christ, Quebecois Catholic Parents’ Association, Farmers’
Association and the Quebec State Council of the Knights of Columbus, the printed
version of the play was banned by the High Court. In January 1979, the decision
was reversed on the basis of a technicality and a petition signed by intellectuals,
including Simone de Beauvoir, Julia Kristeva, Phillippe Sollers, Denis Roche and
Christiane Rochefort. Colas, appealed to the Supreme Court and lost. More judicial
proceedings followed until the Supreme Court declared, in 1980, that it would
not hear any more cases against the work, stating that ‘any injunction against
a work of art having considerable social impact, should come from the Public
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Prosecutor of the province, given that the work affects the whole society, not
isolated individuals’.5
Since 1980, Les fees ont soif has been successfully staged several times —
even during the papal visit to Canada in 1984 — and as recently as July 2005
during the Festival de Fringe in Montreal, without being decried as blasphemous
or scandalous. In the literary and in the cultural paradigm, Les fees ont soif is
considered as a prominent marker of the post Quiet Revolution assertion of the
feminine identity and the social rupture from religious dogmatism in Québec.
Why?
Les fees ont soif: feminist iconoclasm and blasphemy
In his book, Sorcières (1862), French historian Jules Michelet describes fairies as
the proud and fantastical queens of Gaul, who brazenly turned their backs on
Christ and his apostles and continued to dance. For this impudence, they were
imprisoned in containers that would be opened only at the end of time. Drawing
on this metaphor in Les fees ont soif (translated by Alan Brown as The Fairies are
Thirsty), playwright, Denise Boucher, attempted to deconstruct the role played
by myth, image and language in the formation of women’s socio-cultural identity
by creating an iconoclastic feminine trilogy of the Virgin Mary, the Mother and
the Whore as a satirical counterpart to the Holy Trinity of the Father, the Son
and the Holy Spirit, to depict how patriarchal tradition has incarcerated women
in stereotypical roles of submission. The three characters rebel against their
archetypal roles and invite the audience to ‘imagine…imagine…imagine’ a
different world, recreated by women.
In Mythologies, Roland Barthes elaborates how societies create myths to
legitimise power structures.6 The rapport between power and myth being
symbiotic in nature, power creates and legitimises the myth and the myth
perpetuates itself while ensuring the official recognition of power. Thus, a myth
is, according to Barthes, a social construct which presents itself as natural, but
is in fact, fabricated by History through social and cultural conditioning.
More than just a system of theatrical representation, the archetypes of the
Virgin, the Mother and the Whore constitute the foundations of an androcentric
ideology that has strived to alienate the woman from her own history and her
body. The originality of Boucher’s play was to create with these archetypes, a
functioning trinity capable of denouncing its fears, its deprivations and its stasis.
The Virgin, despite her status as a female religious icon, is more of a feminine
model than a feminine creation. The patriarchy accords her power and authority,
but only to serve as the model of the perfect, submissive woman. As Julia Kristeva
illustrates in her article ‘Stabat Mater’,7  the religious and secular representation
of femininity in our civilisation is characterised by motherhood — the
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desexualised maternal representation of women — a myth reinforced by the
dogma of the Virgin Mother.
Boucher sought to explore not the myth of the Virgin but the wife and mother
repressed in her, as she explains in the foreword of her play:
Since childhood, the image of the Holy Virgin walked in my body and
my head. The woman hidden in her haunted me. Where would it be
possible to meet her?…An entire bachelor culture had projected and
transferred its fantasies of virginity on the mother of Jesus and all other
women. An androcentric culture had only fabricated a single archetype
of reference for women — that of the virgin. A woman who does not
enjoy sensual pleasures, be it a mother or a whore. Women are thus
exiled from the gratification of their bodies.8
A proponent of the same tradition as Kazantzakis, Scorsese and Gibson,
Boucher tried to emancipate the Virgin Mary from the conflict between the
contradictory elements of the human and the divine that co-exist as part of her
personality. Adhering to the iconoclastic conviction that the Divine-Human
beings remain essentially divine by overcoming their human impulses and urges
and by seeking the ‘higher mission’ through constant prayer, Boucher induces
her character of the Virgin Mary to expunge the divine and embrace the human
by rejecting prayer and abnegation from her life: ‘Once upon a time, one
day…and that is today, I began to distort the Angelus’.9  ‘To make a statement,
one must come down from the cross’.10
In the theatrical production, Boucher divided the stage into four distinct
areas, offering a representational space to each archetype — Marie, the mother
in a kitchen; Madeleine, the whore in a bedroom; and the Virgin Mary as a statue
raised on a pedestal towards the back of the stage. In the foreground is the
neutral space, a space free from patriarchal influence, where the three characters
discover themselves, express themselves freely, and develop their solidarity.
More than the depiction of the Virgin, flanked by her supposed alter egos, Marie
the wife and mother and Madeleine the whore, it was Boucher’s transgression
from the terrain of art — or rather her subversive use of art — to attack the
overpowering influence of the church on the behaviour of women and the
sanctity of the dogmas of the Virgin and the Holy Spirit, that drew the wrath
of the clergy.
The statue of the Virgin is portrayed as holding a thick and heavy chain, a
parodied representation of the rosary and making a mockery of the Litany of
Loreto:
I am an image
I am a portrait
I have my feet planted in plaster
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I am the queen of nothingness
I am the door to an abyss
I am the unconsummated marriage of priests (…)
I am the mirror of injustice
I am the throne of slavery
I am the elusive sacred vessel
I am the obscurity of ignorance (…)
I am the help of the useless
I am the tool of weaknesses
I am the decayed symbol of rotting abnegation
I am more oppressive and more repressing than all words (…)
I am the imagined image
I am she who does not have a body
I am she who never menstruates.11
The eternally idolised Virgin leaves her pedestal to occupy the same space as
the housewife and the whore, to express her doubts and her aspirations. She
agrees with Marie, the mother and wife, about the impossibility of articulating
a feminine voice within constraints of a predominantly masculine discourse.
Says Marie, speaking to her demented mother:
You who suffered for your subservience, why are you trying to force
me into submission as well? (…) you liked the parish priests. They turned
you away from your body. From your man. And from me. They robbed
you of yourself. (…) They cheated you, mama. Their discourse does not
belong to us. It does not possess the vocabulary to express what I feel,
what I am looking for. It denies me my identity.12
Stepping into the neutral space, the Statue of the Holy Virgin continues:
They profess: ‘Silence is golden’ in order to crush under their feet, the
silent female herds. I too have to shut up so that I can listen to Him
always. I owe it to Him to sport the Buddha’s grin, the Sphinx’s head,
the Virgin’s eye.13
Pushing the limits of decorum and of what was considered as representable in
a theatrical production, Boucher not only engages in vulgarising discussion
about sexuality, incest and rape, but even involves the Holy Virgin in doing so.
Like a frolicsome teenager, the Statue keeps singing repeatedly: ‘Someday my
prince will come for me’.14
As an almost shocking sequel to Madeleine the whore’s drunken monologue
about her depression and her growing aversion to her profession, the Statue
moves to the neutral space, chanting a commercial for tampons:
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On those dreary day, lady, thanks to Tantax, feel free! Go horse riding,
play tennis, swim! Tantax is discreet. Tantax protects you. Tantax allows
you the freedom of movement! Use Tantax! Be modern! Be free! Be
Tantax!15
The Statue incites the women, Marie and Madeleine, to articulate what was than
considered ‘unspeakable’ and joins them in voicing in a nursery rhyme, their
womanly fears of solitude, ageing and independence in a male dominated society:
Statue: Fear
Marie: Fear of going mad.
Madeleine: Fear of being alone.
Marie: Fear of growing ugly.
Madeleine: Fear of becoming too fat.
Statue: Fear of knowing too much.
Marie: Fear of being touched.
Madeleine: Fear of laughing too much.
Marie: Fear of weeping.
Statue: Fear of speaking out.
Marie: Fear of making a fool of myself.
Madeleine: Fear of being a hussy.
Marie: Fear of becoming frigid.
Madeleine: Fear of an orgasm.
Marie: Fear of not having an orgasm.
Madeleine: Fear of being free.
Marie: Fear of my husband.
Statue: Fear of mice.
Statue: Fear.16
To reinforce her metaphorical accusation against a system that legitimises the
use of abuse as a means of controlling women, Boucher had the actress playing
the role of the Holy Virgin, also playing the role of the rapist of the whore and
justifying: ‘Raping a prostitute does not amount to rape’.17
In an almost ironic theatrical twist, the Virgin and Marie take the centre stage
to condemn the judiciary and lament the judicial fiasco that ensued as a result
of the rapist’s trial:
Marie: The trial has all the elements of a masquerade. All the humiliation,
all the misery of a dispossessed woman.
Statue: The judge came across as objective. The lawyers as well. None
of them felt implicated. (…) None of them recognized in the victim the
image of their mother, their daughter or their spouse. Patrimony remained
unaffected. As if to say that our heritage permits the rape of women.
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During the trial, the question that aroused the most interest and the
anxiety and made us forget even the accused, the question that became
the deciding one for the acquittal of the accused was: ‘Did the victim
resist?’18
Some of the lines articulated by the Virgin in this scene are tainted with crude
and scandalous sous-entendus about sexuality; for instance, the statue of the
Virgin says: ‘No matter where. No matter when. No matter how. A tail can thrill.
Everyone knows that.’19
In Luke 12:10, blasphemy against the Holy Spirit is decreed as unforgivable,
but Boucher did not consider it as a stumbling block to her feminist iconoclasm
— she makes the Virgin call holy prophets ‘eunuchs in flesh and mind’,20
deplore her role in the story of creation as the sacrificing mother, call the Holy
Spirit a bird, and denote herself as the ‘Immaculate of all male obsessions’ and
the ‘queen of the mute’:
I was given a bird as a husband. My son was robbed from me through
all the ages. He was given a celibate, jealous and eternal father. I was
sculpted in marble and made to crush the serpent with all my strength.21
Questioning the dogma of the Immaculate Conception is interrogating the dogma
of original sin and the virgin birth and amounts to attempting to dismantle the
very foundation of the Christian monotheist civilisation. As Leonard Levy
demonstrates in Blasphemy, ‘The virgin birth was always a likely subject for
blasphemous ridicule from Taylor’s mad utterances in the seventeenth century,
to Paine’s sarcasms, to Yeat’s “Stick of Incense”’.22
In the denouement of Les fees ont soif, in which each of the characters rebels
against her culturally imposed social role, the Virgin breaks her plaster cast,
drops her rosary and releases the serpent, the symbol of sexual desire, a creature
cursed by God in the story of Creation, and expresses her disgust of the existing
order:
I can’t take it anymore. I won’t take it anymore. No. No. I don’t want
this sarcophagus. I don’t wish to be worshipped as a statue whilst I am
being denigrated, despised and demeaned in every woman. I no longer
want to be an alibi for this cursed race of old boys!23
Commenting upon the iconoclasm in the play, feminist Claire Lejeune who
prefaced the published version of Les Fées ont soif, describes the play as ‘a
diabolic Sabbath in which the sense of sin and the sacrosanct distance between
the mother and the whore are simultaneously lost in public’.24
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Defence against allegations of blasphemy
Elaborating on the characteristics of blasphemy, Lawton points out that those
who have set out deliberately to blaspheme, ‘set out to argue a system of belief
or to commend a way of life, and what is taken to be blasphemy is often, in their
view, incidental to their aims or a misrepresentation of them. They tend to feel
and say that their words have been taken out of context’.25
The creators of the Les fées ont soif always avowed what Bakhtin would call,
their ‘carnivalesque’ aspiration to undermine and destroy the hegemony of
Quebecois paternalistic ideology and to elucidate feminine potentials as an
alternate conceptualisation of reality. The music composer, Jean-François
Garneau, fearlessly affirmed: ‘Our entire culture is a culture of celibate men who
have rejected women and children through the ages.’26  Comedians Michèle
Magny and Sophie Clement, who played the roles of the Mother and the Whore
respectively, publicly asked: ‘Up to now, why did our mothers maintain their
silence on topics like rape, incest, prostitution and their own self privation of
pleasure?’27  As for the use of coarse language, Boucher deemed it necessary
because stereotypes are not easily shattered.
While the Church claimed its ‘right to respect’ and affirmed its dedication
to the emancipation of women, editor of Le Devoir, Michel Roy, expressed the
opinion that Boucher could have achieved her objective on the dramatic, lyrical
and ideological planes by withdrawing the passages that many believers
considered as blasphemous.
The issue of blasphemy normally arises in a community that is divided, and
it generally arises because the community is divided. For the readership and the
viewers of Les fees ont soif, the boundaries between theatrical representation
and reality began to blur. Even for Fr. Emile Legault, founder of the Companions
of Saint-Laurent and a strong defender of theatre in Quebec, in a daring television
interview praised the play as a ‘marvellous theological intuition’ but made the
following observation:
Five minutes through the play, I began to say to myself that the author
was wrong in not presenting to us her characters as clients of a
psychiatric clinic. If she had, then the Madonna would not have been
the Holy Virgin in person but a mentally disturbed person who thinks
she is the Holy Virgin.28
Dailies like La Presse reported the angry response from male protesters that
the personalities portrayed in the play were a far cry of what their mothers or
their sisters were. As for those who practised the oldest profession on earth,
they did so ‘out of their own free will because it paid fifty dollars a quarter of
an hour, better paid than most factories’.29
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And then, of course, there were rejoinders from agnostics, who felt it was
time to re-examine the dogma of ‘virginity of a mother’,30  and frenzied feminists
from the Council for the Status of Women, who accused Quebecoise society of
muzzling women and artists radically. Detractors representing this extreme,
such as Micheline Carrier, retorted: ‘There has never been an occasion for women
to interpellate the Church without being reminded to respect the established
order, because the Church refuses to engage in a dialogue with women as if to
say that the Holy Spirit breathed only upon the male half of humanity.’31
A study of the religious history of Quebec indicates that the blasphemy law
in Quebec, formulated in 1806, is very precise — the most severe form of
punishment was, undoubtedly, cutting the tongue of the offender. Drawing on
this analogy, Nancy Huston articulates the conclusion of her article on the
reception of Boucher’s play:
In North America, almost twenty centuries after the birth of Christ, the
belief still prevails that — just as the best way to keep a fish from
smelling is to cut off the nose — the best way to keep a fairy from being
thirsty is to cut out her tongue.32
From outrage to acceptance
The Quebecois society of the 1970s strove to reject Les Fées ont soif from its
cultural discourse for its vulgar language and its treatment of then proscribed
themes such as menstruation, prostitution, violence against women and women’s
rage and madness; from the social discourse for its religiously blasphemous
import and its virulent onslaught on taboos and myths profoundly anchored in
the history of the people; and from the artistic discourse for its amateurish
melange of genres like poetry, theatre and opera. However, as is often the case
with censorship and succès de scandale, despite its modest artistic quality and
its espousal of what now seems to be a utopian cause of the feminism of
difference, the play has found a niche in the literary history of Quebec as a
daring attempt to create social justice for women by calling for a profound
restructuring of society and of the way in which people think and experience
the world. By stressing that ‘the personal is political’, breaking the silence over
issues like rape and incest, and, of course, rendering the discourse with much
potence by attributing it to the character of the Holy Virgin, this play made the
social inequality of women a public and not merely a private problem.
How does one explain the public’s nonchalance in the consequent years
leading to the present, to the staging of what was once disparaged as
blasphemous? Envisioning the humanity of the divine and evoking or expressing
it in art is still considered as an attack on conventional piety as we have seen in
the public’s reaction to Scorsese’s The Last Temptation of Christ (1988) or Mel
Gibson’s The Passion of Christ (2004). It is therefore understandable how a
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recognisably human dimension and an avant-garde feminist depiction of the
Virgin as a woman compelled to suppress her corporeal desires, a mother who
resents having to sacrifice and grieve for her son in silence in accordance to a
higher plan (‘I went through this excessive agony of making a child see the light
of the day and the darkness of the unknown higher plan. Since I gave him life,
I became in many ways responsible for his death as well’33  ), and as a rebel who
finally breaks away from her role, challenged the beliefs and expectations of the
Quebecoise Catholic community.
But with the passage of time, a community that was already divided and in
a state of transition gradually lost the importance it accorded to religion as a
factor of social cohesiveness. Therefore, an artistic creation that was once
considered as morally and spiritually objectionable and had overstepped the
metaphorical and ideological limits imposed by the traditional order, did not
shock the Quebecois society anymore. The focus of the public has thus shifted
from the alleged blasphemous content to the humour and the social message
embodied in the play, which Ingrid Pux who played the role of the Virgin in
1995 when the troupe Majeure presented the play, describes as being ‘topical
because it shows women fossilised in stereotypes’.34  Far from being an
indictment against men, as it was viewed when it premiered amidst the
re-emergence of feminism as ‘feminism of difference’, for the audience today the
play, ‘transmits the enduring message that the world can only change when
women and men work together to bring about change instead of imprisoning
the other in proverbial clichés’.35
I must confess, however, the moral conflict that assailed me while writing
this chapter. Boucher’s depiction of the Virgin scandalised me, for, as a Catholic,
I have always revered the Holy Virgin for her emancipatory role in the history
of redemption of Mankind. As a daughter, a wife and a mother, I look up to her
not as a servile instrument in the fulfilment of a greater plan but as a role model
exemplifying dedication, fortitude and courage — she is one of the reasons why
I feel privileged to be a woman. Despite my reservations and my personal
religious convictions, as a Bakhtinian, I laud Les fées ont soif for its artistic
iconoclasm, which induced society to reconsider and re-evaluate its attitude
towards women; and for its heteroglossic capacity to reflect a multitude of
dissenting voices in a dialogic relationship, interrogating the predominance of
a single repressive ideological discourse.
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7
The body of Christ: Blasphemy as a
necessary transgression?
Carolyn D’Cruz and Glenn D’Cruz
This chapter was originally prefaced with an audio-visual presentation showing key
scenes from Martin Scorsese’s film, The Last Temptation of Christ, cut to the folk
hymn, ‘Go Tell Everyone’, which is reproduced below. The video segued into a short
duologue, which dramatised the ambiguity inherent in God’s call. The presentation
concluded with the same hymn accompanied by images of the poor, the marginalised
and the powerful.
God’s spirit is in my heart
He has called me and set me apart
This is what I have to do, what I have to do
He sent me to give the good news to the poor
Tell prisoners that they are prisoners no more
Tell blind people that they can see
And set the downtrodden free
And go tell everyone, the news that the kingdom of God has come
And go tell everyone, the news that God’s kingdom has come.1
Did you hear the call?
What call?
I think it’s the call from God.
You think? If it is the voice of God shouldn’t you know?
But it could be the voice of the devil fooling me to believe it is God. How will I
ever know for certain?
You won’t.
In the Last Temptation of Christ, Martin Scorsese’s Jesus heard voices. He was
not always sure if it was the voice of God calling him, setting him apart to redeem
the world from sin, whether it was the work of the devil leading him into
temptation, or whether it was just his own basic corporeal voice of desire. In
any case, Scorsese’s Jesus struggled between the pull of a divine plan on the
one hand, and temptations of the flesh as part of living a typical life on earth on
the other. In contrast to the many filmic images of Jesus that episodically rise
from the dead on our television screens at Easter time — images embodied by
93
the likes Max Von Sydow, Jefferey Hunter and Robert Powell — Scorsese’s
image of Jesus, as he puts it, does not ‘glow in the dark’. Scorsese wanted to
present the world with a Jesus whose human side was not effaced by his status
as a deity. Adapting his filmic text from Nikos Kazantzakis’s novel of the same
name, Scorsese underscores the struggle that Jesus experiences as a man coming
to terms with the temptations of ‘ordinary’ life. He experiences these temptations
as strongly as the voices that call him to a duty not to himself but to others.
It is possible to read The Last Temptation of Christ as a text that responds to
Scorsese’s own calling. When Paramount Pictures initially agreed to proceed
with the film in 1983, the studio executives asked Scorsese why he wanted to
make the film; he replied: ‘So I can get to know Jesus better.’2 This would come
as no surprise to Scorsese scholars, as one can hardly miss the Catholic themes
and iconography in films such as Mean Streets and Raging Bull. Indeed, many
academic commentaries on The Last Temptation of Christ note similarities between
this film and its predecessors, arguing that the entire Scorsese canon dramatises
the struggle between the sacred and the profane, the body and the spirit. As
Rolando Caputo notes:
Scorsese has so doggedly and publicly pursued this ‘long treasured
project’ [The Last Temptation] that there is almost a hidden implication
that he would have us believe most of his previous films were mere
sketches for a canvas, of which Last Temptation is the final unveiling ...
In retrospect, and not surprisingly, many of Scorsese’s films are a little
bit of Last Temptation, or as Kay more aptly states it, he is ‘synthesising
all his cinematic Scorsesisms into one film.3
Furthermore, it appears that Scorsese heard his own calling to get to know Jesus
better well before he became a film director. He was brought up Catholic, served
as an altar boy and wanted to become a priest before studying film at New York
University. As a ‘true believer’, so to speak, Scorsese was attracted to
Kazantzakis’s novel because he found the novelist’s representation of Christ
accessible. While recounting an episode in his film when Christ says: ‘Lucifer
is inside me, he’s saying I’m not the son of Mary and Joseph, I am the son of
God, I am God’, Scorsese says:
So he thinks it’s the Devil inside him saying this, and he believes he is
the worst sinner in the world. I felt that this was something I could relate
to: this was a Jesus you could sit down with, have dinner or a drink
with.4
If we were to give any weight at all to authorial intentionality, as so many people
do, we would be more than hard pressed to accuse Scorsese of wanting to make
a blasphemous film.5  As far as intentions go, Scorsese recalls a priest telling him
that Kazantzakis’ novel was read in Catholic seminaries in order to provoke
94
Negotiating the Sacred II
debate and discussion. Scorsese states: ‘this is what I hoped the film would do’.6
Defending Scorsese against charges of blasphemy, Jonathan Rosenbaum remarks:
‘the religious doubts about Scorsese, one should stress, are not doubts about
religion, but on the contrary, doubts which could only exist within a system of
religious belief’.7
But regardless of Scorsese’s authorial intentions, despite his careful framing
of The Last Temptation as a fictional text, he was bound to offend the
self-appointed guardians of Christianity over the way the story of Christ should
be told. It ought to be common knowledge that as a text, The Last Temptation
of Christ will be read in a variety of institutional and discursive circumstances
and contexts that generate different meanings. Cinemagoers, for instance, might
be interested in the film’s aesthetic qualities, seminaries might use the film as a
pedagogical tool, and equally some viewers might find the thought of Jesus
Christ having sex on film titillating. As we will see, Christian fundamentalists
used the film to galvanise their constituency against what it saw as moral
corruption. So, if Scorsese was intent on provoking ‘debate and discussion’ on
his particular religious calling, he could not escape doing so among a cacophony
of other receivers of the call.
In this sense, Scorsese’s struggles presented through the non-‘glow in the
dark’ Jesus are not unlike our own. Perhaps each of you has heard a calling.
Perhaps it is a religious calling and you are certain it is the voice of God. Or
perhaps, in accord with the seemingly secular context of the modern academy,
you might prefer to think of a calling as the voice of conscience or reason. But
for some people, like us for example, even the voice of conscience and reason
does not adequately capture the ‘spirit’ of the call to which we are responding
to today. Now neither of us, the authors of this chapter, are religious in the strict
sense of the term, although we have extremely divergent relationships to the
heritage of Christianity. Yet the call that we underscore here and now cannot
escape the messianic tone of at least one thread of Christianity’s heritage: the
coming of justice. Our philosophical guides for grappling with this heritage and
call are located in works by Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida in particular.
We will come back to these guides later. For now, let us focus on our aesthetic
guide, Martin Scorsese and his fictional, cinematic re-telling of the story of
Christ, which gives the hypothesis of this chapter its impetus: the contention
that so-called ‘blasphemy’ might be a necessary transgression against the
fundamentalist Christian Right, and as an important consequence, an essential
ingredient for creating a more just society.
For the record, we do not believe that the film is actually blasphemous, if we
take blasphemy to mean ‘a contemptuous or profane act or utterance, or writing
concerning God’.8  Christ is tempted by flesh in the film, but he does not succumb
to it. He wonders if he is merely mortal, but eventually accepts his divine calling.
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But this is beside the point. The point is that the charges of blasphemy were
made by a tightly organised, relatively powerful group of Christian
fundamentalists — most notably the National Federation for Decency led by
Donald Wildmon in the United States — who were able to disrupt the very
production of the film, years before it even made it to the screen.
In charting these attempts to censor the film, we get an idea of just how
influential fundamentalism can be in determining who gets to speak about Christ,
and how Christ must be spoken about in order to speak legitimately. It also
shows who gets to define blasphemy.
In his book, The Man the Networks Love to Hate, Donald Wildmon recalls
that when he first heard about Paramount’s plans to fund Scorsese’s Last
Temptation, he orchestrated a nationwide campaign to prevent the film’s
production. He exhorted Christians to express their outrage by bombarding
Paramount with letters, phone calls and postcards of protest. ‘Thankfully’,
Wildmon states, ‘this flood of communication convinced Paramount, which had
already spent $2 million on the Last Temptation project, to cancel its plans’.9
Paramount’s withdrawal from the project generated apprehension throughout
the film industry, and for a short while, it seemed that the film would find no
producer.
Five years later, Scorsese secured the backing of Universal, a subsidiary of
the Music Corporation of America (MCA), on the proviso that he would produce,
direct and develop his subsequent projects exclusively for them. The company
gave The Last Temptation ‘a budget less than half of the average Hollywood
film’.10  Universal tried a number of methods to defuse religious controversy,
and went as far as hiring conservative religious opinion makers as consultants
for marketing the project (the consultants later resigned after their calls for
revising two thirds of the script went unheeded). Still controversy could not be
defused. This time, the fundamentalist response was even more extreme, and
widespread. In fact, Christians of various denominations joined the
fundamentalist protest all over the world (some even bombed a Parisian theatre).
Needless to say, very few protesters had actually seen the film. Nonetheless, the
scale of the protests against the movie was unprecedented. Wildmon engaged
in a media blitz that saw him appear on network television shows such as Oprah
and Good Morning America. He sent 250 copies of the script to what he calls
‘influential’ Christian leaders, and recalls that his organisation, the American
Family Association (AFA),
recorded a three-minute Last Temptation-related radio spot that was
soon airing on 800 Christian radio stations nationwide. We also hurried
to produce a 30-minute television program attacking the movie. It aired
on more than 50 Christian stations and cable networks. We urged people
to protest by writing and calling MCA/Universal. Our AFA phone number
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also appeared so people could call and request a special petition asking
local theatre owners, out of respect for Christians in their community,
not to show the film. But this was only the beginning. In July I wrote
to 170,000 Christian pastors and asked them to promote the protest effort
in their churches. I also sent out more than three million letters to
Christian lay people.11
Following the example set by Wildmon and his organisation (by now re-named
the American Family Organisation), other fundamentalist organisations such as
the Campus Crusade for Christ, under the direction of Reverend Bill Bright,
‘offered followers a ‘Last Temptation Battle Plan’, complete with information
packet and video on the life of Christ’.12
As David S. Olson notes in his recent account of the American Family
Organisation’s campaign against The Last Temptation of Christ, the fundamentalist
protest was effective. Three Republican Congressmen attempted to pass a
resolution that the film be withdrawn from circulation, and the film lost money
at the box office because many cinemas refused to screen it. (It recovered a little
over half of its production costs).13  Indeed, only cinemas associated with MCA
would actually screen the film.14  It is still illegal to watch the film in Chile, and
when the film was released on video, the Blockbuster chain refused to carry it.
Controversies surrounding the film were re-ignited in the mid 1990s when it
first appeared on national television in Britain and Canada. In fact, according to
the Independent Television Commission, The Last Temptation held the record
for the most complaints received by a television station in 2003. This record of
1554 complaints was broken only recently in June 2005, when Jerry Springer —
the Opera attracted more than 15,000 complaints when aired on the British
Broadcasting Association.15  Clearly, when the Christian Right embarks on a
campaign to censor particular representations of Christ, one thing is certain:
millions of Christians throughout the world will dismiss texts that they have
never seen, even though they might be spiritually and theologically engaging.
So, why did the fundamentalists protest so much? What incited one Reverend
Bright to describe the film as ‘absolutely the most blasphemous, degenerate,
immoral, depraved script and film that I believe it is possible to conceive’?16
To begin with, it seems that representing Christ with the fascinating possibility
that he too struggled with doubts, fears and passions, like other human beings,
was far more shocking than the supposed ‘true’ flawless Christ told through the
Bible’s gospels. The irony is that this overtly fictional representation of Christ
allows audiences to grapple with Christ’s story in ways that traditional Hollywood
depictions of Christ do not. As Jonathon Rosenbaum puts it: ‘serious engagement
with doctrine is considered blasphemy, yet Hollywood representations of Biblical
incidents are viewed unproblematically, even though they are dependent on a
series of almost arbitrary and often absurd representational conventions’.17
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Predictably, the fundamentalists also objected to the presence of women at
the Last Supper. But more than anything else, they objected to the portrayal of
Christ as having sexual impulses. He is depicted, in the infamous ‘dream
sequence’, as making love to Mary, sister of Lazarus. Notwithstanding the fact
that this sequence is presented as Christ’s last temptation — the desire to produce
a family and make a life with them, as so many other human beings do — the
Christian Right was intent on preserving Christ’s call to sacrifice himself for the
sins of the world as completely unequivocal. If the presentation of a doubting
Christ makes this film blasphemous, then we certainly do believe that blasphemy
is a necessary transgression for redeeming some of the sins of the world today.
For without having doubt about the sanctity of our calls — without pausing to
ask how we might distinguish the calls of God from those of the Devil — what
sort of responsibility would we be taking for our ethical behaviour?
This is not to suggest a nihilism or relativism in the making of ethical
decisions. It is rather to acknowledge that ethical decisions are caught within
conceptual distinctions such as Go(o)d and (D)evil, which, like all antithetical
values, are not independent and complete entities in themselves, but knotted
together in the very acquisition of their meaning.18 While Nietzsche exploits
the exposure of the conceptual complicity between Good and Evil in his campaign
against morality, thinkers like Derrida and Levinas, as we will see below,
explicitly link the non-totality of conceptual opposites to the opening toward
the Other. This opening toward the other is known as the ethical relation. The
Other for Derrida and Levinas cannot be known in advance, so in order to be
responsive to the call of the Other we must endure the passage of suspending all
reliance on a programmatic, universalised morality.
The scandal over the film clearly illustrates that responding to the Christian
heritage is governed not so much by who hears the call, nor even who answers,
but whose voices acquire power to not only name the call, but act on its behalf.
This kind of fundamentalist response to art as outlined above begs a terrifying
comparison with George Bush’s recent proclamation that ‘God told me to invade
Iraq’. For what Bush shares in common with the fundamentalist Right who
frequently sabotage particular representations of Christ is both a forcing and
forging of who gains propriety over the Christian heritage. Crucial differences
between artists as opposed to the fundamentalists and Bush are situated in the
fact that the former explicitly portray an interpretation of their own singular
relationship to Christ without claiming their representations as Gospel, as it
were. Both the Bush administration and the Christian Right act as if they are the
‘chosen people’ responding to the call of God. We are asking here today, if all
of us here and now, whether Christian or not, or whether from any other religious
denomination for that matter, are obliged to take responsibility for what takes
place in the name of such a call.
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As mentioned earlier, if there is a call from the Christian heritage that we
want to reaffirm here and now, it is a call for justice. Yet, in doing so, we are
forced to reckon with all the atrocities that occur in the world today in the name
of justice. Now, while we might not have the means or power to expropriate the
term back from its current world stage appropriators, we do have the ability to
respond to a certain spirit of justice that ties Christ’s message to what Derrida,
after Levinas, situates as the ethical call of the Other. For Levinas, ethics inheres
in the face-to-face relation, where the self stands accused by the face of the other
before its own concerns with self over-coming. It is the ‘nakedness of the face’
that confronts the self as a summons to responsibility in the encounter of the
other’s death. Levinas wrote:
The other man’s death calls me into question, as if, by my possible future
indifference, I had become the accomplice of the death to which the
other, who cannot see it, is exposed; and as if, even before vowing myself
to him, I had to answer for this death of the other, and to accompany
the other in his mortal solitude. The other becomes my neighbour
precisely through the way the face summons me, calls for me, begs for
me, and in doing so recalls my responsibility, and calls me into
question.19
This ethical relationship to the Other is not subsumable within a universal ethics,
as it is intrinsically a singular relation. Unlike Kant’s categorical imperative or
Mill’s utilitarianism, Levinasian ethics do not have recourse to rules and maxims
that guide behaviour. Like the Pharisees who Jesus castigates in the gospels
(Matthew 23:23, Luke 11:42), contemporary fundamentalists promote strict
adherence to the literal ‘truth’ of the Bible, thereby invalidating interpretations
of the holy scriptures that emphasise the practice of justice over sanctimonious
observance of the law.
Without detailing the intricate dialogues between Derrida and Levinas
regarding how the Other gets situated in the language of ontology,20  let us focus
on the fact that Derrida reinforces this singularity of the ethical relation when
he distinguishes justice from law.21  For while law aims to be universal and
rule-bound, answering the call for justice must attend to the singularity in which
each of its calls are made. Moreover, Derrida situates law as something that is
deconstructible, because it is institutional, conventional, calculable, legible and
to use a famous Derridean term, ‘iterable’. Justice on the other hand, is ‘infinite,
incalculable, rebellious to rule’ and undeconstructible. For Derrida, maintaining
the space between law and justice is necessary in order for the singularity of
the Other to be given room to interrupt the universality and generality of
calculated laws. In other words, the decision between what is just and unjust is
never insured by a rule as justice comes in the form of a singular idiom. As John
Caputo,22  has noted, Jesus is exemplary here. Through the gospels that tell us
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of Jesus making the blind man see, of saving the whore from being stoned to
death, and of raising Lazarus from the dead, we find the ethical resonance of
the face-to-face relation, where Jesus attends to the Other’s command each time
he is called: singularly.
In presenting Jesus in all his human frailty (yet without discounting his
divinity), Scorsese opens a space from which we can perceive ourselves struggling
over the receiving end of a call. Who’s calling you? The Bush alliance? The
casualties of war? Or your neighbour in her everyday struggles? Do you respond
to a programmatic, universal ‘Ethics’, or are you finding yourself increasingly
attuned to countless calls from singular others who suffer? These questions are
not supposed to be easily answered. As outlined in what Derrida calls the aporias
of justice, our role in judging the answers to these questions cannot take place
by a mere instrument that calculates. Each decision in the name of justice requires
a ‘fresh judgment’ to be made in a ‘reinstituting act of interpretation’.23  If we
are serious about responding to the heritage of Christ, then this requires a unique
interpretation that no ‘coded rule can or ought to guarantee absolutely’.24
Furthermore, a free decision must go through the ordeal of the undecidable,
which is not merely the tension between two decisions, but the negotiation with
that which is beyond calculation; an impossible decision. If Christ did not struggle
between his divine calling and life on earth, there would have been no sacrifice
at all, but the mere robotic motions toward a destiny that had no business with
free will. Yet the passage through the undecidable does not mean that we
therefore forgo the making of the decision; this would reduce action to an equally
inert disposition. The final aporia of justice that Derrida outlines concerns the
‘urgency that obstructs the horizon of knowledge’.25 The immediacy and
urgency in which incoming calls from others are received demand that a decision
must be made no matter how much time and information one has at one’s disposal.
We must respond and act in the here and now as Christ responded to the
downtrodden then and there. Such a treatment of justice — the call for a fresh
judgment, the ordeal through the undecidable and the urgency of the decision
— is a far cry from the programmatic doctrine of Christian fundamentalism. If
the struggles of Scorcese’s Jesus give us a character that is more relatable and
accessible to our own ethical problems today, then perhaps the blasphemy
Scorsese is accused of is a necessary transgression for reacquainting ourselves
with Jesus as an ethical activist. As an accessible character, Scorsese’s Jesus also
invites us to ask where our own ethical calls come from, and judge what
temptations we might succumb to, and what sacrifices we might make as we
attempt to heed the calls. For, without struggling with these questions and
agonising over our responses to them — as Scorcese’s Jesus did — we would
be fleeing from a responsibility for passing on the heritage that is committed to
bringing the good news, so to speak, to the oppressed.
So, just as my father sent me
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Now I’m sending you out to be
The spirit throughout the world, the whole of the world
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Section III
Reinterpreting Freedom of Expression
Multiculturalism and religious pluralism pose a particular set of political issues
for a liberal society. On one interpretation, all that freedom of religion requires
is freedom from persecution. Yet, a stronger requirement suggested for many is
that a liberal society should make allowances for the religious group. For instance,
it has been argued that allowances may be made to enable the member of a
religious group to participate in religious observance, and to maintain their
integrity in meeting religious duties. An even stronger claim is that tolerance
in a society with religious pluralism requires more than mere exemptions to
laws, but respect for their beliefs. As Peter Jones (1990) puts it, ‘“respect for
beliefs” is a principle that is especially relevant to a pluralistic society in which
different groups of people hold fundamentally different beliefs. It holds that,
in such a society, not only should people be allowed to conduct their lives in
accordance with their most deeply held beliefs, they should also not have to
endure attacks upon those beliefs’. Such a principle, however, is seen as deeply
at odds with the liberal principle of freedom of expression.
Providing an analysis of what he calls the ‘monologue of Liberalism’, Jasdev
Singh Rai presents the perspective of the Sikh community that was involved in
protests over the play Behzti. Rai rejects the dichotomy between freedom of
expression and religious fundamentalism and orthodoxy implicit in Nash’s
interpretation of the dangers of multiculturalism. What Sikhs were protesting
about was not blasphemy, but the misrepresentation of their religion from the
perspective of the West, and the deliberate intention to offend. Rai makes a case
for the Indic model of tolerance. Plurality of meaning does not exist in Indic
civilisation as two separate entities but subsumed as a whole—what might seem
like conflicting dichotomies to the Western observer, like the sacred and the
profane, coexist without any problem. Conflict arises when attempts are made
through art to impose a hegemonic view on individuals or when what is cherished
as sacred by a community is publicly discredited or desecrated. To bring about
change in what some may perceive as oppressive dogmatism, one does not need
to blaspheme or offend a religion, but rather resort to intellectual debate and
critique.
Jeremy Shearmur explores the limits of J. S. Mill’s justification of freedom
of speech in terms of the interrogation of religions’ claims to truth. While
supporting Mill’s position, Shearmur offers arguments against an expansive
interpretation of the requirements of freedom of speech. He takes the position
that offence is a harm to be avoided. More specifically, Shearmur advances a
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(tentative) theory about how we might classify ideas, in terms of the degree and
kind of criticism to which they might be subjected, and also suggests that those
of us who operate in a sphere in which ideas are routinely submitted to a high
degree of critical scrutiny, should legitimately exercise a degree of paternalism
— in the sense of not necessarily treating other people’s ideas in the manner in
which they are, prima facie, advancing them, unless they are fully aware of what
the implications of so doing may mean. Typically, people have beliefs that they
implicitly take to be correct and organise their lives by. In going about their
lives, they are not offering their ideas up for public scrutiny in terms of truth
and falsity. He argues that we are only entitled to challenge them when we are
invited to do so, or when such views impinge significantly upon us or those
about whom we care. This suggests that the acceptability of vigorous attacks
upon, or questioning of, people’s views is context dependent. The implication
of the argument from offence is that cartoonists and artists do wrong when they
ridicule religious beliefs, or use them as the basis for ‘aesthetic play’.
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8
The monologue of liberalism and its
imagination of the sacred in
minority cultures
Jasdev Singh Rai
The particular evolution of Western civilisation has forced upon its artists a
responsibility that becomes invalid and obscurantist when transposed upon the
cultures of Indic civilisation. The fundamental distinctions between the two
civilisations offer different challenges to the artist. But Western hegemony in
the arts often clouds critical thinking and encourages the generalisation of
inherited western experiences and concepts as universal and transcendent rather
than as particular to its own cultural evolution. The arts and the theatre have
enjoyed an uninterrupted progress in Indic civilisations for over 3000 years. In
that period, subjects such as freedom of expression, boundaries, and sacrilege
have been considered in this ancient and pluralistic civilisation, and even
articulated in the ancient text of arts and theatre, Natyashastar.
What does the sacred mean in other civilisations, and can it be treated in the
same context as the sacred in Western civilisation? In other words, firstly, can
civilisations be treated to similar artistic explorations, and can art have
intrinsically a uniform role across cultures and civilisations? And secondly, can
the Western format of the institution of arts and its temple, the theatre, enjoy
the same immunity from the normal etiquettes of engagement in Indic cultures
as it does in Western civilisation?
The editors’ comment: ‘In recent years, issues surrounding the rights of
minority cultures to recognition and respect have raised new questions about
the contemporariness of the construct of blasphemy and sacrilege. Controversies
over the aesthetic representation of the sacred, the exhibition of the sacred as
art, and the public display of sacrilegious or blasphemous works have given rise
to heated debates and have invited us to reflect on binaries like “artistic and
religious sensibilities”, “tolerance and philistinism”, “the sacred and the profane”,
“deification and vilification”.’ This offers an opportunity to open Western
discourse on freedom of expression to a different construct of critique in which
words such as ‘blasphemy’ lose their meaning and concepts such as binaries are
uncomfortable juxtapositions. There is a paradox in the parody of the passionate
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Western artist struggling against the fabricated demons restricting freedom of
expression that he/she assumes exist within ancient civilisations such as Indic.
The depth and breadth of freedoms in Indic civilisation have evolved over a
much longer period than the experience of freedoms in the West and need to
be appreciated in the context of different political and social philosophies that
have been prevalent in South Asia.
A principle perspective in the West is a dualist worldview, and inherent in
Western civilisation are the concepts of evangelic universalism in almost all
fields. A driving force within the imposition of Western philosophical paradigms
in the public space is an assumption that at any given time some basic principles
or ideas occupying the public space in that particular period are universal without
contest: that they are absolutist, from which people deviate at their peril, or the
standard toward which others need to strive. Usually only one philosophical
paradigm or conceptual framework dominates and determines the public space.
For instance, in medieval times, Christian dogma was the universal absolute
truth, while post-Enlightenment, secularism and science are the paradigms of
truth. It is in this secular paradigm that freedom of expression is often held as
an absolute, and from which the purist accuses people of deviating from, or of
compromising.1  It is within this context that the sacred and the profane exist
in Western civilisation and the contest between the artistic and the restrictive
is played out in various forms of art. In this binary world, the Church once
considered it a triumph to uphold laws against blasphemy, hence restricting
freedom of expression. The opposite has now been legitimised in the public
space, where the theatre’s efforts to push the boundaries of expression even
through offence2  are seen as a triumph against the traditional restrictions of the
Church.
However, to impose this Christian, Western dynamic upon other civilisations
and cultures is at best naive, and perhaps constitutes a political statement. There
is a fundamental difference between Western and Indic civilisations. The essential
philosophy of Indic civilisation destroys generic dualism and absorbs it. It enables
multiple philosophical paradigms and conceptual frameworks to occupy the
public space at the same time. It also abhors evangelic and assertive universalism
and perpetually deconstructs it. Moreover, most Eastern philosophies devalue
anthropocentrism. Since dualism is destroyed, the dichotomy of sacred and
profane has little relevance in Indic cultures. Therefore, the appreciation of the
‘sacred’ has to proceed within different perspectives. This chapter argues that
the ‘sacred’ is the creative in Indic civilisations, standing independent of the
concept of the profane; and offence is seen as the failure of theatre rather than
its triumph over restrictions. Moreover, protection of what is ‘sacred’ from
offence is part of the embedded political philosophy of pluralism.
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The British play, Behzti, which attracted considerable indignation from the
Sikhs in Britain and was ultimately forced to close down, was set within the
contesting binaries of western philosophy. Its producers had assumed that the
Western conceptual and historical evolution of freedom of expression as a
universal norm is absolute. They failed to see that the play had transgressed the
boundaries of success and entered the arena of failure, as well as the hegemonic
politics in their perception of Indic societies as operating within the same binaries.
Principles and pluralism in Indic civilisation
As a generalisation, the bulk of Eastern philosophy, with some exception such
as the Nyaya and Vaisesika schools,3  absorbs and devours dualism within most
of its strands. The perpetual conflict for hegemony between opposing
universalisms becomes redundant in Indic civilisation. The artist is free in Indian
civilisation, because the civilisation itself is essentially free from dogma. This is
the obvious thing that escapes the Western liberal artist when Indian cultures
are ‘orientalised’ and treated under the rubric of the dualist struggle in terms
of which the main body of Western civilisation comprehends reality. Edward
Said, who introduced the word ‘Orientalism’4  in relation to perceptions about
the Islamic world, charged the West with failing to understand other cultures
and of imposing its own worldview to make sense of others; this
misunderstanding was partly romantic and partly demeaning. Such an approach
perverts the understanding of alternative cultures, and eventually it leads to
the leading Western-educated minds in other cultures internalising the myth
created by the West of themselves. Similarly, Western liberalism has generally
failed to comprehend the non-dualist world view of the East in practical everyday
life. Although many Western intellectuals romanticise it ‘intellectually’, they
rarely understand its practical expression, and often simplify the seeming
contradictions in Eastern cultures in Western dualist contests of good–bad,
freedom–oppression.
Multiple and sometimes competing complexities fusing into one strand are
a feature of the dominant Vedanta school of which the Advaita (meaning non
dualist) Vedanta5  of Adi Sankara6  has inspired most of Hindu thinking. In
Vedic thinking, there is not only Brahma the creator, and Shiva the destroyer,
but also Vishnu the preserver. One creates, the other destroys, the third
preserves. What is destroyed is created again, preserved and destroyed and it
goes on. Time and space become irrelevant, as does history. There is harmony
among the three rather than conflict. Underlying all this is the still, unmoving
Brahaman,7  the Eternal in whom everything finally collapses into, who has set
this drama, the Lila, an illusion of cycles perceived subjectively by each human
mind. Thus, Hindu philosophy obfuscates certainty and undermines
fundamentalism anchored in divine revelation.
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In the ordinary tapestry of Indian life, Rama, the god of virtue and charity,
can sit with Kali, the god of destruction and sacrifice. The Dharmasashtra, the
text of chants of moral duties can be read with the Kama Sutras, the texts of
pleasure, in the same temple. Varanasi, the holiest place of worship on the Ganges
is not very far from Khajurao, where the temples have bestiality, orgies,
homosexuality and heterosexual positions carved on temple walls. The sacred
and profane are not seen as in conflict with each other. The tapestry is flattened,
all existing in the same domain, the same corner, walking and breathing together
without threat from the other or threatening the other.
In the Sikh philosophy, Satguru, the eternal teacher is called by so many
attributes and character names that the name loses meaning, becoming ‘anaame’8
(without name) in the Dasaam Granth, the text written during the period of the
tenth Sikh Guru, Guru Gobind Singh. The anaame is the benevolent architect
of the tranquillity of a quiet beach, and also the alleged demonic destroyer who
created the Tsunami9  as explained in the Guru Granth Sahib, the textual guide
of the Sikhs compiled by the ten Sikh Gurus.10  Everything functions within
hukam,11  the laws, but no one quite understands why things happen,
ultimately.12  Bad and good are in people’s minds. We can venture conjectures
on the mechanics, but to understand ‘the why’ is beyond ordinary language
and discourse. No one can know the ultimate truth; therefore no one can claim
to have knowledge superior to that of others.13
Dialogue and critical discourse is an intrinsic feature of Indic philosophies.
Consequently Indian philosophies and cultures are used to disagreements and
critical views. But in critique and dialogue, offence is avoided in Indic cultures.
For instance, within Sikhi, the trinity of Hinduism (called Trimurti) is not
dismissed with a language of condemnation, but it is made irrelevant through
subtle critique.14 The human can outwit the trinity gods and make a direct
connection with the Eternal. The pantheon of Hindu gods is thus made irrelevant.
But, in the Sikh scripture, Sri Guru Granth Sahib, the language is never offensive,
never commanding, just as it never is in Indic traditions. It initiates a debate
within the individual to come up with the desired inference. The one eternal
divine reality of Sikhi and the multiple gods of some sections of Hinduism have
coexisted in the same territorial, social and political space without either system
waging a crusade against the other.
The sacred and profane exist within the same context, in the same dimension,
in the same space. They are not demarcated by territory or barriers. Differences
exist in people’s minds. Therefore, there is no battle for the artist to overcome
or external forces to challenge, except people’s minds. The success of the artist
is to introduce a dialogue within the mind.
But this is where the Natyashastar 15  places sanctions, as does Kautaliya’s
Arthashastra. Both prohibit deliberate offence. The reason becomes apparent
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when other aspects of Indian civilisation and the theory of arts are considered.
The Natyashastar, written about 2500 years ago, is the text of theatre and arts.
The Arthashaster, also written around the same time by Kautaliya, is a text of
statecraft and politics, written at least 1500 years before Machiavelli’s The Prince.
Most Indic philosophies believe in an eternal drama. Creation is engaged in
a drama, the lila (Sanskrit), constructing, deconstructing in perpetual cycles
operating concurrently.16 Lila is the key concept that enables Indian thinker
to escape from universalism and anthropocentrism. There is nothing special
about Man. All creation is engaged in this perpetual drama. Some day, humans
will become extinct and may rise again. All human ideas are conjectures as no
one can penetrate the ultimate reality of the drama. On the other hand, our
perceptions are illusions, maya, which are real for us, but in the wider context,
part of illusion within the lila.
This enables an enduring plurality and the freedom from hegemonic
tendencies. The philosopher is under no compulsion to be an evangelist and
spread his inspirations or impose his world view. In Indian tradition, the guru
(the guide) waits, and the disciple comes to him. Different gurus have different
perspectives. The Nyaya school17  is highly analytic, as opposed to the intuitive
and even blind belief system of some schools. It uses principles of human reason
to deconstruct. The Samkhya school is atheist.18  It believes that only what we
can see, feel and reason, exists. The Vedanta, the most popular school in Hindu
society, believes in the Brahaman,19  the creator and the creation as maya, an
illusion. Yet, the different schools co-exist in the same town, and in the same
Kingdom.
Stated within the acceptable norms of dialogue, nothing is shocking and
nothing is really suppressed in Indic civilisation. There is nothing that invites
the wrath of the ‘Church’, as there is no Church. Since there is no concept of the
sacred and the profane as distinct entities, everything is sacred. All life, all
creativity and all action are sacred. Even rejection of a divine order or a God
isn’t considered blasphemous, unholy or a sacrilege. In fact, the Samkhya school
of Hinduism is atheistic and has coexisted as an alternative philosophy of reality
without tension between it and other systems.
Hindu civilisation makes a subtle difference between philosophy and
pragmatic everyday life. The differences are manmade. People pray to stone
gods, but the philosopher engages in dialectic beyond gods. Beliefs exist in
perpetual dialogue with others, with the environment, and with the abstract
perception of truth. The individual is free to choose his god and his version of
reality, his method of perception and form of sacredness. The individual’s
engagement is voluntarily. No church or doctrine forces a particular world-view
upon the individual. But the culture imposes that he or she accepts and respects
the personal space of the other. What one individual considers sacred may seem
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ridiculous to the other. This degree of pluralism survives by each person and
community respecting the other for what they are, not what they can be in one’s
terms.
In this free-for-all world, order is maintained in society through some
regulation. Civil regulation is part of society, made sacred, but never so
universalist as to warrant crusades to convert other systems. There are at least
four versions of the Dharmasutras, 20  (also named Dharmashastra) the texts of
duties, but there have never been conflicts or wars over ‘which’ Dharmasutra.
Whenever domination occurs, it is asserted out of pure desire for power and not
in some vague belief in one single absolutist idea of the cosmos and life. There
are laws, but they are often made by the hegemonic caste or group. These are
not absolute laws. They are enacted and imposed consciously by a section of
society for its own benefit, sometimes hideous and unjust laws which function
to create privilege. The upper caste claims authority from the ancient sages for
these laws and repression of others. But if the Brahmins created the caste for
their own power, the sanyasi (ascetics) made the casteless system outside the
civil. In traditional India, the towns and villages were often regulated by the
Brahmin with rules codified in Manu’s laws.21  However, the dissenter could
legitimately walk out on this and into the almost bohemian and non-materialist
life of the sanyasi, with their camps and dwellings in forests. The sanyasi could
wander into the towns and villages without fear, but did not stay there to avoid
living under civil laws. One version of the Hindu text, Ramayana was written
by Valmiki, a sudre (of the low caste), yet Brahmins, not so long ago, cleansed
themselves even when the shadow of a sudre prevailed on them.
But one almost universalist concept in Indic civilisation is to limit the scope
of gratuitous offence as a weapon of critique, in order to maintain this fiercely
pluralistic society. This is the principle that requires the arts and the theatre to
avoid offence for the sake of offence, ridicule for the sake of ridicule, or
‘profanity’ simply to make a point. The sacred is not universal but individual
to the person or the community. Each person and each community of believers
creates his/her own space outside others. That space is its ‘essential’ and, therefore
sacred. And each creates its own rituals, practices and causes. The rules of
dialectic allow critique but not offence. Offensive acts towards or offensive
representations of another’s sacred is a political statement. It is the equivalent
of robbery, impropriety or intended humiliation.
If people were to ridicule the other’s choice, make mockery, deliberately
offend, and purposely destroy the ‘sacred’ imagination of another, society would
break down into a series of violent retaliations and power struggles. This is the
basis of self regulation in Indian civilisation. The distinction between critique
and offence is embedded in culture. Since another’s god is not imposing any
laws upon one’s own value system, there is no reason to embark on a campaign
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of humiliating the other’s god or the other’s beliefs. There is no mileage in parody
of the sacred, since the submission to a god or a system is voluntary.
This principle of civility allows the atheist of the school of Samkhya to live
as neighbour in the same street as the believer in the elephant god, Ganesh. The
person who sacrifices to Kali (goddess of destruction) and the Sikh who rejects
this multitude of gods and idol worship and the Muslim who believes in a
revealed religion, the Christian who believes in a son of God and the Buddhist
who does not ponder about a creator, can coexist. This coexistence would break
down if the humanist put up plays offending the others in his or her assumption
of superior values, or the Christian stamped on the elephant god as devil worship,
the Sikh spat on the idol of Kali, and the Muslim tore down the crucifix of Christ
under pretext of freedom of expression. Indian society would simply tear itself
apart. Plurality survives on rejection of universality but respect of the other’s
sacred space.
One of most spectacular living examples of this plurality of beliefs,
philosophies and ways of lives is seen at the three-yearly festival of Maha Kumbh
Mela, rotating between four cities in India. The Hindu Pantheon, from the nanga
sadhus (naked holymen) to the rigidly caste-ist and puritanical Brahmins, come
together in a gathering of millions. Nothing creative can shock in the Maha
Kumbh Mela. In this grand spectacle of Indian civilisation in performance, there
is no absolute ceiling, no divinely ordained universal restrictive laws, and no
desecration as understood in Western civilisation. It is a world of believe and
let believe.
Perhaps the very concept and terminology of religion is misplaced in Indic
cultures. Hinduism has the Dharmasutras, the texts of natural duties, the
Shilpasashtra, the texts of science and architecture, the Arthasashtra, the text
of politics and statecraft, the Kama Shastrar, the text of pleasure, and the
Natyashastra, the text of theatre and arts as well as many other smaller Vedic
texts. But they also coalesce. There is the wide-ranging Manu’s laws,22  which
deal with individual moral life, inter-personal interactions, community relations,
commerce, politics and in fact most aspects of life. They are part of the so-called
sacred cannons of Hinduism. How can these broad fields be classified as religion?
They are part of a civilisation that does not differentiate between the religious
and the political, between the secular and the spiritual. Indic philosophies tend
to work on the premise of a holistic approach and interdependency.
In Sikhi too, the distinction between religion and politics, worship and action,
science and spirit, simply do not exist. They are artificial atomistic distinctions
created by modernity and when applied to Sikhi, they confuse interpretation
and meaning of the Sikh teachings. The word that Indic systems use to describe
themselves is ‘dharma’.
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The word ‘dharma’ does not have a direct transliteration in English. Sri
Krishna Kant, Vice President of India in 1997, made a clear distinction between
dharma and religion.23  He described dharma this way:
First and foremost it [dharma] means living in harmony with nature and
natural laws. It means to live by moral and ethical principles of the
society without surrendering the freedom to question them. The term
‘Yuga Dharma’ signifies that Dharma itself is continually evolving and
not rigid or inflexible. The continuous evolution of Dharma has been
through debate, and the triumph of logic, consensus and harmony. Most
importantly, Dharma is not linked to any religion or set of beliefs.24
The Krishna society describes dharma as ‘the inseparable quality that makes
a thing what it is. A stone’s dharma is to be hard, water’s is to be wet, fire’s to
be hot, sugar’s to be sweet’.25 The Mahabharat, one of the sacred texts of
Hinduism, describes: (‘dhaaranaat dharmam ityahuh dharmo dhaarayate prajah,’)
‘They call it dharma, since it upholds; it is dharma that upholds the people (of
the world)’. That which upholds, supports or sustains this universe, without
which the universe would disintegrate, is dharma.
The Guru Granth Sahib, the living textual Guru (Guide) of the Sikhs does
not use the word mazhab, which translates as ‘religion’, but the word ‘dharam’
(a Punjabi word for dharma) as the context of its teachings. There is now a body
of work in India which refutes the use of the word ‘religion’ in reference to Indic
systems, and which considers the word to be appropriate to Abrahamic traditions,
with a restrictive meaning. The word ‘dharma’, in my own writings is described
as the essence of modern science with the spiritual dimension intrinsic. Thus,
it is the elusive truth which science is trying to search and which Indic traditions
have been speculating and searching for a long time. Religions, on the other
hand, tend to end up in proscriptive truths. (Truth, that is, so-called.)
Therefore, parallels with Western civilisation become irrelevant and irrational.
Indic systems never strive to create a single way of thinking or a single ‘truth’
or system of understanding reality. The civilisation is most at ease when there
is pluralism. From this perspective, statements such as ‘binaries like artistic and
religious sensibilities, tolerance and philistinism, the sacred and the profane,
deification and vilification’ lose their meaning and context.
The challenge from the universalists
Indic civilisation has seen an invasion of its systems at least three times, and all
from the Abrahamic universalist creeds. First Islam crusaded against India’s
idols, and then it embarked on an economic and sometimes oppressive program
of converting people to its revealed set of universals. The Sikhs, the Marathas
and Rajputs (Hindus) rose against the Mughals to stamp out their intolerance.
Then Christian zealots and missionaries and neo-scientists came with the Empire,
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openly mocking and ridiculing the gods of the Hindus. Mahatma Gandhi used
this offensive and oppressive behaviour of the colonist as one of his campaign
logics to drive out the British. The humanists (an atheist version of Abrahamic
creeds) gained enough Indian converts and caused mayhem through secular
democratic theory (Indian Congress Party) and the communist party. There has
been a tension between the ‘reformists’ and traditional India since independence.
But gradually, ancient India is pluralising the liberal universalist. Since all human
thought and ideas are conjectures, the very idea of a set of some secular principles
being more sacred and universal than the ideas and practices guiding worship
of the elephant god is an antithesis of Indic philosophy. More than three thousand
years of cultural pluralism has survived by restraining from imposing.
In post-colonial India, modernism with its universalist tendencies, has cast
a long shadow in the social, political and arts fields. It has influenced mainly
the educated classes. Traditional philosophy is not taught in schools, and people
are left to find out about it through religious institutions or general literature.
It is only in the last two decades that some critical thinking is emerging on the
different conceptual foundations. It is quite common to find that ‘educated’
Indians think in Western dualist concepts and Western ideas of freedom of
expression. No lesser a person than Vice President Krishna Kant commented on
this: ‘The Western education system forced us to think in Western ways.’26
The most likely reason may be discerned from Lord MaCauley’s words in
February 1835 when he wrote his rationale for a new education system for British
India (during the Empire): ‘We must at present do our best to form a class who
may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of
persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals,
and in intellect.’27 There hasn’t been a fundamental reform of the Indian
education system since. It is common to find the average Indian brought up on
traditional education and knowledge, reacting differently than the educated
classes to similar issues. One of them is freedom within the arts. Interestingly,
a modernised universalist and united but intolerant form of Hinduism has also
emerged from the educated classes which David Ludden ascribes to the influence
of modernity.28  It is expressed as political Hinduism of the Hindu Mahasabha,
an umbrella organisation of Hindu movements which started in the early
twentieth century in reaction to British colonialism, and which gave rise to the
Bharatya Janata Party (BJP).
Critique and conflicts within Indic discourse
In Indic civilisation critique is encouraged, a dialogue of disagreement is
encouraged and a discourse of rejection of the other’s belief through debate
(textual, verbal, and visual) is promoted. In fact, the Upanishads are critiques
written and discoursed over centuries. However, there is a balance between
offence and critique which has been observed in Indian civilisation for centuries.
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When it breaks down, it leads to violence and disruptions. This became evident
in the modernised version of Hinduism of the BJP, with its intolerant universalist
and united formulation of Hinduism. But ancient India rejects them just as it
dislikes the secularist enforcer.
There have been breakdowns and conflicts between different groups in Indian
history. They have been conflicts for power. In the Hindu pantheon, even gods
fight. The gods of some people win wars over the gods of others. The gods of
some are plagiarised. But the culture reverts back to its pluralistic stability and
mutual respect. For instance, the Sikh Scripture, the Guru Granth Sahib subtly
critiques the Hindu pantheon. The Hindus treat the Granth Sahib with reverence.
The Granth Sahib does not offend but critiques, thus respecting, but not agreeing
with, the Hindu pantheon.
The arts and particularly theatre is a field in which critique and disagreement
has been expressed for centuries. However, this has generally followed guidelines
established by the ancient text, the Natyashastar.
Indian arts and theatre, the Natyashastar
In ancient Indian arts theory, the entirety of existence is itself theatre. The
constructed theatre of man is only another drama within it. It therefore evolves,
dissolves and plays within the larger theatre of life, ideas and philosophies.
The Natyashastar (or Natyasastra) of Bharata (the writer/s), the oldest text
of arts and theatre in India, propounds a sophisticated theory of theatre and of
the performing arts. The Natyasastar stands as one of the greatest books from
the ancient literature of Indian civilisation and brings the theories of the other
shastras into drama. It is a detailed text on the theory, practice and rules of
performing arts. Five main principles summarise the Natyashastar. These
principles are Artha, Rasa, Abhinaya, Sahmita and Natyadharma.29
Artha is the sentiment or the substance that the author wants to convey, that
is, the message of the text. In Indian theatre, the text is extremely important,
written within the wider philosophy of maya (illusion of reality) as lila (drama).
It is not absolutist. It engages human life and the wider drama of existence. The
message, the substance, strives to impact through Rasa.
Rasa is the essence. Rasa cultivates the receptive faculties of receivers
activating a whole range of responses whose aim is a condition of sahmita
(wholeness). Rasa is not a sudden revelation;30  it results from a gradual
revelation. The performer and the audience become engaged in the whole
performance. But bhavas, or states of mind, have to be aroused. The Natyashastar
recognises two distinct bhavas. The sthayibhavas, 31  of which there are nine,
are dormant in human nature and aroused by external stimuli, and the
vyabhicaribhavas, of which there are 33,32  and which are transient and fickle.
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Abhinaya is the variety of props and techniques that give visual form on the
stage. This is the function of the actor and the director.33
Sahmita is the concept of wholeness. A particular event or a story may be
performed, but the story is in the context of the holistic view of life, the
intertwining facets of human existence that are essential in Indian philosophy.
As Yarrow states from the Natyasastra: ‘Art is not diversion, escape, amusement:
it is means to wholeness of vision and to the integrated function of perception
in more than ordinary modes.’34 Sahmita also concerns the intrinsic knitting
together of artha, the rasa, and abhinaya.
Natyadharma, the rules of drama, determine how, when and what can be
put on stage in one form or other. The rules require that the play avoid grim
realism, tragic ends, sexually explicit actions, political revolt and offence.35
Although theatre in India has made some dramatic departures over time, for
instance, plays have put tragic and grim ends (for example, the tragic love operas
Heer Ranjha, Sohni Mahiwaal and the Tamil classic Shilappadikaram 36  ),
contained politically subversive messages (in the dramatic political poetry of
folk singers called Dhaadis in Sikh uprisings against Mughals, and in Nil
Darpan,37  an 1860 play that exposed British colonialism’s effect on indigo
workers and was banned by the British subsequently leading to the Censorship
Act of 1876), and have been sexually explicit ( such as the temple dances of
Devadasis, which shocked the British), the principle of avoiding offence was
retained throughout. However, according to Kautilya’s Arthashastra, the guide
to State craft, entertainers were permitted to make fun of the customs, castes or
families and the practices and love affairs of individuals.38 The fine distinction
between ridicule, fun and gratuitous offence was maintained. The early Indian
cinema stuck close to the five principles of Natyashastar, and modern Indian
cinema still avoids offence.
The other aspect of theatre and arts in Indic civilisation is that, unlike Western
theatre, the inherited Roman amphitheatre, it generally lacked distinct theatre
enclosures with an audience captured in a walled setting. The temple itself was
theatre. Theatre travelled to the ordinary person, into the villages, in remote
places and in big cities.39  It blended.
The performance could last for days, which made the task of the performers
extremely difficult as they had to retain the rasa (essence) from day to day, keep
the audience engaged, and get the message across. The challenge was to deal
with difficult critique without offending, but leaving a deep impression that
asked the audience to think for a long time after the performers had left. The
play avoided immediate offence, but succeeded in leaving a sentiment and a
dialogue within the recipient.
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Thus, the traditional Indian audience is sophisticated, having inherited a
pattern of theatre which rejects universality and sustains the general principles
of plural life in Indian cultures. Traditionally, Indian theatre has been conscious
of the freedom of conscience that allows for a pantheon of beliefs and choices.
This gives the artist complete freedom in creativity. Theatre understands that
each person and community creates its own sacred space as its identity and its
creative activity. The creation of these variable and innumerable forms of creative
sacred spaces gives rise to forms of art and expressions of the individual,
deliberately transported out of the domain of explanation or reason in many
instances. Disparate systems co-exist within a healthy dialectic of critique and
doubt. But the art is in learning the boundaries of critique, so the arts never
become offensive. This is understood within traditional theatre, which can be
provocative without being offensive. The play succeeds if it can engage the
audience through rasa, with the artha (the sentiment) that invokes thought
rather than anger. It fails if it causes offence and provokes violent response or
anger.
Modernity and Indian arts
In this ancient and highly sophisticated civilisation, modernity has created
disruptions. Many Indians educated within Western systems are oblivious of
the history and theories of the Natyashastar, and have transformed Indian theatre
to a mirage of Western theatre. Indian life has been ‘invaded’ by western cultural
forms.40 Theatre is bound by the limits of time and it uses Western theatre
theory to be provocative. But the audience of the villages and the traditions are
used to a different sophistication in theatre. They do not like the brutal form of
theatre of the West. They can appreciate the subtle and entertaining form of
Western theatre. But they react adversely when it provokes with offence, because
this breaks one of the most sacred principles of Indian plurality, ‘respect and
be respected’, the dialectic of critique without the politics of desecration and
hegemony.
It is an irony that the Western liberal cannot teach the traditional Indian
freedom of thought as it is intrinsic in Indic civilisation, so he/she reverts to
teaching the Indian freedom to offend! But an important question is ‘offend what
and offend for the sake of what?’ If criticism and disagreement is allowed and
since no system of belief assumes a position of infallibility, what exactly is offence
trying to achieve?
To offend implies a self elevated sense of superiority as the racist in the street
does. To offend assumes one knows better than the other. But, according to Indic
civilisation all human knowledge is ultimately a myth, a creation of human
imagination. The truth remains elusive. The Indic civilisation does not support
the belief that there is an objective knowledge out there to be decoded
definitively through the empiricism of science. Even science is a human
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construction, a certain way of looking at things, a methodology. In the Indic
context, why is the myth of the liberal any superior than that of his predecessor,
the Christian or the Muslim? And how are the myths of the Muslim any superior
to that of the Christian or the Jew? How are the humanist’s ethics any more real
than those of the animist or the so called superstition of Ganesh, the elephant
god? The humanist calls his creed rational liberalism, the Christian fundamentalist
claims his creed to be a divine revelation that cannot be faulted. The extremes
of the two exist in tension and compete to claim authentic legitimacy. The use
of the weapon of offence in this duel is understandable as neither concedes
ground or acknowledge the other to have legitimacy too. When the dialectic
breaks down or is restricted, the politics of violence and offence takes over.
The new religion of Western civilisation is a certain construction of human
reason, a particular worldview. The liberal is as fanatical as his predecessor, the
Christian believer. Just as the Christian wanted to spread the message across the
world, and force it down the throats of the rest of the unwitting world, the
liberal assumes a similar crusade driven by a belief in the universality of his
ideals. When examined in context, the genesis of Western liberal thought from
the Enlightenment appears to have failed to address the essential problematic
feature of medieval Christian dogma. The sinister fanaticism, the certainty, the
universalism that gave rise to the crusades, colonialism, slavery and oppression,
has crept through intact into the new liberal creed. Negri’s ‘Empire’41  is a great
expose of the neo-colonialism of liberalism. All that has changed is that faith in
the certainty of divine revelation has been replaced by faith in the certainty of
human reason. The West stumbled towards freedom from the oppressive
restrictions of the Church. But it shows little if any recognition that the ‘other’
(that is, Indic civilisation) has had freedom for at least three millennia and has
no sanction against criticism, no system of inviolable oppressive ethics, no
concept of the proscriptive, no problem with freedom of expression and no
concept of the sacred as defined in relation to the profane. The distinction
between sacred and profane does not exist in Indic theatre.42 There isn’t
comprehension that Indic civilisation does not have a sense of religion in the
context of Abrahamic religions. It appears that hegemony seems to empower
interpretation and comprehension of the other through one linguistic tool and
worldview.
In the Indian context, the profane is the universalist, because it attempts to
undermine the basic Indian concept of pluralism. When the sacred is deliberately
treated with disrespect, rather than critique, it is seen as the beginning of political
universalism, a concept Indian civilisation has successfully contested and defeated
time and again through its known 3000 years of civilisation. This was at the
heart of the response of the non-Westernised Sikhs in UK to the crude theatre
of Behzti.
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Behzti, the contest of civilisations
We come to the practical: the real drama of Behzti. There were at least three
plays in the entire saga: the serious play by Gurpreet Bhatti, the semiotic play
by the Birmingham Repertory Theatre (or its director), and the drama out in the
street — a clash between two civilisations.
Bhatti’s play was simple and straightforward. Written from an orientalist
perspective of Sikhi and full of cultural clichés common in liberal fraternity and
the Westernised sector of Sikhs, the play tried to deal with the humiliation of
women in a religious context. Lacking any deeper understanding of Sikhi, she
interposed Christianity as a model of religion upon Sikhi and the Sikh Gurdwara
as the institution. The characters involved the president of the Gurdwara and
people around him. The play’s theme is sexual corruption and financial greed.
He is killed by one of his victims. Ms Bhatti admitted that this was pure fiction
and without any basis in reality.
The Sikh public is weary of these negative stereotype plays which seem to
be the ones that get financial backing and mainstream opportunity for
production. However, the Sikhs are used to parody and to jokes about them.
Indians joke about Sikhs as the English joke about the Irish. The Sikhs even join
in these jokes and joke about themselves. Moreover, fictionalisation of life in
theatre is something Indians (and Sikhs) are used to. The Sikh tendency is to
ignore these, as they initially did with Bhatti. It is possible that some
British-educated Sikhs may have been offended by this type of negative portrayal
production and might have written to the theatre or local council. But that is as
far as the protest would have gone. The majority of Sikhs, born in India, would
simply have brushed off the production. Drama is fiction. There have been
controversial and provocative productions by other young Sikh writers in the
past, but the Sikhs have simply ignored them or found them amusing. A
playwright called Harwant Bains produced a play in which a Sikh cuts his hair
on stage and mocks the ‘religion’. He tried his best to get publicity by provoking
the Sikhs. He went on to claim to have had threatening phone calls, possibilities
of demonstrations, etc. The Sikhs simply ignored him. Fiction is fiction. His
production died a quiet death.
Moreover, the theme of humiliation of women is not new in Indian theatre,
or to the Sikhs. The attempted disrobing of Draupadi the wife of the Pandavs
in the epic Mahabharata, the sacred Hindu text about dharma and virtue in war,
is a classic narrative in Indian culture. Sikhi, like other Indian philosophies,
makes no distinction between the religious and the secular. Inevitably, a narrative
of a Sikh man humiliating women would involve the principles, or lack of them,
of his dharam (moral duties). Dharam and ‘religion’ are two different words with
different meanings, as described earlier. Indian philosophies call themselves
Dharma and not ‘religions’. But colonialism insisted on a particular category,
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and hence forced a dichotomy upon Indic cultures. The dichotomy between the
religious and the secular is meaningless in an Indian cultural context.
Indian theatre has dealt with the theme of women’s humiliation successfully
for millennia without offending the audience and yet leaving the message of the
writer deeply imprinted in the minds of the audience. The Sikhs expected that
subtlety from Bhatti. Many traditional Indians expect writers of Indian origin
to know of the traditions in Indian theatre. But disjunctions in cultures and
community become apparent in instances such as this which are a theatre of
their own. Ironically, neo-Western Indians, ingrained with universalist liberalism,
think they are ‘educating’ their ‘provincial’ community while the community
assumes that such Indians have a critical understanding of their civilisation.
These conflicting assumptions were evident in Behzti.
Behzti went a bit far. Not the play, the artha, written by Gurpreet Bhatti,
but another play in the background. This was the abhinaya playing silently,
whose sole aim was to offend. Abhinaya is the variety of props and techniques
that give visual form on the stage. The props used to give form to the play were
not fiction nor did they have any relevance to the play. It was a semiotic theatre
reminiscent of colonialism, triumphalism and power. This was the director’s
play; the director wanted to provoke for the sake of provoking, offend for the
sake of offending. The director had power, the public’s money behind the theatre,
and a mere two centuries of fundamentalist Western liberal rhetoric. The director
tried to bring an Indic civilisation system into the dual context of Western
historical experience and the recently discovered freedom of expression. The
director tried to construct the concept of sacred and profane, the triumph of
reason over ‘religion’, an assertion of crude freedom over conjectured proscriptive
restrictions. The director tried deflating the icon that is central in the Sikh system
and tried to make the essential in Sikhi mundane and irrelevant. The director
was on his own little crusade to teach the Sikhs about freedom of theatre and to
gain publicity in his attempt. But, for the Sikhs, the play had gone beyond rasa
into offence. It was no longer attempting to stage Bhatti’s play, but the Director’s
perversion. The artha, the rasa and the abhinaya had no cohesion, or sahmiti.
As far as the Sikhs were concerned, it was no longer theatre but the director’s
‘safe zone’ of intentional humiliation: the offence that was disallowed in
Natyashastar. This was no longer theatre nor a creative act, but a political
statement. From their perspective, theatre had failed and entered into the politics
of neo-colonialist presumption.
The Sikhs, like most Indians, are sophisticated in receiving theatre. Thousands
of years of cultural orientation are not lost merely by migrating to another
country. Controversy, criticism, subtle deconstruction, bad language, sexual
perversions, character assassination, etc, are all acceptable as part of fiction, but
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political humiliation and deliberate offence is not acceptable. It broke the
natyadharma and failed to create rasa.
The director brought the Gurdwara and the Guru Granth Sahib’s text into
the stage where rape and corruption were being staged. From an Indian
perspective, this was no longer theatre, but a political statement. At best, it was
a misguided political statement imagining a battle between artist’s freedom and
religious dogma. This has no history or relevance in Indic civilisation. Indian
civilisation recognises the artist’s total freedom, but also the artist’s responsibility
towards wider pluralism and the freedom of the individual to his sacred art. It
was also clear from the play that the writer had no real knowledge of Sikhi, the
institution of Gurdwara, or the benign teachings of Sri Guru Granth Sahib, the
living textual guru of Sikhs. The director treated the living created iconology
of the Sikhs into his dead world of intellectual discourse, the post enlightenment
war between the Western concept of human reason and its assumed irrelevancy
of the Abrahamic God in Western public life. At best, it was ignorance of the
‘other’ because there is no such conflict in Sikhi or Indic civilisation.
Sikhs protested. It is interesting that on the twelfth day, British born
non-practicing young Sikhs emerged from the pubs in Birmingham, saw the
pain of their community and took matters into hand. They attacked the theatre.
Although brought up in Britain, they do not share the British middle class
reverence for the Western theatre as a ‘sacred’ place. The theatre stage has
replaced the Church pulpit in the West. At one time in Western history, the
pulpit was the safe stage from which war could be waged against ideas of heresy
and blasphemy. Now it is the theatre which is the safe stage from which war
can be waged against the very concept of ideas being called heresy or blasphemy.
But this historic Western conflict between Church and State, between Church
dogma and scientific thinking, between Christian proscription and Western
liberalism, the perpetual tension of duality, receives little empathy within the
civilisation of Indians. Indians have inherited a tapestry of plurality of coexisting
imaginations without restriction, and in the minds of Indians, theatre is the
drama beyond the confines of the building. The ‘magic’ ‘epic’ or ‘divine’ world
co-exists with the everyday (Yarrow).43  In the Indian mind, there is nothing
sacred about theatre if it breaks from the natyadharma (the rules of engagement
in theatre). Once a performer moves away from dharma, he/she forfeits the
assumption of sacred ‘freedom’.
The Gurdwara as the ‘sacred’
Since everything is maya, an illusion of realities that emerge and then vanish,
drama is played in the context of the wider world. According to Sri Guru Granth
Sahib: ‘This world is an illusion; it dies and it is re-born — it comes and it goes
in reincarnation.’44 The Sikhs believe that every second is a new creation. The
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past dies, its memory only constructed, the present is real for a nanosecond and
the future hasn’t arrived, it is just conjecture.
The Hindus carry out a special service called Arti. It is worship of the
creativity of nature but represented in a plate. Arti is very sacred. The Sikh
gurus critiqued this. Arti is the entire world. Everything is in a creative state,
dying and reliving. The individual needs to break from the confines of buildings
into the broader space that exists around him or her. The sacred space is the
wider world, not in a confined theatre or building.
But then, why is the Gurdwara sacred? The Gurdwara is not sacred in the
sense of demarcated territory. It is the sovereign territory of Guru Granth Sahib,
a text to other people, but which is treated as a human person when it is read.
Derrida’s philosophy of the differ/ance may help to explain this phenomenon.
The Guru Granth Sahib was written by the Sikh Gurus themselves and is in
raags (musical format) and cannot be changed, added to or modified. The text
is considered as the spoken word without the lag that Derrida conjectures,
without the censor of the human mind, without that corruption that takes place
between the hidden and the stated. One of the practices in Gurdwaras is to recite
the Guru Granth Sahib without an intervening interpretation. The Gurdwara is
the residence of the guru. The Sikhs identify themselves with the Guru Granth
Sahib, treating it as a living, speaking and engaging entity. It makes no sense
to others, but that is the essence of Indian plurality. It is the creative act of every
Sikh treating a text as a living person.
The Sikhs do not see the theatre as a sacred territory where the rules of the
wider society can be suspended and offence created. But, brought up with
pluralism, they respect the Western institution of the apparent ‘free’ theatre.
However, they do not expect this historic western tension played as freedom to
colonise their own cultural space. They do not mock it nor humiliate it.
Coexistence requires negotiation of mutual respect, not assuming a right to
offend the other’s sacred. But when the director of the theatre went beyond the
Western cultural sphere and dragged in the created sacred of another to humiliate
in the theatre’s safe territory, the theatre forfeited that respect and war was
declared. Like the colonist who used indigenous co-opted intermediaries to
legitimise their rule, the director justified his act by pointing out Bhatti’s origins
in a Sikh family. The Western theatre commands respect from people like the
Sikhs as long as it stays within its own boundaries. Once it crosses into the
territory of others then it has to respect the rules of the ‘other’, otherwise it can
only enforce its respect with the aid of the coercive power of the State to suppress
the people whose otherwise benign indifference is provoked into protecting
their own. The Sikhs stood outside the theatre for twelve days quietly protesting,
puzzled by the transgression of the director and the theatre’s production
manager’s refusal to engage in a dialogue. Dialogue is at the heart of Indic
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civilisation. The theatre production manager refused ‘dialogue’. The manager
set up a monologue a few days prior to the play being shown, and then, like the
imperialist, decided that the community had to learn ‘freedom of the theatre’.
The director’s crusade, like a colonist, to ‘teach’ an ancient civilisation the West’s
newly acquired concept of freedom was an absurdity in itself. Like the French
who pursued culture evangelisation in East India in the seventeenth century,
only to be thrown out, like the missionaries who caused havoc with their
soul-saving crusades in ancient civilisations, the manager-director of the
Birmingham Repertory Theatre was on a mission, little realising the comedy of
the producer’s own position. The director’s freedom is that of the adolescent
emerging into puberty, full of bravado, threatening without the wisdom of
experience. The Sikh has inherited centuries of freedom with the sophistication
of critique and drama without crossing the limits of offence.
It is notable that the Sikh representatives who defended the Sikhs’ objections
to the play in public statements,45  made a clear distinction between the artha
and the abhinaya, stating that they had no problems with the substance of the
play, but objected to the depiction of the Gurdwara and symbolism of Guru
Granth Sahib, both of which are their sacred institutions separate from those of
others.46  In contrast, almost all articles and comments by leading figures from
the arts and media, including the petition by 700 leading luminaries of British
arts conflated everything into ‘freedom of speech’47  and ‘refusing debate’48  or
‘the right to challenge religion’!49  Most of the articles and statements attacking
Sikhs seemed to lack any rationale or analysis and depend more on histrionics.
It is still not clear to Sikhs who this debate was supposed to be with, as the
audience was largely white middle class and some British educated Indians who
rarely if ever go to Gurdwaras. The community that this debate was supposed
to be initiated in was enraged by the disrespect shown to the Guru Granth Sahib
and the Gurudwara, the ‘Rasa’ had broken down.
In context, Behzti brought two civilisations into contact but in unfortunate
circumstances. From the perspective of Indic civilisation, the West’s much
protected and prided freedom of expression extending to freedom to offend50
in arts and theatre51  is but an old conflict being played between those in power
and those without power that started in the Roman amphitheatre with its
captured audience in a walled confine. The Romans ridiculed the weak in the
bloody games in their amphitheatre. After them, the Church saw its right to be
free to offend human reason from the theatre of the pulpit. In the twentieth
century, human reason assumes a new born right to offend religious doctrine
from the theatre of arts. This has no relevance in Indic civilisation which is based
on the principle, ‘believe and let believe’. Freedom of conscience and expression
is a fundamental aspect of the non-dualist Indic civilisation. It allows critique
and dialogue but stops at gratuitous offence to preserve and nurture its essential
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plurality. The wider play in Behzti was the interaction between two different
civilisations with different historical evolution of ideas and political dynamics
of freedoms, and with different philosophical developments. One which sees
the right to offend as its sacred duty, while the other which, in the words of
Yarrow, ‘needs to be recognised...for the subtlety and power of its grasp of the
nature and operation of individual and communal effects as embedded in its
performance tradition and in Natyasastra’.52
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9
Blasphemy in a pluralistic society
Jeremy Shearmur
In this chapter, I will tentatively address a difficult issue: what we should make
of blasphemy today, in a society like Australia?1  My discussion falls into three
parts: considering blasphemy under the headings of truth, ridicule, and play. I
also discuss some different dimensions to the character of the offence. I conclude
with a discussion of some particular problems about blasphemy posed by the
fact that we are living in a pluralistic society, in the face of which I make some
specific — but inadequate — recommendations. I am happy to call them
‘inadequate’ just because my aim, at the end of the paper, is to open up what
seem to me some difficult problems rather than to resolve them.
In my preparatory research, I came to the conclusion that the more that one
looks at some of the issues connected with blasphemy, say, at their history, the
more complex they turn out to be. The consequence is that if, as in the present
chapter, one is trying to speak in general terms, one becomes acutely aware of
just how thin the ice is upon which one is treading. As a result, it is bound to
be the case that, in addition to provoking the kind of critical reaction that I am
intending to provoke, and which I am hoping will lead to a fruitful response to
the issues which I am setting out to raise, I may also provoke all kinds of gnashing
of teeth on the part of those who have specialised knowledge on issues that I
deal with very briefly. All that I would say in my defence is that I am acutely
aware of my fallibility and, as a former student of Karl Popper’s, I am aware of
the need for criticism, which I look forward to receiving in due course.
Let me start by saying a very little about a key problem. It is: What is the
character of blasphemy as an offence, and why was it thought appropriate to
punish it? My concern here will not be with its legal status,2  but with what the
underlying concerns have been. There seem to me to have been several lines of
argument. I will mention but five.
The first, as, say, we meet it for example in Leviticus 24, 16-18, is that the
punishment, even with death, of the blasphemer is simply seen as a command
of God, which is to be followed as such.
The second is that blasphemy is understood as a substantive offence against
God. Here, humans who make accusations of it, and uphold the law in relation
to it are, as it were, acting in His defence, or in defence of His reputation.
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The third is slightly convoluted. It is that blasphemy is understood as
something which, if unpunished, will threaten those who do not punish it with
the judgement of God. Punishment of the blasphemer is, here, seen as a reaction
to the threat of the collective punishment by God of those who fail to punish
blasphemer.
The fourth is the idea that an attack on religion is problematic because of
what are thought to be its social consequences, i.e., the destruction of civil order.
This played a significant role during one period of British law, as is illustrated
by the following statement by Lord Chief Justice Hale:
…to say, religion is a cheat, is to dissolve all those obligations whereby
the civil societies are preserved, and that Christianity is parcel of the
laws of England; and therefore to reproach the Christian religion is to
speak in subversion of the law.3
Finally, there is a more typically modern understanding. This is the notion
of blasphemy as an offence against the sensibilities of believers, and, further, as
something which because it so offends, is problematic because it is liable to lead
to a breach of the peace.
Let me now move to the discussion of blasphemy, as such. I need briefly to
explain why I am discussing the issue of blasphemy under the three heads to
which I have referred: truth, ridicule and play.4  I do so because, historically,
one can note people as having been charged with blasphemy for activities that
fall conveniently under these somewhat different headings, and I wish to argue
that the issues that they raise are somewhat different, too.
Historically, one element in blasphemy has been a simple contesting of the
truth of various religious claims. This, for example, was one element in the
charges against Thomas Aikenhead at the end of the seventeenth century and
against G. W. Foote in the latter part of the nineteenth. In earlier times, people
who had wished to contest the truth of Christianity, were sometimes punished
— but for impiety. In the context of an orthodox Christianity feeling under
threat from Socinianism and Deism,5  Aikenhead’s youthful mixture of
contestation of and irreverent comment about Christianity was taken horribly
seriously, and he was executed.6  Foote, the editor of The Freethinker in the
1880s, combined denial of the truth of Christianity, and fierce argument to that
effect, with the use of ridicule.7  In the context of one of the trials of The
Freethinker, Lord Coleridge declared:
I lay it down as law, that, if the decencies of controversy are observed,
even the fundamentals of religion may be attacked without a person
being guilty of blasphemous libel.8
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This is generally accepted in Western countries today; but, for example, it may
be contentious for some Muslims. Foote, however, did much more than this.
And that takes us to the second category, of ridicule. One of the features of The
Freethinker were various hostile cartoons about the life of Jesus, and more
generally illustrating in a satirical manner various themes from the Bible. The
latter included an unsubtly illustrated version of the verse from Exodus 33,
verses 22-3: ‘And it shall come to pass…that I will put thee in a clift of the
rock…and I will take away my hand and thou shalt see my back parts’.9 The
Freethinker’s cartoon, as the previous quotation from Lord Coleridge implicitly
indicated, raises the issue: Is the use of ridicule as part of an attack on religion
acceptable?
Third, and of particular significance in our current context, is what I will
term the playful or aesthetic use of blasphemy. By this I mean blasphemy
committed not as part of a disagreement with, or an attack on religion (although
it is not clear that it would be used in such a manner by a devout religious
believer), but, instead, as used for literary or artistic effect. An obvious example
here is Salman Rushdie’s playing with themes from Islam to literary effect, in
his Satanic Verses. We may here, similarly, consider the work of art, Piss Christ,
and also, say, in a much more minor key, parodies of the Creed, and so on,
produced by William Hone for political purposes in the early nineteenth
century.10 The key idea here is that religious material is played with, or used
for effect, in ways that believers could reasonably find offensive, but where the
motivation of those making use of this material is not to attack religion. With
this before us, let me now turn to the body of the paper, and to the issue of
truth.
Truth
Truth seems to me usefully looked at in terms of the kinds of consideration that
John Stuart Mill advanced in his On Liberty. I should state explicitly that my
concern, here, will be with the social consequences of epistemological fallibilism11
rather than with the specifics of Mill’s views; Jonathan Riley has argued
powerfully that Mill’s own arguments are best seen in the wider context of his
social philosophy, and that seen in that light, Mill is to be taken as arguing for
a more liberal view than that which is presented here.12  If it is being claimed
that various religious doctrines are true, then some kind of case has to be made
for them. What is involved here, may seem to get us into the territory of various
traditional arguments for the existence of God, such as the ‘cosmological
argument’. But what is actually offered in the context of religious proselatisation
may be rather different.
Now if any such claims are being made as to the truth of religious doctrine,
we get straight into the issues which J. S. Mill discussed.13  He argued that all
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of our knowledge is fallible, and that if we are aiming for truth, our best course
of action is to submit our claims to open critical scrutiny. In this context, he was
then able to develop arguments against the suppression of opinion. To Mill’s
argument, it might be objected by the believer: ‘but our religious views are not
fallible’. However, those who agree with Mill can respond: ‘but you have
certainly not furnished us with telling arguments that show you views to be
anything but fallible.14  And your tendency, across history, to kill or to imprison
those who have objected to your claims, does not exactly speak for their strength
— for if the arguments were strong, why should they require support from the
hangman or the jailor’.15
It seems to me that, here, the case for allowing the public contestation of
religious doctrines is unanswerable. Not only is the Millian case a powerful one,
but since the Reformation we have lived in a society in which religious truth is
contested. If there are Catholics and Protestants — to say nothing of Muslims
and Jews, and also non-believers — who are members of a single society, then
clearly there is disagreement about religious truth.16  Indeed, the very beliefs
of these groups implicitly or sometimes even explicitly involve the view that
the other religious beliefs are incorrect. If we are living in a society that is
pluralistic in this sense, the notion that the discussion and the contestation of
religious ideas should be suppressed would seem an absurdity. (It is, however,
worth noting that Jewish criticism of Christian claims, particularly its claims
about itself as a supposed fulfilment of the Old Testament, was frequently
suppressed.17  ) Given that all the groups to whom I have referred —
contemporary Judaism apart — are universalistic and attempt to convert others,
this is surely an invitation to contestation.18
Today, Christendom accepts the case for openness of argument. (Although
one wonders sometimes what the more dogmatic believers would do, if they
could get their hands on the reins of enough political power.) It is not clear that
this case for openness of argument is accepted by all Muslim clerics. Attitudes
there, at least in terms of the views of some clerics, seem closer to those that
were common in Western countries several centuries ago, although there are,
of course, also liberal Muslims. There is also room for debate as to just what is
supposed to be accorded what kind of protection, and it is quite another matter
what anyone actually becomes concerned about (the Rushdie case had strong
political elements to it). At least in principle, to voice disagreement about some
key issues is problematic, even if all that is involved is intellectual engagement.
Of course, in practical terms, no Muslim is going to be able legally to take action
against Christian ministers who may say things within their religious
congregations that are at odds with Islam. Further, Muslims have, I think, to
face the fact that if they choose to live in a society like Australia, they are living
in a society in which the open intellectual contestation of their beliefs — whether
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by sceptics, or by those who favour other religions — will take place. Further,
if such contestation is conducted along the ‘decent’ lines that Lord Coleridge
suggested, other citizens will expect that those engaged in such contestation
will, if necessary, receive full protection from the law.
Some limitations of the truth-based argument
It is, however, worth pausing to consider what the intellectual issues to which
I have referred actually amount to. For this intellectual case has limitations; in
particular, it does not seem to me to offer the basis of a case for ‘freedom of
expression’. (Clearly, someone might say: ‘but the case for freedom of expression
does not depend on arguments like Mill’s, but, instead, relates somehow to ideas
about human agency, or is simply a “right”’. But it is just not clear on what basis
such a right could be established if, say, it involves a purported entitlement to
behave in offensive ways towards others.)
Let me return to the fallibilistic argument from Mill. As far as I can see, all
that is required for the fulfilment of the kinds of requirement that Mill set out,
is that there be some place where such contestation can take place, and that the
results of debates about such matters be freely available in the society.19 What
this means, is that there need to be journals in which such matters can be
discussed, and places where people interested in such things can meet. This is
a very different matter from some entitlement to bombard other people with
challenges to their views when they do not wish to encounter them,20  or, say,
a right even to demonstrate as opposed simply to the advancing of arguments.
More generally, an awareness of human fallibility seems to me in principle
compatible with restrictions on the dissemination of information which has not
been exposed to some appropriate form of inter-subjective scrutiny. This might,
however, today be accomplished without the suppression of opinion, by way
of the requirement that certain kinds of material be published only in a setting
in which an indication can be given of the basis on which others disagree with
what is being advanced. For example, rather than the making of claims about,
say, holocaust revisionism illegal — which may itself backfire21  — there could
be a legal requirement that the material be posted only to web pages that allow
for responses by scholars who disagree with the case being argued.
Let me also offer some further considerations against the taking of Millian
arguments in an expansive way. There is much that goes to constitute our
day-to-day lives that might quite fairly be called necessary fictions. We typically
have a view of the world, and of ourselves, which we implicitly take to be correct
and live by, and which we are not interested in having challenged. Most people,
if they are not suffering from depression, are moral heroes in their own internal
narratives; and all of us operate within a framework of assumptions — many of
which will not, in fact, be true — which we certainly do not wish to have
challenged, unless we choose to open them up to such challenges. Some of those
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reading this will, like myself, be academics, and this means that certain things
that we do will be subject to fairly constant challenge and criticism. More
generally, the cultures in which academics live and by which our ideas are
broadly informed are subject to certain kinds of challenge and scrutiny. But
typically — and, I think, quite properly — the ideas that constitute the
assumptions under which we live on a day-to-day basis, are not usually submitted
to such scrutiny. In part, this is because one can, as it were, hardly live in the
open — with all aspects of ourselves and our conduct exposed to the critical
scrutiny of others all the time. In part, it is because many of these ideas are
simply things that we use while getting on with other, more pressing, matters.
At the same time, one of the features of life in Australia which I have come to
value — as compared, say, to the USA — is that there is a degree of accountability
here to one another, in our ordinary culture, for what we believe.22
Now, the ideas on the basis of which we live may well be incorrect or
misguided. Sometimes, we may become annoyed with other people because of
what they believe and act on. But broadly speaking, it seems to me that we are
not entitled to challenge them (unless we are invited to do so), unless it is the
case that those ideas and their actions (or failures to act) impinge significantly
upon us, or upon others with whose well-being we have a legitimate concern.
In this respect, while intellectual contestation is important, there is no case for
the view that one is simply entitled to harangue other people, unasked, about
their ideas or view of the world. (Or rather, there is a sense in which one may
do this, in respect of people who are friends of ours, provided that they have
the option to stop being our friends if they find this wearing!) Such ideas —
consider, say, whether or not they think that eating meat is wrong — in effect
become like the tastes of these other people: things that we simply live with
provided that they neither positively harm others in ways that we find
intolerable, nor make us really uncomfortable. If they harm others,23  we may
feel it our duty to open up a discussion about them. If they simply make us
uncomfortable, we may need to modify how we interact with these people (for
example, just moaning about them to friends who agree with us), or possibly
even break off contact with them.
This may seem a somewhat timid viewpoint, and you may even object to it.
But if you do, just ask those who know you, how many of your views about
things they think to be incorrect, and ask yourself: ‘would I like to be constantly
open to contestation about them?’ Alternatively, you may yourself be committed
to some form of proselytisation; for example, for some religious view, or for
some form of environmentalism. If this is the case, it is worth bearing in mind
just to what extent you may be infringing upon the kinds of informal rules that
we normally live by concerning such matters, and thus pausing to consider just
how obnoxious you may be. If you are going to do this, however, it seems to
me that what is good for the goose is good for the gander. You should recognise
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that not only may people (understandably) start to avoid you, but you may
legitimately expect them to make you aware of the range of objections to your
views, if they are not too polite to do so.
This is a somewhat difficult matter. For consider, say, the Protestant who
thinks that if you are not saved, you will suffer in Hell.24  How, such a person
might say, can they be expected to conduct the ordinary niceties of life with
you, without drawing this to your attention — and repeatedly, because so much
hinges on it? They would surely do this, if you were in physical danger; and
how much more important is your fate in Eternity? But just as that person may
feel that he or she cannot engage in polite social chit-chat with those on the edge
of a precipice, so the objects of their concern may find that they really cannot
take constantly being engaged with on this subject. The only courses of action
may be to agree not to raise the issue, or to separate.
There is, however, also another aspect to all this. It is that, as academics who
are used to the cut and thrust of discussion, we typically come to know what
we are letting ourselves in for if we enter into it. For each of us, there will be
certain kinds of standards to which we know that we will be held accountable
in our various professions and the sub-areas of these that we inhabit. I can, by
now, make a pretty fair judgement as to what the (different) standards are, to
which different groups of philosophers, of political scientists, of historians of
economic thought, and so on, will hold me accountable if I give a paper to them.
Further, if I make some claim — say, about the arts — in a gathering of people
who deal with the arts professionally, while I cannot judge quite how what I
say will be appraised, I will have at least a rough idea about the kinds of things
that might be thrown at me.
Such knowledge, however, is typically acquired by us gradually through
our lives, and sometimes somewhat painfully. I can still recall coming to
university, as a gauche young man who simply did not know how these things
worked, and how painful the first few steps were. I have also had the (at times
difficult) experience of operating within different disciplinary contexts. By
contrast with all this, we may forget that other people may not have this kind
of experience behind them. As, say, we are sometimes reminded when a capable
but academically inexperienced mature student joins an introductory course in
the subject that we teach, people may have specific views which they believe
to be true, but where their asserting them as true does not mean quite what it
would normally in academic contexts. If I make claims that I assert to be true,
this opens me up as an Aunt Sally, for everyone to have a go at. If people do not
have an academic background, they may not realise what they are getting into
if they make similar claims in an academic context. But, on the other hand, unless
we are anthropologists or sociologists with an interest in these issues, we are
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not likely to have any real knowledge as to how their claims about the status of
such views are made and negotiated in different areas of even our own society.
I would, in this kind of situation, suggest that we should exercise something
the name of which I hardly dare speak, namely, paternalism. That is to say, it
seems to me that, unless it is clear that the people in question wish to have their
ideas contested as we would have our claims contested, their views be treated
more like the expression of tastes. This will typically not be fully adequate to
the cognitive character of those views, and there is a risk that we may be insulting
to them. But perhaps better this, than the exposure of their ideas to the full force
of the critical apparatus that we, given our training, may be able to bring to
bear upon them. This, while fully legitimate in its place, may be inappropriate
if used in a contest in which people are not accustomed to it, or do not realise
what they are getting themselves into. I am reminded of a conversation that a
good friend of mine reported that he had with his partner. They had some
disagreement about their personal affairs, and he said to her: ‘We should talk
this out.’ She said: ‘No way — you, as a philosophy lecturer, are a specialist in
arguments. I would not have a chance, even if I was right about everything.’
Just as in this case, it seems to me that in the kind of situations about which
I have been talking, respect for other people as persons may mean that we should
treat their views as having a somewhat different status from what they may
present them as having. After all, we may be quite used to discovering that ideas
which we have cherished, and have worked on for a while, turn out just to be
no good. Given our professional training, we typically have the resources to
cope with such things, even though the experience may not be pleasant.
However, it may not be something that other people, without these resources,
can easily cope with at all. It is certainly not clear to me why coping with it
should be thrust upon them, without their indicating positively that they wish
to get into such a situation.
Accordingly, there seems to me a case for the protection of some ideas from
criticism — although it is not one which compromises what I might call the
minimalist Millian case for there being a public sphere in which any idea may
be contested (including, of course, ideas as to what such a sphere should be like).
At the same time, it is important to note that the case for the moderation of
criticism was made in the face of the vulnerability of the people whom I was
discussing, and also under the assumption that what they were doing was not
having adverse effects on others. The (interesting) social task here would be to
create ways of behaving which protect the vulnerable, but which do not shelter
the powerful.
134
Negotiating the Sacred II
From intellectual engagement to ridicule
So far, I have been dealing with issues of truth and falsity, and of the
contestation, back and forth, of particular claims. But what of ridicule? Is it ever
appropriate to ridicule or to insult things about which other people have deep
feelings?
Here, it seems to me, we get onto more difficult ground. For if, say, a Christian
believes that God, the all-powerful creator of the universe, gave his Son not only
to suffer the humiliations and pangs of mortal life, but to die a gruesome death
for the sake of each of us — then to poke fun at this, seems simply grotesque.
It certainly is not something that can rest upon a J. S. Mill-style defence. May
anything be said in its favour? Two interesting lines of argument here were
advanced by the English Freethinker G. W. Foote, who ended up being
imprisoned for blasphemy in the 1880s.
First, consider those who are not believers. They may find the hegemony of
the ideas to which they are constantly and oppressively exposed, simply
intolerable. I recall, here, a comment made by a distinguished sociologist of
education, who was Jewish, and who undertook an ethnographic exercise, over
a period of three years, in a fundamentalist Baptist school. He later recalled that,
he hit a problem:
…in one of the phases of research, the last phase, the write-up.
Obviously, my ox had been gored. As a non-Christian at Bethany I
experienced repeated proselytising by students, parents, teachers, and
the superintendent of the school. I felt that I had been assaulted by the
most arrogant people I had ever met in my entire life…Obviously, all of
this had gotten to me in more ways tha[n] I understood; it was coming
out in my writing, though I didn’t want it to. I did not want chapter
one, let alone chapter two, three, four, five or six, to be redolent of the
anger suggested by terms such as ‘assault’ and ‘arrogance’.25
In this case, the sociologist could get away from the group which he had studied.
But what if one were a member of a minority group, who were endlessly the
targets of something similar from the wider culture?
In this setting, at the very least, it would be fully understandable to let off
steam, to other members of one’s group, about the kind of things to which one
was subjected. This, indeed, was pretty much Foote’s explanation for one of the
things that his newspaper did: for running his cartoons, poking fun at passages
from the Bible. His argument was that the material was sold in a newspaper for
Freethinkers; it was not forced upon religious believers, and it would be pretty
clear to the believer what the character of the journal was, should they come
across a copy.
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Foote, however, offered another line of argument, too. Let me present it, in
his own words:
Christians may, of course, urge that their feelings on such a subject as
religion are sacred, and a few superstitious Freethinkers may concede
this monstrous position. I do not. The feelings of a Christian about Father,
Son and Holy Ghost, are no more sacred than my feelings on any other
subject. I have no quarrel with persons, and I recognise how many are
hurt by satire. But the world is not to be regulated by their feelings, and
much as I respect them, I have a greater respect for truth. Every mental
weapon is valid against mental error. And as ridicule has been found the
most potent weapon of religious enfranchisement, we are bound to use
it against the wretched superstitions which cumber the path of progress.
Intellectually, it is as absurd to give quarter as it is absurd to expect it.26
I do not know what you might make of this. In some ways, for Foote to take this
line in a situation where he might well go to jail for it, and indeed did, was
courageous. At the same time, it is also clear that such satire need not be on the
side of what is right, even though it may be horribly effective. Consider, in this
context, the use by the Nazis, and by the regime in the Soviet Union, of art and
representations which dehumanised those with whom they disagreed. Not only
were those — often very powerful — representations exercised in the interests
of views which were, surely, wrong, but they also served to dehumanise people,
in ways which opened them to what became ghastly treatment. All told, there
seems to me something to be said for treating people with decency, and respecting
their sensibilities, even in cases where we think that they are deeply wrong.
Such concerns, however, look to me pressing only in the case of ordinary
people, and those who do not exercise power. The powerful can, surely, well
look after themselves — although even there, there is surely something to be
said for recognising the human in everybody. If we accept this argument, then
there is also reason to accord them a certain kind of respect — which would
include not submitting those things about which they have the strongest and
most tender feelings, to the full force of our abuse.
Play, or the aesthetic use of blasphemy
So far, our concern has been with those who wish to take issue with the content
of religion. But if we consider blasphemy in contemporary contexts, this seems
to me not, typically, what we are concerned with. Instead, what has been thought
problematic, has been the use of religious ideas for aesthetic reasons or, to put
it bluntly, a certain kind of playing around with them.
Consider Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses. Here, he made a certain amount
of mileage, for his own aesthetic purposes, with themes from Islam: the so-called
‘satanic verses’ episode itself, which related to the supposed interpolation —
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and then deletion when their character as illegitimate interpolations was revealed
— of some verses into the text of the Koran, which legitimated the role of some
local gods as intermediaries between people and God. In addition, Rushdie played
around with the idea of the denizens of an imaginary brothel, who boosted their
custom by naming themselves after the wives of the Prophet. Was Rushdie’s
aim to attack Islam, in something like the way in which Foote did Christianity?
Surely not; it was more a matter of his using these ideas, as instruments in his
novel.27  Similarly, one might say, the artist responsible for Piss Christ was
playing around with Christian symbolism.
What is to be said about this? Clearly, there are legitimate uses of religious
material, not only in a devotional context, but — because of the extent to which
our culture and language is (still) permeated with them — for the purpose of
playfulness and parody. Two things, however, are worth noting. First, such
usage is parasitic upon the public, cultural significance of the material. The
reason why a form of words that draws upon well-known passages from the
Bible, or from the Creed, or upon religious symbolism, may make the impression
that it does, is because of its resonance with the material from which it is drawn,
and the kinds of public associations that it has. Second, there is the problem of
the offence that it may cause.
It might be said: ‘No offence is intended — the artist had his or her own
private intention.’ This, however, will not wash, because of the public
significance of the material. After all, the aesthetic weight of the material is
drawing precisely upon its public, in this case religious, meaning.28 What is
more, people have to take into account the public meaning of what they are
saying. If, say, someone gets up and yells ‘Fire, Fire’ in a crowded, darkened
cinema, it is possible that they may have had their own particular intentions —
for example, they might be giving an impromptu performance of some free verse.
But this is no excuse; unless there is a very distinctive preparation of the people
who will be receiving the material,29  such that this serves to diffuse its normal
social meaning, it is clear how it will be interpreted. And the poet will justly
suffer the consequences of their action, if they don’t do so.
In the course of the discussion of the Salman Rushdie case, John Updike is
reported as having said: ‘it is perhaps in the nature of modern art to be
offensive…In this century if we are not willing to risk giving offence, we have
no claim to the title of artists’.30  But bear in mind what it is to be offensive.31
First, if someone is offensive to you, they may surely risk retaliation, and if they
thought about it, they might well realise that this is what they should expect.
Why, after all, should the rest of us be expected to sit there and have people
behave offensively towards us, without reacting to it? This, of course, then leads
to that element in blasphemy cases in which people are taken to have committed
an offence, because their conduct is liable to lead to a breach of the peace.
137
Blasphemy in a pluralistic society
Second, being offensive — especially to the defenceless — may simply be a
horrible thing to do. Once, say, people understand just what kind of offence
certain kinds of conduct, or the improper use of Aboriginal designs, may give
to the people in question, it is surely inexcusable to persist in giving offence. It
is a horrible action, and also made worse by the sheer lack of power of the people
on whom it is inflicted. However, it is not at all clear, say, that the kinds of
offence that may be given to ordinary Muslims, or to devout Catholics or to
conservative-minded evangelical Christians is any less. Just think, in the latter
cases, of how they might experience what is taking place. As I mentioned before,
in their view, the creator of the universe chose to humble himself, take on human
form and to suffer, so as to bring about the salvation of all who would accept
this gift…and this is then mocked, turned into a travesty, or used as a prop for
the purposes of comedy. I am not advocating the jailing of the people who might
behave in this way. But it seems to me that we should think twice about the
idea that such activities can easily be defended as part of a supposed right to
self-expression. However, should we go along with such ideas we face a problem;
one that I am not sure how to resolve.
Blasphemy in a pluralistic society
When Salman Rushdie wrote, he knew full well what he was doing. The
knowledge that he displayed — in playing around with the ‘satanic verses’
episode and even in his use of the names of the wives of the Prophet — required
some real knowledge of Islam. But it should equally have been clear to him that
what he was doing would have been found highly offensive by some Muslims.
Clearly, there was much more to the episode than this. There was a strong
political element to the attention that his work received, and Muslims could find
much other material that would give offence, but which was not singled out for
condemnation in this way. Many of his Western readers, however, might have
found these aspects of his work unusual, and while — especially if they came
across some commentary upon them — they might have been able to understand
them, they would surely not have experienced the kind of emotional reaction
that some Muslims may have felt.
One obvious problem however, is that now that we are a pluralistic society:
in Australia, there are many faiths and sensibilities, and even societies which
are relatively homogenous are affected by what is done elsewhere. Just what
protections are needed, and what should be protected?
In the face of the Rushdie case, one reaction in the UK was that some Muslims
there wished for Rushdie to be had up for blasphemy. They swiftly discovered,
however, that in Britain laws against blasphemy related only to the Christian
religion — and even, it might appear, to the doctrines of the Church of England.
There was, then, a call for the widening of blasphemy law, so that it would apply
to other religions. This, however, poses a problem; namely, what should count
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for this purpose. Think about this in an Australian context: Christianity — in
all its forms? Islam — bearing in mind that, for Shiites, the twelfth (occluded)
Imam would also require protection? Judaism? Aboriginal beliefs? But what
about Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Mormons, and New Agers, to say nothing of
Little Pebble?32
There is also a further problem here: namely, just what the content of that
which receives such protection will be. It is often — and surely rightly — said
that, say, Aboriginal cultures are not static, but evolving. The same, surely,
might be the case for what others hold to be Holy. But this poses a problem: if
what is so recognised acquires special protected status, it can surely become the
subject of politics. In an early episode in the Garfield cartoon series, Garfield, a
fat striped cat, was made to say something like: ‘One good thing about being a
cat is, any food you touch, becomes yours.’ The Holy, or what plays a key role
in your culture such that it demands protection, might equally become the
vehicle for a not dissimilar kind of acquisitive opportunism.
In addition, as I noted earlier, one feature of religious pluralism is that the
key tenets of many religions commit their devotees to denying the claims of the
devotees of other religions. It is just not clear that there can be respect and
mutual tolerance, if you take the claim to the truth of your own beliefs seriously,
and it is integral to your own views that the other people have got things terribly
wrong.
Finally, here, although I can address this question only very briefly, there
is an interesting problem concerning whether, with regard to these matters,
there is an area between the private and the public.33  I earlier referred to one
line of argument in Foote, in which he argued that the cartoons in the Freethinker
were produced for an audience of secularists, and that this should have been
clear from the character of the publication. It is possible that the same might be
argued, in respect of the Gay News blasphemous libel case. Here, a short poem
by James Kirkup, depicted a Roman centurion expressing his love for Jesus, by
means of various forms of sexual activity conducted with his just-dead body.34
It would seem as if the poem was intended to express a genuine devotion, but
its public meaning was highly offensive, and Mrs Mary Whitehouse, of the
British National Viewers and Listeners Association — a crusader for morality
— brought a private prosecution against it for blasphemous libel, which was
successful.35  One might ask, however: but should not the fact that it appeared
in Gay News indicate that it was produced for, as it were, a niche market, such
that those who might find this offensive would understand that it was not for
them? But in this particular case, the reaction of their own readers, and that of
those working on the paper towards the poem, suggested that this defence might
not be open to them,36  even if it could be defended in a wider context.
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Where does all this leave us? I am initially inclined to say that, in a pluralistic
setting, there is good reason for ditching the crime of blasphemy. At the same
time, there is surely a case for prohibiting by law offensive behaviour that is
liable to provoke a breach of the peace. At another level, it would seem to me
that it is reasonable to regard as morally offensive the production of things that
would deeply offend harmless people: consider, again, the deliberate violation
of things that Aboriginal people hold as sacred, but now generalise this to the
core concerns of others. At the very least, this should mean that we don’t fete
work which gives such offence, or express solidarity with it if it is criticised.
This does not mean that we should silently acquiesce to calls for the death or
imprisonment of those who produce it.
I said, above, that I am inclined to offer that response. But there are problems
about it, not least this question of what, and to what extent, things get protection,
and who gets to decide. It is surely only core concerns that should receive such
protection. But who gets to decide what people’s core concerns are? And does
the protection that might be accorded to the core concerns of major religions,
really extend to, say, the fantasies of some group of ratbags who thinks that
aliens have kidnapped them a space ship, and then returned them to Earth with
remarkable news for mankind?
I am left unsure about what we should do concerning these matters. One
might say: be respectful of work that has a public meaning as sacred, in the
cultures within which our work is produced and in which we would expect it
to be disseminated. And over and above this, be mindful of the sensibilities of
the vulnerable. But such a response is clearly inadequate, and I am happy to
leave this problem to others, to see what they make of it.
Andres Serrano, when his Piss Christ was attacked, commented that he
thought that its destruction was an act of ‘desecration’.37  Clearly, I might be
tempted to take any criticism of my paper in similar terms — if I were not, in
these matters, influenced by Karl Popper, who stressed fallibilism and the
importance of holding everything open to criticism, and who argued that it is
good for us, even if we don’t enjoy it.
Endnotes
1  I would like to thank Geoff Stokes for conversation and for some most useful comments on a draft of
this paper, from some of which I was not able to benefit on this occasion, for reasons of space, and also
to David Wall and the editors for some useful criticism and suggestions.
2  On which, see Reid Mortensen, 1994, ‘Blasphemy in a secular state: A Pardonable sin?’, UNSW Law
Journal, vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 409-31. A useful brief overview of blasphemy laws in different states and
territories is provided at: http://www.caslon.com.au/blasphemyprofile2.htm.
3  Quoted by Mortensen, ibid., p. 411.
4 There is also of course the issue of blasphemy as expletive; but this I will not discuss here. For a rather
different classificatory approach, see Anthony Fisher and Hayden Ramsay, ‘Of Art and Blasphemy’,
2002, Ethical theory and moral practice, vol. 3, pp. 137-67.
140
Negotiating the Sacred II
5  Socinianism, named after Lelio Francesco Maria Sozzini (1525–1562), was a sixteenth and seventeenth
century religious movement, which called into question the deity of Christ, and emphasised, by contrast,
the unity of God. It is sometimes regarded as an early form of unitarianism. Deism, a loose movement
influential in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, while accepting the existence of God and his
role as a creator, rejected revealed religion in favour of a sceptical and rationalistic approach, and also
rejected the idea that God subsequently intervened in his creation.
6  See, notably, Michael Hunter, 1992, ‘“Aikenhead the Atheist”: the Context and Consequences of
Articulate Irreligion in the Late Seventeenth Century’, in Michael Hunter and David Wootton (eds.)
Atheism from the Reformation to the Enlightenment, Oxford: Clarendon Press; and also W. Cobbett, T.
B. Howell et. al. (eds), 1819, A Complete Collection of State Trials, xiii, London, pp. 917-40. For
background, see also the other articles in the Hunter and Wootton collection, and also J. A. I. Champion,
1992, The Pillars of Priestcraft Shaken, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
7  Foote’s fascinating Prisoner for Blasphemy, London: Progressive Publishing, 1886, is available on the
internet at: http://homepages.ihug.co.nz/~freethought/foote/blasphemy/0bcontents.htm. Foote is
discussed at length in Joss Marsh, 1998, Word Crimes, Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press.
8  Quoted in Marsh, ibid., p. 160.
9  It is reproduced in Marsh’s Word Crimes, ibid., p. 142.
10  For some discussion of which, see Marsh, ibid.
11 That is to say, that aspect of Mill’s views about toleration, that stems from the stress that he placed
on the idea that human knowledge was fallible, that currently accepted views may not be correct, and
so on.
12  See Jonathan Riley, 2005, ‘J. S. Mill’s Doctrine of Freedom of Expression’, Utilitas, vol. 17, no. 2,
pp. 147-79.
13  It is striking from the discussion in Hunter and Wootton, that at times the production of apologias
for the truth of Christianity against imagined opponents gave rise to people taking the imagined
opponents’ case seriously and finding it telling.
14  For critical discussion of claims to infallible knowledge in the Shi’ite tradition of Islam, compare the
work of Abdolkarim Soroush, 2002. Some of his essays are available in English in his Reason, Freedom
and Democracy in Islam, Mahmoud Sadri and Ahmed Sadri (eds), London etc: Oxford University Press.
15  Clearly, an argument might be made for the suppression of material on the grounds that it might
mislead the immature. But it is not clear that, for example, the history of the suppression of heresy or
of Jewish objections to Christianity, can really be placed in that category.
16 This oversimplifies, in that there was, historically, the recognition of a kind of pluralism within
Islam, as in the milet system of the Ottoman Empire (cf.
http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2004-03-25-ivanov-en.html), and also in Christendom at such times
as Jews were not being persecuted. In addition, in the period immediately after the Reformation, a
system was adopted in which the religion of a country was simply settled by the choice of the ruler.
17  Cf, for example, Richard Popkin ‘Jewish Anti-Christian Arguments as a Source of Irreligion from
the Seventeenth to the Early Nineteenth Century’, in Hunter and Wootton (eds) Atheism from the
Reformation to the Enlightenment. Isaac Troki’s Faith Strengthened, for example, something that it is
tempting to say should be compulsory reading for all evangelical Christians, is currently difficult to
obtain in printed form (although a version is now available on the internet at:
http://faithstrengthened.org/). It is striking that Hans Joachim Schoeps was able to remark in the
‘Foreword to the Second Edition’ of his The Jewish-Christian Argument: ‘This book made its first
appearance in 1937, behind closed doors, as it were, for the authorities at that time in power in Germany
allowed its sale only in Jewish bookstores and to Jews. Then, when it was noticed that it was a
“dangerous” book, it was prohibited completely.’ See his The Jewish-Christian Argument, London:
Faber, 1965, p. xiv. See also Richard Popkin, 2006, Disputing Christianity: The 400-year-old Debate over
Rabbi Isaac Ben Abraham Troki's Classic Argument, Amherst, N.Y.: Humanity Books.
18  At the very least, if one is offering arguments that are supposed to convince others, this opens up
the possibility of contestation; for example, to the effect that the arguments are not valid or are not
telling.
19  I am offering this as an argument as to what follows from epistemological fallibilism, not as an
interpretation of Mill. There has been argument about just what follows from Mill’s own arguments,
with some (for example, John Skorupski, 1989, John Stuart Mill, London: Routledge) taking the line
that I am commending here, while others (for example, Jonathan Riley in his ‘J. S. Mill’s Doctrine of
141
Blasphemy in a pluralistic society
Freedom of Expression’) argue that Mill’s own argument leads to a defence of more expressive activities,
such as demonstrations.
20  But where, obviously, if they offer arguments or try to convince others that they are right, they
deserve everything that they get in response.
21  Compare, in this context the controversy in 2004-05 opened up by the Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad’s remarks about the Holocaust. It is striking that the Pakistani academic Ijaz Hussain, in
an opinion piece ‘COMMENT: Who is more civilised: Iran or the West?’ was able to make what read
like a reasonable case for Ahmadinejad’s views, by way of describing the legal suppression of dissent
about the Holocaust in several countries, and providing a list of people or organisations which had
questioned it. He did not, say, refer to works which contest such claims, such as Deborah Lipstadt’s
Denying the Holocaust (New York: Free Press, 1993), or to the various publications on the David Irving
libel trial against Lipstadt in the UK. Ijaz Hussain, 2006, ‘COMMENT: Who is more civilised: Iran or
the West?’ Daily Times, Pakistan, January 4 2006; see
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006%5C01%5C04%5Cstory_4-1-2006_pg3_5)
22 The tradition of freedom of religion in the USA seems to be taken as a freedom to live without ones
religious ideas being challenged and this — or so it seemed to me when I was living there — extended
to beliefs about many other matters, in a manner that contrasts with day-to-day life in Britain or Australia.
23  Clearly, what counts as another may be contentious — say, with regard to vegetarianism, or, say,
the treatment of some socially unpopular minority — but on the face of it there is a difference between
how something is to be appropriately handled if it is broadly socially contentious in the society in
question, as compared to ones having what is very much a minority viewpoint in the society in question.
(For example, pleas for vegetarianism in a society of meat eaters need to be made in journals rather than
at the dinner table.) Even issues that are contentious may need to be treated in a circumspect manner:
if, say, the vegetarian chooses to eat with meat eaters in a society in which there were lively divisions
and debate about vegetarianism, it would hardly be appropriate for them to accompany the meal with
a running commentary about sentience, slaughterhouses, and quotations from Peter Singer.
24  Cf., on this, Joseph Alleine, Alarm to unconverted sinners etc, London: Nevil Simmons, 1993 etc.
25  Alan Peshkin, 1992, ‘Experience Subjectivity’, Qualitative Interest Group, College of Education,
University of Georgia, 1992 conference proceedings, Keynote Address.
http://www.coe.uga.edu/quig/proceedings/Quig92_Proceedings/peshkin.92.html (Viewed January 21,
2005).
26  Quoted from Foote, Prisoner for Blasphemy (see note 2).
27 The ideas of which Rushdie made use were familiar enough, and had not been thought of as
particularly contentious, in discussions of Islam. See, on this, and on many of the other complexities
of the Rushdie case, the discussion in Michael M.J. Fischer and Mehdi Abedi, 1990, Debating Muslims:
Cultural dialogues in postmodernity and tradition, Madison, Wis: University of Wisconsin Press.
28  I have in mind here something along the lines of the view developed by Quentin Gibson and used
by him and others in the context of textual interpretation in the history of political thought; cf. James
Tully (ed.) 1988, Meaning and Context, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
29  Or, say, unless they were a recently arrived visitor to the country who could quite reasonably not
be expected to appreciate the significance of what they were saying.
30  Quoted in Daniel Pipes, 1990, The Rushdie Affair, New York: Birch Lane Press/ Carol Publishing
Group, p. 108.
31  Of course, what is offensive is something which will change over time and will also be
context-dependent, which introduces further problems that I cannot even attempt to deal with, given
the space at my disposal.
32  ‘Little Pebble’ is the name of the leader of a Catholic religious group, who in 2005 was in court to
answer charges relating to sexual conduct towards an under-age member of his flock. For a site which
gives some indication of the charges against him, see http://users.bigpond.net.au/wanglese/pebble.htm
(Viewed January 3, 2006); for the group’s web page, see: http://www.shoal.net.au/~mwoa/ (Viewed
January 3, 2006).
33  I would particularly like to thank Geoff Stokes for discussion on this point.
34 The poem is reproduced at http://gaytoday.badpuppy.com/garchive/events/070502ev.htm (Viewed
November 3, 2005).
35  See, for a brief report,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/11/newsid_2499000/2499721.stm, which includes
a picture of Mrs Whitehouse. (Viewed November 3, 2005.)
142
Negotiating the Sacred II
36  It is striking, however, that from Rictor Norton’s personal account of the background to the
publication http://www.galha.org/glh/214/norton.html, not only was there considerable protest from
within the readership of the journal, from people who found it offensive, but Norton indicates that
they ‘did not relish defending a poem that we frankly realized was rather sick’, even if it was sincere.
37  See ‘Andres Serrano talks with Judith Ahern’, Photofile 53, April 1998, pp. 8-13; see p. 13. Serrano
claimed that he saw it as a desecration ‘not toward the mage but toward Christ himself’. But this seems
to me simply an indication of the degree to which — not unlike the poet in the cinema — his personal
interpretation was of kilter with the public meaning of what he had produced.
143




The argument in this section considers artistic creation and self-expression
achieved within restriction. It is hard to see that the value claimed for artistic
expression, of showing the world anew, or of expressing the common concerns
of humanity, requires that art should be unrestricted. While it might be assumed
that artists must work without restriction in order to express themselves, ‘fetters’
do not necessarily constrain what may be represented. For instance, films that
respect modesty may also express sexual longing and consummation. Restriction
is a condition for creativity, and is a framework within which creativity is
recognised.
As artist and curator, Christopher Braddock coordinated the exhibition Votive:
sacred & ecstatic bodies including the works of Ian Breakwell and Cathy de
Monchaux (Britian), Pierre & Gilles (France), and Megan Jenkinson (New Zealand).
The exhibition responded to controversy surrounding Tania Kovat’s exhibit
Virgin in a Condom at the Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa in 1998
and the work of Andres Serrano, Braddock writes about issues of blasphemy in
artworks that engage with collisions between sacred imagery and the body. This
chapter addresses complex relationships in the artworks between, on the one
hand, attitudes of devotion and, on the other, severe critique of the Church. The
artists exhibiting in Votive transgress, but avoid obvious attacks through an
emphasis on religious ecstasy and sensory qualities of religious symbols, rather
than their meaning. Braddock argues that the gallery provides a context for the
exploration of devotional forms excluded from the Church.
The next two chapters explore externally, and internally imposed censorship.
Post revolution Iranian cinema has been subject to heavy censorship particularly
in the manner in which the romantic relationships between men and women are
represented on screen and the language that is used in the script — un-Islamic,
profane, blasphemous or sacrilegious utterances, acts and gestures are forbidden.
In a culture that upholds religious norms stringently and where idolatry and
imitating the creative act of God is considered to be highly sacrilegious, Michelle
Langford is surprised that no official sanction has been imposed against producing
films but instead, cinema is used as a vehicle for promoting the State’s agenda
of educating people about Islamic values. While the lack of ‘fundamentalism’
may be surprising, it is clear that the state still seeks to control the social construct
of the pure and the impure within these films. However, Langford’s analysis of
Iraqi cinema shows that even stringent controls do not necessarily undermine
an artist’s ability to express themselves, or to critique the State.
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Many Australian Aboriginal societies utilise secrecy as a fundamental norm
for regulating speech. In Yolngu society, a person requires ‘the right’ to speak
on a topic, and the anthropologist Ian Keen has reported that this secrecy is
supported by self censorship, even when a person knows information, they may
refuse to acknowledge that they have this knowledge. Silence presents a means
of negotiating the sacred and preserving the sanctity of Indigenous knowledge.
In Indigenous Australia, collective experiences of a community are sacred and
cannot be recounted. Stories are the only way by which such a sacred world
may be represented, but stories embody ancestral beings and places and are
sacred in their own right so they should not be needlessly evoked.
In our final chapter, Caroline Josephs, a writer, makes a very personal
exploration of this system. In identifying with the Yolngu and giving credibility
to their religious accounts of the land, she interprets the silence surrounding
such stories not as censorship but as respect, or awe, in the face of the sacred,
and as a means of negotiating the relationship she has with others. By employing
various forms of storytelling — braiding genres of personal, cultural, conceptual
storytelling — the author covers three aspects of silence in relation to one
particular story — the Wagilag Sisters Story. Josephs weaves what she cannot
say about the Yolngu Wagilag Sisters story into her own story of ‘coming to
know’ the story and the place of their dance.
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10
Blasphemy and the art of the political
and devotional
Christopher Braddock
A breakdown in the unity of state and church has altered the context in which
blasphemy might be understood. Rather than viewing blasphemous libel as
intrinsically linked through the Ecclesiastical courts within the unity of State
and Church, the emphasis has shifted to the individual in society whose freedom
of artistic expression is constrained instead by the secular laws of defamation
and obscenity. In this light, artists such as Andres Serrano and Tania Kovats
embrace a freedom to use dramatic and visually confronting binary oppositions
in their works of art.1  Andres Serrano juxtaposed the crucifix with urine, and
Tania Kovats, a statuette of the Virgin Mary with a condom. Such iconography
provokes the possibility that these artworks might function as simultaneously
political and devotional: powerfully critical of church institutions, while
aesthetically operating as symbols that evoke reverence. In this context it is
significant that, in the debates that followed the controversies surrounding these
works of art, the arts establishment emphasised the division between church
and state in justification of the artists’ right to freedom of expression, and the
difference between temple and museum was highlighted in discussion about the
contextual setting of the museum as a place in which 'blasphemy' could not
occur. Artistic intention, and the context in which these works are witnessed,
are debated as factors in determining the possibility of blasphemy within the
divide of state and church, museum and temple.
In this chapter I will argue that interpretations of graphic Medieval images
of the body that avoid binary opposition are useful in a reappraisal of the
controversy surrounding artworks such as Serrano’s Piss Christ and Kovat’s
Virgin in a Condom. This raises questions about the role of devotional images.
Do they exist primarily to reinforce the strict teachings of the church or can
they be used to examine those beliefs? If we accept the latter as a possibility,
could these confrontational images signify divine revelation in the body, the
very essence of the Incarnation?
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Locating ‘blasphemy’ in the polemical
The beginning of the twenty-first century has brought into focus issues of
right-wing religious fundamentalism (be it Islamic or Christian) even more
sharply. The dangers and dilemmas of essentialist religious paradigms have
joined a list of vitally important global issues to be reckoned with, arguably as
important as global poverty and global warming. It is in this light that
bearing-witness to blasphemy becomes part of a debate about tolerance within
a pluralistic society.
As Kyla McFarlane described in the catalogue for the exhibition Votive: Sacred
and ecstatic bodies, 2  in the last decade, Australia and New Zealand bore witness
to artwork seemingly crossing the boundaries that constitute blasphemy:
In October 1997, Melbourne’s National Gallery of Victoria closed an
exhibition of works by American artist Andres Serrano after two physical
attacks by members of the public on his photograph Piss Christ (1987).
This incident followed earlier claims by Christian groups and senators
in the USA that the work was indecent and obscene.3  Serrano had
received funding from the National Endowment for the Arts and,
following a complaint from the American Family Association, Senator
Jesse Helms proposed that indecent or offensive works should not
continue to receive funding. New York Senator Alphonse D’Amato also
condemned the work in Congress. His outrage, and that of Helms, was
publicly echoed by many constituents.4
Serrano’s work is a photographic enlargement of a small commercially produced
crucifix immersed in Serrano’s own urine. Without the title of the work to
indicate the substance of piss used to create the image, the viewer might revel
in the sublimely romantic connotations of a misty atmospheric sky at sunset
striking at the heart of the crucifixion story with its hope of resurrection after
death. But Serrano’s titling ensures that the viewer has to confront the dilemma
that this is a vat of urine.
A severing of the unity of state and church has reinforced the freedoms of
the individual to roam across boundaries making a question of ownership of
religious symbols and their employment difficult to answer. The Catholic
Archbishop of Melbourne, Dr. George Pell, who considered Piss Christ
blasphemous, applied unsuccessfully for a Supreme Court injunction to prevent
the National Gallery of Victoria from exhibiting the work. Justice Harper cast
doubt on the need for the common law of blasphemous libel in Victoria, saying
that Australia ‘need not bother with [it]’ because contemporary Australia is a
pluralist, tolerant society.5  Justice Harper distinguished the Victorian position
from the English law stating that blasphemous libel is ‘an anachronism of English
history from a time when the State was intrinsically linked with the Church,
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through the Ecclesiastical courts, and the unity of State and Church was not
transported to the Australian Colony. This position is supported by the fact that
Victoria does not recognise an established Church under section 116 of the
Australian Constitution’.6  Now that the state and the church are no longer
inseparable, the question of authority and how religious iconography is employed
appears to shift to wider concerns of freedom and artistic expression as
constrained by the laws of defamation and obscenity. A calculation of the level
of offence experienced by the viewer moved to centre-stage.
McFarlane points to a similar reaction of public outrage with respect to Tania
Kovat’s Virgin in a Condom:
In a matter of days, Tania Kovats’ Virgin in a Condom (1992) was stolen
by a visitor to the Museum of Contemporary Art in Sydney. Exhibited
as part of ‘Pictura Britannica’, a show of work by young British artists,
it provoked numerous letters of protest and complaints from incensed
Christians and Muslims when it toured to Te Papa/Museum of New
Zealand the following year.7
Virgin in a Condom is a strikingly polemical work. On the one hand, the seven
and a half centimetres tall mass-produced statuette is a religious object made for
the purpose of evoking the Virgin Mary’s divine intercession and has been
covered with an object used, more or less exclusively, for covering erect penises
or a variety of sex toys, such as ‘butt-plugs’. Clearly, many viewers understood
the work as presenting an analogy to the Virgin Mary as a dildo. As I will argue,
a reappraisal of these binary interpretations might suggest that, on the other
hand, the statuette is religiously shrouded or concealed, visually resembling a
work such as Piero della Francesca’s Madonna della Misericordia (circa 1445) ,
in which the Madonna protects the people with her mantle. This condom as
shroud evokes notions of the polarised role models for women within Catholicism:
that women are unfairly torn between virgin and whore in the archetypal models
of Mary, the Mother of God, and Mary Magdalene, the redeemed whore. As
well as this, the sculpture strategically provokes discussion about the Catholic
Church’s prohibition of contraception by the use of condoms. Neither of these
issues, by the way, had any prominence whatsoever in the New Zealand media
coverage surrounding the controversy over Virgin in a Condom’s presence in Te
Papa. The lack of media coverage on these key issues highlights an assumption
that artists intend to shock rather than engage in public debate. Such an
assumption overlooks the possibility that artist’s may intend to provoke public
discussion on these issues, or to explore unconventional views on religion within
a museum context. I will return to this point in discussing the role of the museum
as providing a space for unconventional views of religion below.
The perceived polemical nature of the work contributed to Virgin in a Condom
becoming, arguably, the most publicised work of art in the history of New
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Zealand, Tania Kovats would not reply to any invitation to participate in the
exhibition Votive: Sacred and ecstatic bodies that I curated in Wellington in 2002.
Her Australasian experience, which included receiving abusive mail and death
threats, had been so traumatic that she wanted nothing more to do with us. Her
representative, the London-based Asprey Jacque Gallery, indicated that the
direction of her work was changing to the extent that another inclusion in a
religious project would misrepresent the artist.
Arguments surrounding the accountability of public expenditure in public
institutions such as galleries form strong undercurrents to these debates about
the control and use of religious symbols. In contrast with the National Gallery
of Victoria, Te Papa Tongerewa Museum of New Zealand stood their ground.
They refused to remove Virgin in a Condom from the Pictura Britannica exhibition
and backed their right to be an artistic conscience of society. In the words of
the concept curator, Ian Wedde, the museum had to be a free space for several
kinds of expression. It had to be available ‘for the expression of divergent and
controversial views’.8  Some of these controversial views may be unorthodox
religious or theological perspectives.
Serrano contends that Piss Christ stems from his religious upbringing, and
that the work upholds his religious conviction that the body can be seen as a
means for obtaining religious redemption. As Serrano puts it:
The photograph, and the title itself, are ambiguously provocative but
certainly not blasphemous…My Catholic upbringing informs this work
which helps me to redefine and personalise my relationship with God.
My use of such body fluids as blood and urine in this context is parallel
to Catholicism’s obsession with ‘the body and blood of Christ’. It is
precisely in the exploration and juxtaposition of the symbols from which
Christianity draws its strength.9
Who then, should decide whether something is blasphemous? The church or
religious group who claims ownership and control, or the artists themselves?
One standard model for the interpretation of art involves consideration of
the artist’s intentions. Within a context of the divide between state and church
and the concomitant freedom of the individual, such a model seems apt. Our
knowing that Serrano sees himself as working within the parameters of his own
faith seems to alter our immediate impression that this is a case of blasphemy.
It is as though, given his Christian upbringing, Serrano feels entitled to use the
religious images as he pleases, and that, as a Christian, he was incapable of
blaspheming. This idea of membership giving entitlement to use images however
you like raises questions about how ‘membership’ is determined, and whether
there can be levels of membership and entitlement.
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A conflicting position about how we should interpret a work of art appeals
to the conventional meaning of the symbols. If we read the image at face value,
it is still his piss, a human by-product of waste not normally associated with the
reverence of God. The media recently condemned American soldiers for the
blasphemy of urinating on the Koran during the military campaign in Iraq. If
this is clearly an act of blasphemy in relation to what is held sacred to Muslims,
and was correctly interpreted as an attack on the sentiments of the Muslim
prisoners they had captured, we would not expect a Christian to engage in a
similar act with respect to their own faith. This raises the question of what role
the gallery plays in providing a context for interpreting a work of art, and its
appreciation.
The context of witnessing blasphemy
Is viewing Piss Christ in an art gallery different from contemplating or
worshipping the image in a church? According to an institutional theory of art,
the identification of something as art influences the manner in which something
is interpreted. Such a theory of art is proposed by George Dickie where a ‘work
of art’ must satisfy the dual conditions of an artefact made by ‘a person who
participates with understanding in the making of an artwork’ together with a
confirmation of its status as an artwork ‘by some person acting on behalf of the
Artworld’.10  According to Dickie both conditions are necessary to confirm the
status of a work of art. From this perspective, does the institutional context of
the museum reserve a place for artistic critique that is separate from those
contexts within which we plausibly interpret something to be blasphemous? In
other words, does it reserve a space that permits artists to manoeuvre across
parameters of critique and devotion? This is a significant question as it has
implications for the role of the gallery as providing a space for alternative views
of religion and for the practice of religion.
Serrano’s work can be compared to Ian Breakwell’s Deep Faith (2001), which
was included in the Votive exhibition. In Deep Faith, a slide projection features
an X-ray of the throat of a woman who had swallowed a small crucifix which
had lodged in her throat. Breakwell found the X-ray while he was an
artist-in-residence at the Cardiff Anatomy Unit. The gradual and repeated
dissolving of a second slide over the first featuring the words ‘deep faith’, a
reference to the 1972 pornographic film Deep Throat, sexualises the work’s
imagery. This overlay of images hovers between acceptance of Christian doctrine,
indeed an obsessive consumption of the Body of Christ, and the sexual act of
fellatio. This reference plays on devotional allusions, toying with the notion of
complete acceptance of Christian doctrine, while aligning this with a sexual act.
The image also has a violent subtext, with the figure becoming an intrusive
lodgement in the throat. As McFarlane comments:
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This association of the figure of Christ with the interior of the body also
echoes Serrano’s submersion of a similar figure in his own urine in Piss
Christ. In both works, the body of Christ is strongly associated with the
functioning of the human body, at the beginning and end of digestive
process. In the former, the figure is taken into the throat and remains
uncomfortably lodged there, whilst in the latter, it is associated with
expulsion of waste.11
Ian Breakwell, Deep Faith, 2001, copyright The Estate of Ian Breakwell
Mediated by photographic processes and presented within the museum, do Piss
Christ and Deep Faith operate outside of the realm of devotion, and only as a
critique of the teachings of the Church? Do they, in other words, simply critique
from the sidelines?
As an artist, the question of where these artworks are witnessed was on my
mind when my work was included in an exhibition in New York City entitled
The Divine Body.12 The venues for the exhibition covered an array of institutional
settings. The gallery at Columbia, the Cathedral of St John the Divine, and a
theological seminary: art, worship and pedagogy. The distribution of the art
works seemed to have been dictated by economic imperative. Those of higher
economic value, such as the Andres Serrano and the Eric Fischl, were provided
with the security of the Columbia’s gallery, while other works were spread out
across the other venues. It occurred to me to ask: ‘What would have happened
if Piss Christ had been exhibited in St John the Divine?’ There might be people
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who think Piss Christ is not blasphemous in a museum, but blasphemous in a
place of worship. To the best of my knowledge the work has never been exhibited
in a place of worship. But, would this be blasphemous? What would happen if
my cibachrome photographs of naked tattooed models were exhibited in St John
the Divine? These works explore white-trash inspired tattoos inscribed close to
nipple, buttock and pubis, intimately photographed. The works aim to provoke
a collision between the practice of tattoo outlawed within most Judaeo-Christian
circles and an edification of the body.
And the question of placing Piss Christ in a church struck at the heart of a
dilemma in viewing both Piss Christ and Virgin in a Condom. On the one hand,
I see them as overly simplistic slogan-like artworks that are blasphemous in their
collision of clearly defined sacred and profane imagery; I would not photograph
the Koran floating in a pool of urine. And, on the other hand, my acceptance of
an institutional theory of art inclines me to think of the context of the art gallery
as a site of questioning and critique, not a site of devotional practice. Yet,
Breakwell’s aestheticisation of the image — projected in a dimly lit space and
viewed against the organ music of the late French composer Olivier Messian —
clearly point to an atmosphere of reverence if not of devotion.
A conclusion that works of art accused of being blasphemous are so simply
because they break religious dogma, or are exhibited in a sacred space, is
problematic. The conclusion provokes questions about the role of religious
symbols in ecclesiastical settings, and suggests that they exist primarily to
reinforce the strict teachings of the church. A religious painting in a church
could also examine or tease-out the nature of those beliefs. My earlier suggestion
that the museum might reserve a place of artistic critique outside the realms of
worship seems now too simplistic, and undermines the possibility of ‘religious’
art operating across the parameters of critique and devotion.
Religious law and sacred bodies
Ian Breakwell’s video, The Sermon, 1984, which was also exhibited in the Votive
exhibition, subtly explored interpretations of ‘the law’ in Catholic teaching and
its relationship with the desires of the body. In so doing, Breakwell shifts our
focus from a cleric reinforcing the law of the church to an individual overcome
by a sense of blasphemy in how he occupies his own body. Kyla McFarlane
writes in Votive:
The Sermon is…[a] sardonic commentary on the effects of the law as
stated by the institutional voice, it takes the format of a television sermon
in a book-lined study reminiscent of the set of Stars on Sunday. The
speaker, a seated priest, begins by calmly reminding the viewer that we
have erred and offended against ‘the laws’ and that clarification is needed
regarding areas of guidance. As the monologue progresses, however, his
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avid pleasure in addressing the perverse and sinful becomes apparent,
with the tone of the address moving from sage, fatherly advice to a
frenzied tirade against the lusts of the flesh and original sin. The sermon
is subject to a kind of leakage, as a perverse desire meets with the rigidity
of the institutional voice…Breakwell’s spoken text is littered with
references to bodily fissures and seepages, such as ‘the rupturing of
membranes’ during birth, or the leaking of sperm from a condom
perforated with holes so that the marriage act can still be performed
within the guidelines of the faith whilst collecting semen for laboratory
tests. Or, finally, the gutting of the stomach of the depraved. Absurd
and viscous, The Sermon ironically describes the impress of the body
and its filthy excesses on the intellectual rigour of the law. In attempting
to contain and restrain, the law itself becomes perverse and obsessive.
By the video’s end, desire and the law become blurred to the point of
misrecognition.13
In the video, bodily function, and our relationship with the body, is inscribed
with the categories of the pure and the impure. The body is thought of as a kind
of temple, which requires us to treat it in a certain way. Yet the attempt to
achieve purity is undermined by the body itself; its own secretions defile it.
Julia Kristeva argues that categories of abomination such as food taboos or
corporeal alterations, topologically correspond to one’s being able to have access
to a place — the holy place of the Temple. Impurity, therefore, has a relationship
to what happens outside the Temple. But this relationship is not contingent on
a physical existence of the Temple: for Judaism, the Temple’s function remained
the same when the Temple was destroyed.14
Kristeva’s notion of the Temple enfolds onto our own bodies, in biblical
terms, the body as a Temple of the Holy Spirit: ‘A mouth attributed to the anus:
is that not the ensign of a body to be fought against, taken in by its insides.’15
This describes a possibility for blasphemy and sacrilege in how we occupy our
bodies individually, and by our relationship to other bodies. Seen from this
perspective, Piss Christ contravenes the boundaries of the self’s clean and proper
body, just as Ian Breakwell’s Deep Faith aligns throat and penis, as a symbolic
protest against an intrusive moral theology.
Beyond the dichotomies of abjection and transcendence
Kristeva’s project seeks to redeem the female body from categories of
abomination, from existing outside the Temple, due to functions that include
menstruation and lactation. And here it is helpful to imagine a fictitious artwork
by Serrano that elucidates Kristeva’s position, let us call it Menstrual Blood Christ.
A crucifix submerged in menstrual blood indexes the sexualised female body,
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identified as abject, and describes a problematic position for women in relation
to the holy place of the Temple.
Serrano himself comes close to such a work with Milk, Blood, 1986. Two vats,
one of milk and the other of blood, are photographed butted up against each
other. Only the central vertical edges of the glass vats are visible so that the
image is abstracted and not dissimilar to some abstract colour field paintings.
Serrano’s Milk, Blood, while engaging in binary opposites on a visual level,
encourages a more diffuse worry.16  For Anthony Julius, this work provides an
opportunity to reflect on the cultural connotations of bodily substances: ‘They
are similar: milk nurtures, blood animates. They are different: we ingest milk,
we celebrate its flow, we obtain it with a caress; we may not ingest blood (save
symbolically, or else to save our lives), we fear its flow, we obtain it painfully,
invasively...Like Piss Christ, the work is mediated by photography and presents
the same tensions between presentation and substance. We are seduced by the
formal, almost minimalist (Rothko) nature of the work but simultaneously
confronted by its substance’.17
Where Kristeva seeks to redeem the body from categories of abomination,
Carolyn Bynum Walker’s research on the female body and religious practices
in the later middle ages (1200–1500) promotes a bodily (incarnational)
manifestation of spiritual revelation that, I suggest, avoids binary opposition.18
She points to graphic physical processes being revered such as: ‘Holy people
spat or blew into the mouths of others to effect cures or convey grace. The ill
clamoured for the bath water of would-be saints to drink or bathe in, and
preferred it if these would-be saints themselves washed seldom and therefore
left skin and lice floating in the water.’19  Following Francis of Assisi, who kissed
lepers, several Italian saints ate puss or lice from the poor or sick, thus
incorporating into themselves the illness and misfortune of others.20  Bynum
Walker cautions us against reading into medieval source material an assumption
of the binary that control of the body equates to a rejection of sex. She argues
that ‘Medieval images of the body have less to do with sexuality than with
fertility and decay. Control, discipline, even torture of the flesh is, in medieval
devotion, not so much the rejection of physicality as the elevation of it — a
horrible yet delicious elevation — into a means of access to the divine’.21
Two sixteenth-century religious paintings support this rejection of the body
as abject, and the connection between sexuality and abjection. Leo Steinberg
argues that, in Lucas Cranach’s Holy Trinity in a Glory of Angels (c.1515-18) and
Hans Schaufelein’s Crucifixion (1515) (both of which depict Jesus with an
erection), the erection is an iconographic symbol of the resurrection. A Dutch
painting, the Good Shepherd, c.1550, from the church of St John in Schiedam,
has Christ’s genitalia as the central focus of the pictorial space. St. Augustus
held that involuntary erections were a condition of original sin. Yet, in Christ’s
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body, as the New Adam, an erection is willed and intended, a sign of the
annulment of sin and death through the resurrection.22 To suggest a singularly
sexualised reading of such an image from the sixteenth century would be to
misread the material, and to fall into the binaries of much contemporary
discourse. Just as we do not need to read these binaries into the
crucifixion–erection–motif, we may interpret a contemporary
Virgin–condom–motif as having to do with fertility and an elevation of
physicality as a means of access to the divine.
Mieke Bal explores such a turning of the tables. According to Bal:
The flesh that is so important in the Christian tradition takes on different
meanings at different moments in history. From the perspective of an
engaging late twentieth century [and now the twenty first century]
where pain and suffering are often bound up with sexuality, we are now
enabled, by artists who endorse this baroque historiography and the
entanglement that characterises it, to scratch away the dust of a
disembodied religiosity and gain access again to a religious life that is
much closer to bodily experience.23
Cathy de Monchaux, Red, 1999, © Cathy de Monchaux
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In this light, another work from the Votive exhibition, Red, by Cathy de
Monchaux, challenges boundaries of the sacred and profane by adopting mixed
messages: heraldic motifs reminiscent of imperially religious crosses and crests,
and simultaneously, gynaecological-like instruments of fetish. Red collapses
institutional order into private blossomings of flesh. The sculpture is obsessively
created. With all the components cut by hand, the detailed clasps, buckles and
leather belts tie down, and yet follow the formation of a concentrically
descending vulva-like velvet interior. Like Ian Breakwell’s The Sermon, there is
a strongly public face to this work that nods to ecclesiastical and, in this case,
royal protocol. Desires of the flesh are here enfolded, literally and metaphorically,
onto the strictures of the law. But what is extraordinarily successful in this work
is the manner in which these conflicting elements never overpower each other
but are held together as palpable transgression. De Monchaux’s Red becomes a
powerful sign of the fertile body, the physically disciplined and restrained body
and, yes, the sexually engorged body, but the enriched body as signifier of
religious life in bodily experience.
Bynum Walker’s caution against binary thinking is also helpful in discussing
Serrano’s work. If it were Christ’s piss (like the dirty bath water of would-be
saints), would the abject transfer to the realm of the sacred? What would we do
with a phial of Christ’s piss, other than venerate it? Moreover, does Serrano’s
photograph of Christ in piss, together with such uplifting and sublime aesthetics,
redeem piss from being an ensign of the body’s abject nature? In this shift from
piss to a photograph of piss I have in mind Rosalind Krauss’ argument, in
referencing André Bazin’s ‘The Ontology of the Photographic Image’, that
photographs, by virtue of their process, are indexically linked to the objects
they portray in ways that exceed representation: ‘The photographic image is
the object itself.’ In this way, the photograph, together with its aesthetic qualities,
might redeem the abject substance.24 The act of pissing on the Koran in war
lacks the devotional and aestheticising intentions of both Serrano and Kovats.
The meaning of the image Piss Christ is much more complex than the meaning
of either pissing on Christ or pissing on a crucifix, just as the meaning of the
sculpture Virgin in a Condom is more multifaceted than the significance of
comparing the Virgin Mary with an erection. Can we view these works from a
position that is beyond the conventional binary of the pure and impure? If we
consider the incarnational possibility that Christianity affords, to become as
Christ, then Serrano’s piss and Christ’s piss — Serrano’s body and Christ’s body
— may become as one. In the words of Damian Casey: ‘God’s place is with the
abject every bit as much as it is on the high altar of the cathedral.’25  In this
light, Piss Christ could be seen as ‘an attempt to retrieve the meaning of the
incarnation’.26  Casey contends that it is Serrano’s ‘exploration of the relation
between the abject and the sacred that makes Piss Christ not only good art, but
good religious art, bordering on the iconic’.27
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When Bynum Walker cautions a straight forward assumption of binary
thinking in medieval source material, she offers us a challenge to re-examine
works such as Piss Christ and Virgin in a Condom from perspectives that are not
preoccupied with the body as primarily sexual in function, or abject secretions.
While both artworks are highly polemical and confrontational — this is piss
and this is a condom — both artists deny a singularly blasphemous intent,
alluding instead to both devotional and political intention. Both images have
historical precedents where body fluids and the body’s imagery are not clearly
divided between the sacred and the abject. I contend that such historical
perspectives inform a richer interpretation of Piss Christ and Virgin in a Condom.
Seen from this perspective, these images signify the possibility of divine
revelation through the body.
Conclusion
We cannot rely on a purely conventional understanding of blasphemy in
understanding blasphemy in artistic contexts. Intentions matter to our reading
of acts of blasphemy and change our perspective on whether they are acceptable.
The context of the museum does more than reserve a space for artists to critique
outside the realms of worship, but enables the possibility of artists operating
across the parameters of critique and devotion. In this sense, the choice to curate
Votive: Sacred and ecstatic bodies in museums offered the possibility to interpret
Ian Breakwell’s Deep Faith and Cathy de Monchaux’s Red (and the other art
works discussed above) as ‘religious’ works that operate outside conformist
religious structures. In this respect museums and galleries have a role in
providing a space for the expression of alternative, and sometimes
unconventional, religious expression; offering artists, within certain restrictions,
the possibility to articulate what they want. The polemical nature of the abject
and sacred common to many of the artworks discussed in this chapter is not
new. Contemporary binaries regarding bodily fluids, suffering and flesh are
often bound up with sexuality, creating a sense of the religious that is
disembodied. It is in a reappraisal of our perceptions of binary imagery
(misunderstood by essentialist religious paradigms) that a solution emerges.
Bynum Walker’s research into medieval perceptions of the abject body as less
sexual and more to do with fertility and decay indicate that the time at which
something is viewed changes our understanding of whether blasphemy has
occurred. It may be, that from the perspective of contemporary religious
authority, these images are blasphemous, however, historical readings of the
body in religious art make us question whether we must view works such as
Piss Christ and Virgin in a Condom in this fashion. These works operate within
a framework that is more complex than a conventional reading of blasphemy
allows. They may also be interpreted as devotional, religious expressions.
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Negotiating the sacred body in Iranian
cinema(s): National, physical and
cinematic embodiment in Majid Majidi’s
Baran (2002)
Michelle Langford
Any religious utterance, act or gesture, stands in the shadow of — more or
less, but never totally avoidable — perversion, parody and kitsch, of
blasphemy and idolatry.1
Where have all the bodies gone? Modesty in Iranian cinema
In the post-revolutionary period, Iranian cinema has been subject to strict Islamic
censorship regulations that dictate what can and cannot be show on screen,
particularly in terms of the representation of women and romantic relationships
between men and women. The rules relating to the representation of women
mirror, in a highly exaggerated way, the codes of modesty relating to women
in society more generally. Censorship functions to ensure that both onscreen
bodies and the bodies of viewers in the audience remain modest. These bodies
must be protected from un-Islamic, profane, blasphemous or sacrilegious
utterances, acts and gestures: primarily those related to sex and un-Islamic
behaviour. This is achieved in life primarily through the veiling of female bodies,
and on screen by a ‘screening’ of such acts and suggestions of sexuality that
might cause one to become impure or ‘haram’. The codes of modesty that prevail
in society are greatly enhanced in the cinema, as all viewers are considered to
be unrelated to the actors and characters who appear on screen. Modesty is
maintained primarily by ensuring that onscreen women are appropriately veiled
and clothed in loose-fitting clothing, and that physical contact between male
and female bodies is avoided. Stories involving either emotional love or the
suggestion of physical love between members of the opposite sex are generally
avoided primarily due to the risk of violating the sanctity of pure, modest and
Islamic bodies.2  Film form, that is, the technical and stylistic devices for creating
meaning in cinema, according to Hamid Naficy has also undergone a radical
process of Islamicisation, which obliges filmmakers to uphold the principles of
Islam.3  In a religious context, where idolatry and imitating the creative act of
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God is considered to be highly sacrilegious, it is a wonder that the creative
audio-visual medium of film has been adopted so readily as an instrument for
consolidating the revolution and educating the population about proper Islamic
morals and behaviour. Indeed, despite his constant critique of cinema during
his years in exile, Ayatollah Khomeini is said to have seen the potential of the
film medium for promoting revolutionary (primarily Islamic) values.4  Just as
Western cinema and the popular and decadent pre-revolutionary cinema known
as ‘Film Farsi’ were seen as an evil force that had corrupted the minds and bodies
of the population during the Phalavi regime, in the post-revolutionary period,
cinema was considered an appropriate vehicle for the purification of spectator’s
and by association the nation’s mind, body and soul. With the enmeshing of
state and religion brought about with the establishment of the theocratic
government in 1979 and the establishment of Shari’a law, both individual and
nation must necessarily reflect Islamic values.
Majidi Majidi’s Baran (2001) is an extraordinary film which successfully
depicts an adolescent man discovering his burgeoning sexuality, and falling in
love with a beautiful young Afghan woman named Baran. Through the use of
very clever and subtle cinematic devices, Majidi generates a deep sense of
emotion and intimacy without ever showing any physical contact between the
two, and without ever violating either the character’s or the viewer’s modesty.
Additionally, by couching this love story in the broader context of the
socio-economic condition of Afghan refugees in Iran, Majidi produces yet another
level of discursive meaning where an ideal model of Islamic love and charity
toward others may be perceived, effectively embodying a highly idealised
conception of the nation. But, through its complex visceral engagement of the
spectator’s sensorium, Baran is a film that also explores the very limits of the
sacred Iranian body on both the level of the national and individual citizenry.
In this chapter, I wish to argue that through the simultaneous idealised
embodiment of Iranian national Islamic values and the faltering, frail and very
physical adolescent body of the central male character, Majidi is effectively
negotiating the limits of the sacred body in Iranian cinema(s). I wish finally to
demonstrate how film — which itself may be considered a body of sorts — may
reach out figuratively to touch and move the bodies in the audience in ways
that exceed simple observance of censorship regulations and generate vital
connections between the viewers and the bodies on screen. In doing so, the film
bears witness to the shadows that haunt any sacred utterance.
Embodying the nation
We see just such a reflection of individual and nation in the narrative trajectory
of Baran. On one level, Majidi’s film functions as an exemplary model of selfless
devotion and modesty, particularly through its characterisation of the central
male character Lateef, an adolescent gofer working on a building site on the
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outskirts of Tehran. The film traces his growing attachment to a young Afghan
woman named Baran, who has come to the building site disguised as a young
man named Rahmat in order to support her family following an accident that
has rendered her father physically unable to work. Once Lateef discovers that
Baran is really a woman, he is clearly struck by love’s arrow and goes out of his
way to please her and swoons in her presence. Eventually, however, Baran is
forced to flee the building site as an illegal Afghan worker and Lateef goes in
search of her. When he discovers the poor conditions in which she lives, and
the harsh working conditions she endures, hauling large rocks from a rushing
stream, he resolves to help her and her family by giving them all of his savings.
Things do not go to plan, however, for Baran’s father, Najaf, gives the money
to his friend, Soltan, who needs it to return urgently to Afghanistan. Surprisingly,
Lateef is not embittered by this situation, for he recognises that this man is just
as desperate as Baran and her family. This is the first example of the
self-sacrificing behaviour exhibited by Lateef throughout the film, putting
collective needs above his own personal desires.
Lateef’s behaviour also functions powerfully as an illustration of the Islamic
principle of welcoming Muslim refugees and displaced peoples. During the
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979–89), Iran opened its borders to Afghan
refugees who were classified by the newly formed Iranian government as
Mohajerin, or ‘involuntary religious migrants’.5 This principle, which is
enshrined in the Quran was, according to Aldeeb Abu-Sahlieh, adopted in the
second Islamic Declaration of Human Rights in 1981:
The homeland of Islam (dar-al-Islam) is one. It is a homeland for every
Muslim, whose movement within [its domain] cannot be restricted by
any geographical impediments nor political boundaries. Every Muslim
country must receive any Muslims who emigrate thereto, or who enter
it, as a brother welcomes his brother: ‘Those who entered the city and
the faith before them love those who flee unto them for refuge, and find
it in their breasts no need for that which had been given them, but prefer
the fugitives above themselves though poverty become their lot. And who
is saved from his own avarice – such are they who are successful’...
[Quran, 59:9]6
Lateef’s first act of self-sacrifice, of preferring the fugitives above himself
despite the certainty that this will increase his own poverty, tends to cast him
as an ideal figure of the Islamic nation as the Quranic principles are powerfully
embodied in him. This embodiment of Islamic values is further emphasised in
his second self-sacrificing act, which becomes for Lateef an act of effacing his
own individual identity.
Throughout the film, Majidi places emphasis on the themes of identity and
identification in a number of ways that provide commentary on Iranian civil
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society and the shifting policies toward Afghan refugees in that society. The
first instance occurs during the first few minutes of the film in a scene where
Lateef goes to a supermarket to purchase food for the construction workers.
Lateef has had to leave his identity card in order to secure credit at the store.
The shopkeeper points out that the account is long overdue and demands
payment. At risk is Lateef’s identity card, and we recognise that he risks the
security of his personal identity for the good of the collective (the labourers).
Later, as Lateef is checking into a hotel, we see a man denied a bed for the night
because he does not have an identification card. Additionally, on two occasions,
the illegal Afghan workers (who do not have work permits) are forced to flee
the building site when a government inspector comes to check for illegal workers.
It becomes clear, when the foreman of the site is asked to sign a document stating
that no illegal Afghan workers are employed on the site, that these Afghans are
no longer treated as mohajerin who ‘were issued with identification cards known
as “blue cards”, and granted indefinite permission to stay in Iran legally’.7 This
detail of the film closely reflects Iran’s changing policies toward Afghan refugees,
who, after 1993, were no longer categorised as mohajerin, but simply as
panahandegan (refugees), a term which ‘was considered to have a pejorative
nuance, even connoting impoverishment’.8 These panahandegan were issued
only with temporary registration cards, which made access to work and other
civil services such as health care and education extremely limited. Lateef’s strong
sense of ideal Islamic devotion to the ‘fugitives’ is clearly being contrasted here
with a view of the state’s pragmatic approach to the refugee question.9  By
extension, this would appear to suggest that, while the government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran is constitutionally bound to abide by the principles of Islamic
law, this may not necessarily be the case in practice, given the explicit removal
of sacred significance from the Afghan refugees, which seems to ignore the
passage from the Quran cited above. Majidi certainly provides an ideal role
model in his film, however, by revealing a considerable gap between this ideal
behaviour and the practices of the state, he has presented us with an allegorical
figure aimed at representing the opposite of that which he would appear to
represent. Lateef’s behaviour is revealed to be explicitly and unrealistically
ideal. The presentation of the ideal individual is used to highlight the flaws of
the state.
Throughout the film, Lateef continues to practice such sacred beliefs toward
his fugitive neighbours. This is brought to a climax with a highly symbolic and
self-effacing gesture. Having already given away his entire savings, Lateef
decides to sell his identity card in order to provide Baran and her family with
the money they need to return to Afghanistan. In aesthetic terms, Majidi sets
up this scene as though Lateef is making a dangerous journey into the
underworld, further emphasising the austere and self-sacrificial nature of his
gesture. As Lateef makes his way through the busy bazaar making enquiries,
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suddenly, two mysterious men begin to chase him through the narrow alleyways
of the bazaar. But, after successfully giving them the slip, another man approaches
him and urges Lateef to follow. He leads Lateef to a dark, cluttered old basement,
which further emphasises the theme of his descent into the corrupt underbelly
of Tehran. Here, another man purchases his identification card. A close-up of
the card signals the symbolic intensity of this moment, as the man removes
Lateef’s photo, and metaphorically erases his identity with a quick flick of his
grubby finger. This act of selling his identity card is a powerful gesture in which
Lateef shows his preference for the fugitives above himself, even though this
will certainly ensure his own poverty. Lateef is the very embodiment of the
ideal national subject envisaged for the post-revolutionary Iranian cinema by
Khomeini, yet ironically his perfection reveals the cracks and contradictions,
the shadow of the very nation-state he is supposed to embody.
Lateef’s developing model behaviour effectively serves as a critique of, rather
than as an example of, state practice. Furthermore, by choosing to relinquish
his identification/identity he is effectively rendered a non-citizen, like the Afghan
refugees, and therefore it is questionable whether he even stands for the state
after all, but rather becomes one of the many displaced people of the region.
From embodied nation to embodied desire
If Majidi presents Lateef as embodying the ideal, self-effacing values of Islam
through his devotion to a series of Afghan refugees on a socio-political level,
and, as I have shown it is possible to read this as signifying the opposite of what
it appears to, then we need to investigate the various levels at which embodied
desire is simultaneously effaced and achieved through the use of cinematic
devices and a very complex deployment of the sound track.
Despite the necessary effacement of the physical, sexualised body in Iranian
cinema according to the mandates of censorship, throughout Baran, Majidi
manages powerfully to suggest the sexual awakening of a young adolescent man,
taking him through stages of confused outbursts of anger in the all-male
environment of the building site, to the discovery of his own capacity for love
of a woman. By staging this inner journey on a building site — ostensibly a male
dominated arena — in which a woman (Baran/Rahmat) intervenes, Majidi is
effectively attempting to argue for the necessity of interaction between men and
women in order for appropriate subject formation to take place and respect for
one another to be achieved. Ironically, however, the woman arrives disguised
as a man. Certainly, throughout the film Baran is literally figured as a
domesticating, ordering and beautifying influence upon this rather ramshackle
and chaotic space. Michael Fischer has suggested that Baran functions
metaphorically as a cooling influence on Lateef’s hot-blooded adolescent
temper,10  although, I would argue, not without first firing him up. Thus, the
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film skirts the very edges of the sacred by alerting us to the pleasures of the
flesh.
Adolescent awakenings
Even before the introduction of Baran/Rahmat to the film, we are provided with
a glimpse of Lateef’s burgeoning but floundering interest in the opposite sex.
On his way back to the building site after shopping for bread, his attention is
drawn by the sound of a woman giggling suggestively. We see him looking
wistfully for a few seconds before the object of his gaze is revealed to be a young
couple in a park playfully throwing a hat to one another. Such a playful but
mediated tryst serves frequently in Iranian cinema as a coded substitute for a
more intimate exchange, which is forbidden from the screen. The
shot-reverse-shot structure of this brief scene leaves the viewer with no doubt
that Lateef also longs for such female companionship as he chews distractedly
on a piece of Afghan bread. Where the hat serves as a playful indirect signifier
of forbidden physical contact — a reminder that the couple are not permitted
to hold hands in public — the fleshy bread may be read as a cryptic clue or
allegorical hieroglyph of Lateef’s burgeoning desire to connect with another
body. In fact, the bread is charged with such allegorical meaning from the very
beginning of the film, when the viewer becomes attuned to the inherently fleshy
qualities of raw dough. This is initially achieved through the evocative
introduction of the soundtrack even before the first image has lit the screen. For
a few seconds we hear some slapping sounds, not unlike the sound of a hand
gently rubbing and slapping flesh. This is accompanied by breathing sounds,
which are pushed to the very front of the soundscape, giving the cinema viewer
the rather tactile sensation that someone is breathing in our ear. As with the
momentary visual withholding of the source of the giggling woman, the few
seconds during which vision is withheld allows the viewer’s mind to wander,
to invest these sounds with our own imaginations, to speculate on the kinds of
images that may accompany them. In this sense, the black screen functions as a
kind of veil,11  highlighting that something has been hidden from view, and
signalling that we must engage both our minds and senses in order to delve into
the deepest layers of meaning presented by the film. Following this aural ‘tease’,
Majidi provides an answer to the sound puzzle, revealing the source of the
sounds to be a baker kneading dough, rolling it out and slapping it onto the hot
stone to be cooked. Even though this image manages to dispel the more titillating,
and potentially sacrilegious suggestions provided by the sounds, Majidi has
managed to attune the viewer to the particularly fleshy qualities of the dough,
and predisposed us to read sensuality into Lateef’s consumption of it in the scene
described above.12
Lateef’s awakening adolescent desire is further emphasised moments later
when he pauses to admire himself in a highly reflective glass door, fixing his
166
Negotiating the Sacred II
hair, smiling and humming to himself, imagining perhaps that a girl might find
him attractive. However, this moment of what may be described as narcissistic
scopophilia — where he already perceives himself to be more man than he really
is — is interrupted (metaphorically shattered) when a man pushes open the door
from the inside, pauses to look at him suspiciously, thus bringing Lateef’s
self-reverie to an abrupt halt. His self-image is not yet fully formed as he balances
on the cusp between adolescence and adulthood.
These are just the first of many clues that hint at Lateef’s sexual awakening.
On the building site, we witness other signs of his faltering and often misplaced
attempts to assert his burgeoning masculinity. This fire that is burning inside
him seems to function at times — such as those discussed above — as a calm,
warming sensation, but at other times will flare out of control and provoke
violent outbursts. Lateef frequently fights with his co-workers over highly
insignificant matters, particularly once the young Rahmat (Baran disguised as a
young man) comes to work on the building site. These outbursts become more
frequent, particularly after Rahmat is given his job in the kitchen preparing
meals and tea and Lateef must join the ranks of the labourers. Gradually, his
outbursts become more focussed on Rahmat, showing ironically that he is learning
to direct his adolescent rage. This rage, however, is suddenly turned to desire
in a key moment when Lateef discovers that Rahmat is really a woman.
This scene is important for the way it is structured cinematically, for it is
designed to generate a powerfully affective experience for the spectator as well
as revealing the emotions that are being stirred up deep within Lateef’s being.
It also cleverly negotiates the censorship rules regarding the portrayal of women
in Iranian cinema. The scene opens with a shot of Lateef going to fetch a heavy
bag of cement. As he moves toward the camera, struggling to carry the heavy
bag in his arms, wind blows a wave of white smoke across the screen, which
irritates Lateef’s eyes, causing a momentary loss of vision. The sound of the wind
generates a highly mystical effect, appearing as a kind of energy that draws
Lateef toward the kitchen area where Rahmat/Baran works. The soundtrack is
then further layered with the distant sound of thunder, rain, and the faint sound
of a woman humming. As Lateef blinks, a reverse shot of a curtain blowing in
the wind briefly reveals the distant silhouette of a woman. Cut back to Lateef,
still blinking he throws the bag of cement to the ground and rubs his eyes. The
sound of wind continues to intensify, and having regained his vision, Lateef
peers intensely toward the blowing curtain, the camera zooming toward him to
indicate the sharpening of his vision. This movement is answered in the next
reverse shot of the curtain, which now blows in slow motion, teasingly rising
and lowering, providing another brief shot of the silhouette glimpsed earlier,
but the curtain refuses to yield for more than a second or two. The movement
and placement of the camera suggests a point of view shot, however when Lateef
enters from screen right, we realise that Majidi has in fact placed us not with
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Lateef, but beside him, therefore implicating us within the scene. The following
shot, however, does not yet reveal to us a clearer view of the scene behind the
curtain, we see Lateef seeing, his eyes widening, fixing his gaze upon the scene
before him. Finally, Majidi provides us with a shot of Baran brushing her long
black tresses, humming to herself wistfully as she does so. She is framed and
‘veiled’ by a frosted window that barely separates either Lateef or the viewer
from her modesty with backlighting providing a further distancing effect to
protect the modesty of all. In this highly affective scene produced by sound,
framing, camera movement and movement within the frame, not only are we
encouraged to feel the passion that Lateef feels, but to experience images and
sounds viscerally.
Don’t tell the mullahs!
Throughout Baran, Majidi effectively uses images and sounds to engage the
viewer in what Vivian Sobchack refers to as a ‘cinesthetic’ mode of embodied
spectatorship.13  In her article, ‘What my fingers knew’, Sobchack argues that
to experience a film is not simply a matter of ‘seeing it’. Rather, our body
functions as ‘a ‘third’ term that both exceeds and yet is within representation’.14
That is, although our bodies are ostensibly located outside and separate from
the representations that appear on screen, through the cinema’s engagement of
our multiple senses, our bodies are necessarily also inscribed into or take part
in the representation itself. In addition, she writes: ‘All the bodies in the film
experience — those on-screen and off-screen (and possibly that of the screen
itself) — are potentially subversive bodies. They have the capacity to function
both figuratively and literally.’15  In coining the term ‘cinesthesia’, Sobchack
draws on two psychoneurological conditions: synaesthesia and coenaesthesia.
Synesthesia is an extreme, but rare condition in which the stimulation of one
sense provokes a perception in another sense. Sobchack explains: ‘Synaesthetes
regularly, vividly, automatically, and consciously perceive sound as colour, or
shapes as having a taste’.16  A less extreme form of this ‘cross-modal transfer’
takes place in figural language. According to George Lakoff and Mark Johnson,
because metaphors originate in concrete, sensate experience, ‘metaphor is
experiential and visceral’.17  I would argue that the highly metaphorical film
language used in Baran, combined with the clever use of off-screen sound, helps
to engage the viewer in just this kind of cross-modal transfer. Not only does
bread metaphorically evoke flesh, it does so largely because we have already
heard/felt the potentially erotic fleshiness of the dough well before our sense of
sight is brought into play. Similarly, in the scene in which Lateef discovers
Baran’s true identity, the enhanced sound of wind serves simultaneously as a
metaphor for the swell of emotion being experienced by Lateef, and may cause
a cross-modal sensation in the viewer of being touched by such a breeze.
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The dominant role played by sound in producing these cross-modal sensory
affects in Baran also evokes the second bodily condition discussed by Sobchack.
According to Sobchack, coenaesthesia is a common, yet under-recognised
perceptual experience in which ‘our equally available senses have the capacity
to become variously heightened and diminished’.18 This capacity is more evident
in children where the hierarchical socialisation of the senses has not yet fully
taken place, but given the right stimuli, this may also occur in adults. Cinema
has the most wonderful capacity to do this, and certainly, as I have already
shown, through his complex use of sound19  in Baran, Majidi certainly attempts
to retrain his viewers’ sensorium to privilege sound over or in addition to vision.
This adds a highly affective and potentially erotic or subversive level of meaning
to the film that plays off and against the pure, selfless devotion on a collective
level, and the personal love for a woman on an individual level.
It is my contention that a figurative and literal exchange between potentially
erotic bodies takes place in Baran. As in the scene discussed above, Majidi
deploys complex cinematic techniques (sound, editing, camera and character
placement) and stimulates our sensory organs (through evocative sounds and
images) in order to weave the viewer into the very texture of the film. In doing
so, he effectively allows the viewer to experience that which cannot be literally
represented on screen. Our bodies effectively fill the gap imposed by censorship
between the characters’ bodies. In doing so, Majidi exposes the viewer to the
possibility of what I would like to call ‘sacrilegious affects’, that is, a felt violation
of the sacred modesty of the Iranian cinema screen. The cinema’s potential for
cross-modal transfer enables the superficial modesty of the on screen
representation to be undermined by a transgressive potential in the aesthetic
realm, capable of activating the forbidden (haram) sensations of the flesh.
Throughout the film, the sounds of wind, rain, thunder, running water, the
fluttering of fabric and bird’s wings, human breath, footsteps, voices, laughter
and birds singing are all used to heighten the embodied sensory perceptions of
the viewers and attune them to what must remain unrepresented, relegated to
the space beyond the frame. Even a close-up of Lateef’s finger wiping mud from
a coin he finds in the street works to heighten our sense of touch. By the end of
the film, our senses and emotions have become so heightened that we are
prepared for the emotionally (and sexually) charged scene that closes the film.
In this scene, Baran and her family are preparing to leave for Afghanistan and
Lateef has come to their village to help. As Baran crosses the grey, muddy
pathway she trips and the contents of her wicker bag spill out onto the ground.
This functions as a moment of metaphorical explosion, betraying perhaps the
feelings she has kept hidden throughout the film. We see among a variety of
other fruits and vegetables, several bright red tomatoes, and some dried figs.
Lateef rushes to Baran’s aid and Majidi cuts to a close-up filmed in slow motion
of Baran and Lateef picking up the spilled items. As their hands slowly and
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gracefully enter the frame a moment of tactile pleasure may be experienced by
the viewer. Although, according to the rules of modesty, the characters do not
physically touch, the framing of the image enables their images to overlap as
they each reach for a ripe red tomato. They therefore ‘touch’ virtually in this
brief and silent parting exchange, which is heightened by the contrast between
the grey earth and the redness of the tomatoes, which provide a melodramatic
sign of their passion. Here, the modest, restrained emotions depicted on screen
overflow into the space between the viewer and the screen, into the dark space
of the cinema where we may even ‘steal’ a publicly forbidden tactile moment.
The almost-direct looks of the protagonists toward the camera that directly
following this scene invite us to share in this intimate moment, further charging
this affective relationship between the screen and the viewer. While, as I have
shown, Baran adheres very strictly to Islamic censorship regulations, this
relationship between screen and spectator set up by the film teeters on the
precipice between the sacred and the sacrilegious, effectively pushing the limits
of Islamic censorship that prevents intimacy between men and women from
being depicted on screen. The modest bodies on screen are shadowed by the
bodies of the spectators seated in the dark space of the cinema. But hush! Please
don’t tell the mullahs, because Iranian filmmakers have enough trouble with
censorship as it is!
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Silence as a way of knowing in Yolngu
Indigenous Australian storytelling
Caroline Josephs
I am, in this chapter, approaching three aspects of silence as a way of knowing
— in relation to Yolngu story and storytelling — through one particular Yolngu
story which I cannot tell. What I can tell — is why I cannot tell the story, and
how pursuing the question of whether I could tell the story, and in what way,
led me on a long intriguing journey.
The three aspects I want to deal with, in relation to one Yolngu story, are:
1. protocols of being silent around storytelling — or not telling;
2. inside/outside knowledge, and touching into the silence surrounding,
           and in women’s business; and
3. embodiment as a silent way of knowing when dancing country.
The way of storytelling
My approach is a step towards Yolngu ways of being and telling as far as may
be possible for a non-Indigenous non-Yolngu storyteller and researcher, and to
make the bridging necessary for a similar audience as myself. Yolngu
epistemology is part of what I am terming sacred epistemology — a mystical
tradition which includes phenomena such as revelation and epiphany, and of
being present to the seen, the known, and at the same time, to Mystery, the
Unknown, the ‘between’, the ‘ship’ of relating. In this process, being becomes
Being, for Yolngu. It is also primarily an experiential approach to knowing, a
felt sense in the body, and can not in my view, be met through analytic
conceptual frames of reference. According to Greg Dening,1  story is the only
way such a sacred world may be represented. Current experiences are sung and
told as contemporary expressions of the Dreaming, the moving from the Wangga
to the present. Past and present thus become fused and ensure a future of deep
intimacy with all beings.
My way of presentation is to work towards exemplifying such approaches
— through personal story (never separate from Yolngu ‘history’ or Dreamtime
story) and traditional storytelling, in ways that represent relationship with
country, and with all beings, including kin with others of clan and tribe. I weave
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these storytellings with explanation in the non-Yolngu tradition to make the
connections clearer for we who are non-Indigenous readers. Knowing, for Yolngu,
is always being approached as an interior experience for the individual, albeit in
the context of the tribe’s cultural knowledge — it is as a consequence always
done within silence. Outside or exterior experiences will always be parallelling
interior internal experiences in symbolic ways, in feeling states and in states of
mind. Storytelling is always intending to link each Yolngu to their own country,
to plants, to animals, to all the Dreamings, and to each other, in particular kinship
interrelationships which are articulated not only through storytelling, but are
constantly reinforced through an elaborate and refined ‘opera’ of mark-making,
music-making, protocols of relating presented in everyday life and ceremony
both. (If you are my mother-in-law for example, there are certain kinds of body
language to be presented in your company, and only certain kinds of humour
may be displayed with certain family members). So, I am presenting a
methodology pointing towards Yolngu ways of knowing at the same time as
telling the stories.
The people, the place, the story
Yolngu people are Indigenous Australians living on their land which is in
north-east Arnhemland, of Australia. Australian Aboriginal people have been
on their land continuously for perhaps 40,000 or more years. (Yolngu language
is probably around 5000 years old). Yolngu came into first contact with white
people in the 1920s with a few anthropologists who travelled by boat to the
remote area, in the 1930s with the establishment of a mission school, and with
the impact of the multi-national bauxite miners, in the 1960s.
As a necessary precursor I am telling of the journey that led me to this Yolngu
story. The story, commonly called in Arnhemland, The Wagilag Sisters Story,
is a story of the Rainbow Serpent. Yolngu personal stories are bound together
with ancestral stories. Narrative (or ‘story’) is inextricably woven with country,
and body to country, and all beings to each other and to country through the
laws of kinship.
In 1979 I met Wandjuk Marika, an Elder, important Law man, master yidaki2
player, artist, from north-east Arnhemland — at a conference in Darwin where
I was talking of the project I was running at the time across Australia. I was
offering a presentation on ‘The Curriculum Development Centre’s Multi-Arts
Project’ in terms of the rainbow, with its many colours and strands. After,
Wandjuk came up to me, shook my hand, and thanked me for the story of the
Rainbow.
We sat in the garden for several hours (I don’t recall how long — clock time
ceased) as he told me stories of his life and, in the course of this, gave my children
Aboriginal names. (It wasn’t till decades later I learned the significance of the
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names and the relationships which they implied). Wandjuk told me three stories
from his country, a thousand miles to the east in Arnhemland, including one of
the Rainbow Serpent. Wandjuk was, what some anthropologists call, a ‘bridge
person’ for his people, keen to describe his culture.
More than 20 years later, I was living in the bush in solitude on the south
coast of New South Wales. It was an unprecedented year for pythons. I had
never seen so many in the 25 years I had been visiting the place. Three snakes
came to visit.
The first — huge — made its way up the Angophera (a native Australian tree)
outside my window, and made its way through a hole and into the ceiling. It
was to spend the winter there, no doubt attracted by the possums who inhabited
the ceiling space during the day, too.
Another python, about six feet long, twined itself into the door jam and
prevented my exit from the top storey to the outside deck, and downstairs to
the bathroom. I stamped and ‘danced’ on the floor inside the door, ‘Go away!
Go away! This is not your place!’ I told my not-welcome visitor. Strange echoes
resounded — of the Wagilag Sisters. Much later I realised the parallels. In one
part of the story, the sisters are singing and dancing to keep the snake from the
door of their hut. Aah!
The third snake manifested when I arrived from Sydney to set up the house
for a visit by Uncle Max3  and a group of people. Uncle Max was to lead us up
Gulaga, the sacred mountain of the Yuin people on the south coast, visible from
the back cliff behind my home — known to the Yuin as ‘pregnant woman with
her feet in the sea’. (One of the sisters is pregnant in the Wagilag Sisters Story).
I opened up the house and went on to the front deck. There on the threshold
was a complete python skin — a gift — a word of poetry — evoking a shedding
of skin, transformation.
Snake stories invaded my dreams. Snake stories arrived in different guises.
I recalled the Rainbow Serpent story Wandjuk had told me so many years
before. I went down to the garage and found my 1979 journals and re-read the
words I had written of my meeting with Wandjuk.
The snake visitations also led to a long conversation with an Aboriginal
woman (not a Yolngu), at the end of which she said she thought I could tell the
story and use my good judgment about what to tell.4
That was before I visited country of the story. I wasn’t sure. It was early
days. I read a number of versions of the story, and everything I could lay my
hands on about Yolngu country and culture.
This story of the rainbow serpent is a living story I cannot tell. I am obliged
to be silent on it. I only learned of the protocols surrounding this ‘big’ story
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while delving into the question of whether I could as a non-Yolngu researcher
and storyteller tell the story. In the process of living with the question, I talked
with many people. Why, I wondered, was it that I could not tell the story? After
two years of talking with many Balanda (or non-Yolngu) people who had lived
with Yolngu and worked closely with them, I found out about what may be
called, ‘protocols’, in relation to the story.
Protocols
First, the story emerges out of the country of Arnhemland — the story track (or
songline) moves from south-east to north. It intersects with another big creation
story of another moiety. (Each story, as well as every person, every creature and
every thing in Yolngu culture, belongs to one of two complementary moieties,
either Yirridja or Dhuwa). The story is associated with three major ceremonies
for both men and women. (Sometimes ceremonies are held separately, e.g., around
menstruation and in former times, childbirth. Some major ceremonies are held
for all.) To tell it out of country makes no sense, as the story, like the serpent,
follows the route of Yolngu Ancestors as they travelled through specific country,
which includes for example, the waterhole of Mirramina, in central Arnhemland.
Custodians of the storytellings are elders from five major clans. The place of
the country where a storytelling is held will determine which part of the story
will be told. It would never be told in what we as ‘whitefellas’ would assume
to be its complete form, or any form we might find in a written ‘text’.
The tellings would be carefully negotiated among the clans for a ceremony,
ensuring that all clans would be agreeable — this is part of a bringing together
and making of relationships of community, through preparation and negotiating
processes. The parts of the story and the ways in which it would be told would
depend not only on these factors, but the purpose for telling (for initiation, for
funeral or another ritual or event), the people present, their ages, gender, and
kinship with others, with the country, who the teller is, the relationship with
Dreamings in the story. In addition, kinship (or relationship with all, and with
other beings and humans) is mapped by the land — gurrutu. It interweaves and
overlays everything.
The story in its oral forms — which traditionally it always is, perhaps
accompanied by singing, dancing, mark-making on bodies — in a kind of
multi-strand ‘opera’ of many senses. It is fluid and changing, dynamic, just like
the Ancestors, moving through country, changing form many times —
transformations that create country and are created out of country. The same
story would never be told on two occasions. It changes. The important elements
will however, be present.
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I was told by Sophie Creighton, an anthropologist who has worked with
Yolngu, that there are important distinctions also between the right to hear a
story, the right to tell a story, and the bestowal of a story.5
Peter Sutton, a South Australian linguist writes: ‘Ancestral Beings are Stories
and their Sacred Dwelling Places are Story Places.’6 When I first saw this brief
inscription on some artefacts in the Museum of Australia in Canberra, I stopped
dead in my tracks! Something happened in my body. I did not know what it
was right then. The sentence would resonate in me for a long time.
What I finally discovered after some time was that my notion of someone
telling a story, was not what it was about — the Ancestors (who are Beings, not
necessarily only human beings) are the stories — and each is intimately dwelling
as Place (in country). The tellers become the Ancestors, those who body forth in
dance as Ancestors.
This turns our ordinary notions upside down — and inside out — which
brings me to ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ knowledge among the Yolngu. I take this up
later.
Here is, however, the version of the story which is an acceptable form; a
public or outside version. It has been carefully worded by Yolngu. Each word
is full of significance, layers of meaning, though it is framed in ways that avoid
much detail of other now unable-to-be-public versions. This version I came to
designate, a ‘fixed version’ to distinguish it from ‘living versions’.
The story covers the territory of a number of clans, in particular the waterhole
named Mirarrmina on the Upper Woolen River in Central Arnhemland. The
waterhole is the home of ‘Wititj’ the Olive Python (sometimes also known as the
‘Rainbow Serpent’), one of the most powerful of ancestral beings.7  Accounts of
the story vary with context and narrative, but the following details (the text
tells us) occur in most versions.8
The Wagilag Sisters Story — A fixed version
Two sisters, the older of whom has a child, the younger is pregnant, are
fleeing their home in the south-east. They are being followed by
clansmen. The Sisters reach Ngilipidji, or the Stone Country of the
Wagilag clan, from where they get their name. As they continue on their
travels they encounter animals, plants and country on which they confer
names, in essence bringing them into being. They decide to camp in the
rich and fertile country surrounding the waterhole at Mirarrmina.
According to some versions of the narrative, one of the Sisters pollutes
the waterhole, which arouses Wititj from his sleep. The younger Sister
gives birth, further inciting the Snake. Unsuspecting, the Sisters make
camp, build a bark hut, and try to cook the food they have caught, but
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things begin to go wrong — the animals and vegetables come to life and
leap into the waterhole. Wititj emerges from the waterhole and creates
a storm cloud with lightning and thunder to wash the Sisters into the
well. The land is flooded as the first monsoon pours down its rains.
Frightened, the Sisters perform dances and sing sacred songs to deter
the Python.
Finally the Sisters drop in exhaustion, and Wititj is able to enter the hut
and swallow them, their children and their dog.
Shortly afterwards, the great Wititj develops a terrible stomach ache.
He rises into the sky above the flooded landscape, and his groans attract
the attention of other great Snakes from surrounding clan estates, who
also rise up into the sky. They talk to each other and discover they have
different names. When asked what ails him, Wititj lies about what he
has eaten, realising that he has probably eaten beings of the same moiety.
Finally, the pain becomes so great that he falls to earth and vomits the
Sisters. (He retains the children, who belong to the opposite moiety, the
Yirritja). When the Sisters are brought to life again by the bites of the
stinging caterpillars, Wititj beats them with clapsticks (malirri), and
swallows them again.
The Sisters’ clansmen had followed them and were asleep by the
triangular impression made in the ground by the Python’s fall. The sisters
come to them in a dream and reveal the secrets of the sacred dances and
songs they had composed in their efforts to stop the rain.
This is the version of the story I was told by a number of expert informants9
that I could tell and write.
‘Outside’ and ‘inside’ knowing
Almost two years after the big snake year in my south coast home I was invited
to Arnhemland as part of a Music Forum (to include a small group of around 25
Balanda (non-Yolngu) anthropologists, ethnomusicologists, and an assortment
of others like myself, an educator, with groups of Yolngu dancers and singers
presenting and speaking) — to be followed by Garma, a festival — the occasion
of Yolngu sharing their knowledge more widely with Balanda as public or
‘outside’ knowledge.
Howard Morphy, a much respected anthropologist who has worked with
Yolngu for many years, says: ‘The delicate and complex relationship between
inside and outside [knowledge] provides the context for understanding the
release of knowledge to Balanda.’10  ‘Outside’ knowledge for Yolngu (according
to Morphy) is analogous to ‘inside’ knowledge which is secret and sacred. There
are layers to this knowledge — indicated by the kinds of words that are used
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in the storytellings for example. There will be other differences of course too.
The public versions will use different words, not so-called ‘power’ words.
Mandawuy told us, for example, of 30 words for the turtle, all with subtle
variations and meanings for Yolngu.
Early in my explorations around the Wagilag Sisters story, I spoke with Nigel
Lendon, who had curated the large exhibition of paintings representing 60 years
of bark paintings of the story. This was held in the Australian National Gallery
in 1998. As I spoke with him of the story, he stopped me suddenly. ‘You know’,
he said, ‘If I had used the word you have just used as the name of the snake in
Arnhem Land, it would have meant death!’ He told me of being stalked while
in country. Curators had spent seven years negotiating the release of the story
in a suitable form to be published in the exhibition catalogue. I felt distinctly
uncomfortable at this news.
Later, I recounted this conversation to Howard Morphy. What did he think?
In his understated way, he said: ‘I think that is a little exaggerated’. However,
Alan Fidock, with whom I had worked in Canberra over many years, and who
had lived and worked with Yolngu for 13 years in Milingimby, agreed that I
could not utter this name, a ‘power word’.
What to be silent about, and what to speak? I knew I would have to move
slowly and with sensitivity. Speaking could have certain very serious
consequences. I did not wish to offend. I was getting conflicting messages. And
women anthropologists had different ideas again about what could and could
not be spoken!11
Much later I was to learn from Howard Morphy:
Power names are called publicly at important stages of ceremonies the
whole time, e.g. the thirty words for turtle are not used in mundane
contexts. And the word you refer to as not being able to use — are used
only in restricted private contexts. However very few words fit into this
category. Most powerful names are known but treated as special. The
silence or the interval between their sounding marks their significance
and creates a sense of awe in their presence as well as the aesthetic power
of their performance.12
Later, at the Music Forum at the Yothu Yindi studio on the Bay in
Arnhemland, I asked Mandawuy a question about colour and body painting.
He spoke in language to others, and eventually came back with an answer. What
was the consultation I wondered? Perhaps, how to explain in terms appropriate
to my level of understanding? I learned that one principle is to show respect,
always ask if unsure, but on the other hand, only ask a question once. Later I
found when I became closer to Gulumbu, I would ask her questions and she
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would simply turn slightly away, as though she hadn’t heard, and then I would
know not to pursue this line of questioning.
Gregory Bateson says: ‘Secrecy can be used as a marker to tell us that we are
approaching holy ground…’13  Bateson’s proposition is that secrecy (or the non
utterance of certain things) was essential in the epistemological process. He says
there is a ‘necessity for the sacred’:
This is a very important and significant matter, that non-communication
of certain sorts is needed if we are to maintain the ‘sacred’.
Communication is undesirable, not because of fear, but because
communication would somehow alter the nature of the ideas.14
‘Communication of certain things alters the nature of the ideas.’ Silence, or
‘non-communication’ is required for the ‘sacred’, Bateson maintains.
Howard Morphy tells us more, specifically in relation to silence as a way of
knowing in relation to Yolngu knowledge:
And in many respects the layering of knowledge can be thought of as a
pedagogical [or learning process] technique, though it is one that
emphasises the variability in understanding that exists at a given moment
among different members of the society. The layering is as important as
the secrecy.15  [my emphasis]
According to Morphy, it is not only the nature of the ideas, but the nature of
the process for learning which renders silence significant. Both layering and
silence have pedagogical intent, are part of the learning process. ‘Inside’ and
‘outside’ knowledge are seen to be different in Yolngu terms. Outside knowledge
is freely available. (There are ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ versions of stories). ‘Inside’
knowledge is available only to certain people at certain stages, in certain
circumstances. It is revealed in phases, with pauses, with silence between, as
Morphy has indicated — a necessary part of a sacred epistemology or way of
knowing.
Morphy indicates that the concepts of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ are more than
the English concept of ‘secret’. ‘Inside’ for Yolngu is used, he says, in two
complementary senses. The first is ‘inside’ in the sense of truth or generative
power. The other is ‘inside’ in the sense of exclusive or secret. In the first, women
and men are equally included. In the second, women are excluded from certain
contexts and certain knowledge.16 The Wagilag Sisters Story seems to hold
both kinds of knowledge. This explained its being associated with both men’s
and women’s business.
What Morphy has not articulated is that Yolngu women also hold certain
knowledge secret from the men — certain women’s business knowledge.17  Rita
Gross (1977) makes a strong case that men’s and women’s rituals, symbols and
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knowledges are always equal and complementary, without gendered hierarchy,
‘co-equal and co-necessary’.18  She refutes any sacred/profane dichotomy of
male/female in Aboriginal religion and argues instead that the ‘correct
interpretation is to see women as embodiments and manifestations of a different
kind of sacrality than that associated with males’. She notes that ‘women’s
experience is inaccessible to males in the absence of articulate females’. Women’s
experience has not been fully articulated from within Aboriginal cultures.19  I
would argue that this is part of an ‘unspoken story’, a story silenced or silent,
another story that has not been told; another aspect of ‘silence’. This is the
unknowable by one gender, of the other. Rita Gross goes further. She looks
deeply into the Wagilag Sisters Story to conclude that ‘women’s unique
experiences are potent metaphors in men’s religious lives’.
Another important point to be remembered is that while ‘outside’ or public
or children’s versions may be simpler in form, they reflect, or are analogous
with, the ‘inside’ knowledge, though this may not be immediately evident.
Helen Verran, a philosopher now working at Charles Darwin University,
says:
Yolngu knowledge is the intrusion of the Dreaming into the secular. The
Dreaming is brought into the here and now by the doing of particular
things at particular times by particular people…Knowledge can only ever
be a performance of the Dreaming, a bringing to life in the here and now of
the elements of the other domain. 20  [my emphasis]
‘Dreamtime’ in Yolngu is called Wangarr, and each language group will have
a different term which is only approximated by the English term, ‘Dreamtime’.
Knowing in Yolngu is not about words, or descriptions, or abstract concepts. It
is more related to being and actioning. I will return to Helen Verran’s notion of
‘performance’ indirectly, through the dancing, a little later.
I could, (I was assured by Alan Fidock, Djon Mundine, Nigel Lendon, Sophie
Creighton), write of the story and tell the story which had been carefully
negotiated and published.
Revelation and epiphany are ways of knowing in Yolngu culture.21  Such
‘events’ happen in silence. What is revelation? It is the known being connected
to the Unknowable in such a way as to open up to all possibility.
In Yolngu culture, Bir’yun is a shimmering effect (seen in finely cross-hatched
paintings) may occur through an experience of what may be termed ‘epiphany’
or ‘revelation’. Bir’yun projects a brightness that emanates from the Wangarr
Ancestral past which manifests in the present through storytelling, singing,
art-making, dancing — or from the Ancestral Beings themselves. The brightness
of bir’yun endows the painting with ‘Ancestral power’.
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This process probably has to be present in the painter in order to evoke it in
the viewers. This may echo the state that has to be present in the storyteller for
the effect to transmit to the audience during a storytelling. The process is
similarly evoked in other forms of expression and sacred art in Yolngu (dancing,
singing), where Morphy reports that there is a progressing from dark to dull,
to light and brilliant, analogous to the transformation that arises in the process.
It is present in the music which builds to a final shout, for example, as well as
in the dances which sometimes build to a frenzy of dramatic and solo
performances (especially as I noted, with the male dancers). I make the parallel
of bir’yun with storytelling and my own experiences later in country.
Raymattja Marika-Mununggirity, Yolngu linguist from Yirrkala, has written
of the relationship between the ‘mythic’ ancestors and the life that is currently
lived by Yolngu:
Knowledge is living, and it comes from a real world, it has real life, real
events and real happenings. That’s what happens with the old ancestral
stories, we still relive that past history, we still sing it, dance and still
bring it and fit it into the present. That’s what makes the present world
a meaningful world to live in.22
Past and present exist together, ensuring a future conserving the Ancestral states
of Being, and are given meaning and significance through re-enactment.
Revelation transforms, transmits, opens up being into Being, opens up into
all possibility. Where creatures can jump out of a fire, and run and jump into a
waterhole, as in the Wagilag Sisters Story, transformation has occurred. Ancestral
Beings can transform in such a way — where an experience is charged — as
well as in a myriad other ways, and Yolngu re-enacting Ancestral Beings
re-embody that transformation. In re-storing the behaviours of the Ancestral
Beings, Yolngu re-story their own being creating Being, maintaining connection
with Ancestors.
Howard Morphy, in writing of the nature of Yolngu knowledge, talks of the
revelatory nature of Yolngu knowledge and its relationship with secrecy. He
uses the word ‘transmission’ in this context. Transmission of knowledge assumes
a direct experiencing, a taking in, a knowing through embodying or ‘immediate
presencing’23  of that knowing.
Morphy points out that the phasing and structuring of knowledge through
secrecy and through revelatory knowing — establishes a rhythm, that allows
slow digestion or absorption, to occur (in the way that snakes digest their food).
There are thresholds at each turning, structured by secrecy. Secrecy can ‘mark
division between inside and outside knowledge’.
Within such a story as the Wagilag Sisters, the potential exists for many
layers of meaning in different contexts. As Nigel Lendon has pointed out —
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there is no one meaning for the story — meanings shift in relation to context,
juxtapositionings, and a particular moment in time:
The search for a singular ‘deep’ authentic meaning is doomed to failure.
Thus the greater interest for developing a knowledge of these works
[paintings of the Wagilag Sisters Story] is in the potential for elements
to carry multiple meanings, in different contexts, conjunctions and
historical moments.24
In Yolngu culture, all is dynamic in relation to the Story or Story versions.
Contiguous elements and multivalent significances are part of the storytelling.
I had come to understand that I could not tell the Wagilag Sisters Story in
any way I chose. I held no authority to tell. Not telling underscores the
importance of some secrets, the mysteries that cannot be spoken.
In Yolngu society, I cannot assume a right to know. I must wait, listen, until
invited into various aspects of the assembling of understanding through action,
relationship in the environment in concert with others, with creatures, through
listening, through ritual, ceremony, through the body, through dance, through
the remarks people casually offer, and in all the details of everyday life.
Story is therefore history performed. And, as Ancestors enact transformation,
so contemporary Yolngu re-create or re-enact the transformations as they tell
the stories, sing the songs, do the paintings on bodies, and dance the dances of
the Ancestors. Storytelling is in this way transformative for those who participate.
In Yolngu terms, a storyteller can produce a storytelling, but it is Reality that
is presented, not just a story.
Let me tell you of one experience that I had at Garma.
First, the landscape.
We are on a vast bush site, a stringbark forest on top of the escarpment.
Between the trees, the deep red earth appears. If you walk a few hundred yards
to the edge of the escarpment you can see the sea in the distance. There are five
hundred Balanda and five hundred Indigenous people (many from vast distances
across the north of Australia) camped in tents dotted in among the trees. A large
space opens up among the trees, covered by beach sand — the shape of a long
triangle and almost as long as a football field — where the bunggul takes place,
late each afternoon. The bunggul is the ceremonial singing, dancing, storytelling
that happens each year of Garma. The ‘boss man’ of the ceremonies and the
storyteller for Garma bunggul is Galarrwuy Yunipingu.
For much of Garma I have spent time sitting on the ground with the women
in the Women’s shelter, learning how to make string, making friends with the
women, telling our stories to each other, and gradually getting to know Gulumbu,
with whom I share an instant and easy rapport.
183
Silence as a way of knowing in Yolngu Indigenous Australian storytelling
And so, to the story…
Silent embodying, dancing as re-enacting story
Franca Tamisari writes:
Dancing establishes relationship between people, country and ancestors
as well as between the participants in a ceremony… In Yolngu dances
‘the body speaks — directly and in its totality’ of our being-in-the-world
and being-with-others.25
Let me remind you of a part of the Wagilag Sisters story:
Frightened, the Sisters perform dances and sing sacred songs to deter the
Python. Finally the Sisters drop in exhaustion, and Wititj is able to enter
the hut and swallow them, their children and their dog.
The Sisters come to [their clansmen] in a dream and reveal the secrets of
the sacred dances and songs they had composed in their efforts to stop
the rain.26  [my emphasis]
It is the Sunday after Garma has finished, and most of the Balanda have gone.
My companions from the Music Forum have gone to a motel, but I choose to
stay on at the campsite, not wanting to sleep inside if I can be in the bush. I
have tried to get an earlier flight out, unsuccessfully. I have heard today there
is to be a ceremony, but I don’t take too much notice, as I imagine it will be held
deep in the bush, away from the eyes of myself, or other Balanda.
A handful of Balanda are still there at Gulkula, the Garma site, and about
300 Yolngu — gradually drifting into the bunggul 27  space.
It is hot in the sun. I have been collecting tea in large tin cans for the women,
for Galarrwuy, for the women in the weaving shelter, back and forth in the heat
to the kitchen, finding cups and sugar and milk to bring for them. It seems
appropriate to tell Galarrwuy as I bring him tea, ‘Gulumbu says I am yeppa
(sister)’. He has shown us the elaborate head-dresses and armbands that will be
for the boys, woven with coloured feathers. ‘These must be special’, I say.
‘Special’, he acknowledges, as he gently puts them back into a bag. Increasingly,
it is emerging, that the ceremony will take place here in the bunggul space, for
two boys from two clans, one of them Galarrwuy’s son.
I go to join the women, as Gulumbu has invited me to do, sitting in the
women’s shelter near where she is tending the fire. She leaves me in the care of
her daughter, Dhambit. Gulumbu, I realise only later, is Galarrwuy’s sister. Kin
establishes obligations, responsibilities, roles, everything. I observe that she has
a leading role to play in the unfolding event.
184
Negotiating the Sacred II
The groups for singing and dancing have assembled on either side of the
ceremonial space where the evening’s bunggul for each day of Garma have, it
seems, been gradually building to this climax.
In shelters28  on opposite sides of the performance space where the figures
of Ganbulapula 29  and a great funeral log stand, sit the groups of the two related
clans. To the accompaniment of yidaki and clapsticks, they sing, each clan
alternating, and the men and women of each clan also take turns to move into
the performing space to dance in the sequence occasioned by the ceremony.
Eventually, I am told, the two boys from the two clans will emerge from the
bush at one side, accompanied by the older men of both clans, to be ushered
into the space for the climax of the initiation ceremony and circumcision. They
are being prepared, painted up, in Yirrkala, the Yolngu town some distance
away.
I stand near Gulumbu, tired now of sitting still in one place with the women
in the shelter for most of the day, as the singing and dancing go on, and
preparations around the bunggul continue. A great turtle is being roasted in the
ground. (Gulumbu calls to me to come and look). It will later be fed to the clan
elders at the end of the ceremony.
Gulumbu is tending the fire that is to be used for the ‘smoking’ of the
relatives,30  and for boiling the ‘treatment’ for the boys, following the ceremony.
I get up, stiff, and beginning to feel my body mightily in need of movement
after four or five hours of sitting still. I have been saying to myself to just
observe, not ask questions on this special day, to be grateful to be present (which
I certainly am) and wait. I cannot sit still any longer. My body won’t allow it.
I get up and walk across to Gulumbu at the fire. Standing opposite her as she
stirs the ‘treatment’ over the fire, I begin to move my body a little as I see the
women doing in the central sandy space.
I am itching to be dancing, restless from being still for so long.
Maarr, which manifests itself in the footprints left behind by ancestral
beings in the landscape features, names, objects, designs, songs and
dances — is not only ancestral power, it also refers to people’s innermost
feelings of love and care, silent wishes ‘which make things happen’,
concealed desires which are not expressed but which nonetheless are
felt and met.31  [my emphasis]
I have always loved to dance almost more than anything else, and it is always
hard for me to be on the periphery of any dancing, painful to be looking in,
unable to participate. I am unsure of the codes here. I have been sitting in the
shelter observing, cautious of moving or of asking questions, conscious that I
am privileged to just be here watching, conscious too, of Gulumbu’s having
made my entry possible.
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‘Can you teach me the dance?’ I ask Gulumbu. I do know this important
principle of being in Yolngu country. Always ask. Be respectful. I have also
been cautioned by a Balanda who has worked with Indigenous people for years:
‘Don’t ask more than once’. I can never know if what I am asking is crossing an
unknown boundary. I am risking something, transgressing the boundary of
being still, being quiet, just observing. It is risky business. But I trust this
woman, her presence, her warmth. I have put on the armband she has made me.
I am wearing the string with possum fur inserted into it she has given me.
Gulumbu looks up from her work of stirring the pot with the stringybark in
it for the boys, straightens up from her task, then turns and gestures to the far
side of the ground, ‘You go right around the outside to that other side. Keep
right behind, and do the dancing there’.
With her blessing on the enterprise giving me permission and courage, I walk
carefully around the outer rim of all the people and the activity in the middle
of the sandy performance space, trying not to run in my impatience to be dancing
— to where the group of women are seated in another shelter, as they rest in
between each segment of dancing. A tremor in my body. I am moving at last —
always for me, a favoured state.
When the women of this clan get up again to dance, I kick off my shoes and
begin to mimic them, staying well back in the background from all the people.
I have positioned myself where I feel myself to be solitary, inconspicuous,
unobserved. There are only Yolngu here, but their attention is focused on what
is happening in front of me, in the bunggul. I am well behind them all. I am
enclosed in concentration, focused on being present to just the dancing. I have
the dancing group of women firmly in my sights through a kind of soft focus
vision, imitating as closely as possible their every movement — allowing my
body to dance the movements, being there, simultaneously as it is happening.
It is something I have learned to do — to let go and mirror the movements, be
the moving bodies there, with my body-mind, here.
So it is startling for me to hear what next takes place in the sequence of
events.
I have been dancing for just a few short moments alone, but in unison with
the group a little distance away in the performance space. The lead dancer turns
her head, continuing to dance as she does so, and calls over her shoulder to me,
‘Come into the canoe with us!’
At the sound of her invitation, and without a nano-second’s hesitation I leap
into the performance space (it feels in many ways a great ‘leap’), keeping my
body and mind open to picking up the steps and the rhythms as they are done,
moving with them. I am alert, but relaxed, excited, keeping my peripheral vision
open, breathing into my belly and letting the body know, forgetting any thinking
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about this strange and daunting thing I may find myself doing, if the focus
stumbles. It is my body which is the dancing, the knowing.
The reality of Yolngu performance, and especially dancing, is thus one
of epiphany and transformation in which relationships with place and people
are established, lived-in and embodied by the dancers.32  [my emphasis]
I am aware of the other Yolngu women dancers, though I am focusing on the
lead dancer. I am in line with the women. The lead dancer is in front of the other
dancers, closer to the singers, and seems to emit the dance calls and to direct the
dancers.
I am kicking up the dust with my feet touching the earth and sending dust
rising as each foot turns in and up slightly to the inside with each step. (This is
different from the men’s ‘hitting’ the earth with their feet). The dust itself
reminds me of a liminality of body meeting the country.
As the meaning of footprints can be said to reside in between, that is in
the social, political links and emotional bonds they fashion between
places and ancestral events as well as people and country, the meaning
of dancing is between the steps, between the participants of a ceremony,
the inter-subjective space of desire and compassion, love and competition,
that one enters through dancing.33
My hands follow the dancers’ movements. I bend slightly forward as they
do, and turn as they do, re-enacting and re-embodying the journey of the
Ancestors, re-storing it to the present, re-storying it in the present.
I am dressed all in black (with long white hair); they are in colourful dresses,
their dark skin glistening in the sun. This country, this story, these people, this
dancing, myself Balanda, here with Yolngu, now, all related, storied, in the
dance.
My hands gesture the different aspects of being in the canoe. Just dancing,
just following, being with the whole group of women, allowing my body to
keep in tune with the lead dancer who gives signals for changes in the
movements. I can just do it by focusing my attention and at the same time
opening to the body and the vision of being with what the women are doing.
With a sharp shout the sequence is finished and we all retire to sit down and
the women laugh and chat among themselves in language, a language I wish
deeply to understand.
Corporeal connection is enacted and elaborated in the cosmology of
Yolngu people in Northeast Arnhemland through images of bodily
transformations, journeys and traces…the body as the ‘hinge’ between
self and the world underlies the idea of ancestral power and the
experiential character of Yolngu knowledge.34  [my emphasis]
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In the dance, the body provides a silent hinge between self, world, ancestral
powers — through embodiment of ancestral power and ways of doing things.
I was, though I could not reflect on it at the time, stepping directly into this
embodying by being in the dance with the Yolngu women. No matter that I did
not comprehend. I was enacting the story that was the story coming in the dance.
I was in the canoe35  with the women, travelling with them, in the in-between
space and time between their culture and mine, between Ancestral Past and
contemporary time at Gulkula and between that time and the writing now.
Something of a liminal silent gap quality invoked this transforming — unplanned,
unforeseen, startling.
My footsteps had taken me to Darwin and the meeting with Wandjuk so long
ago, to Garma, and to meeting Gulumbu, Derrkngu, Rarriwuy, Wityana,
Mandawuy, Raymattja, and other Yolngu people, and into the dancing. All of
these events were connected it seemed to me, in tracings, in footsteps on the
country, connected through a kind of silence, the in-between and ultimately in
the embodiment that occurs as dancing the country.
I had traversed three kinds of silence to reach this place: the protocols of
storytelling for Yolngu, the understanding of the parallelling of inside and
outside knowing, and a culmination of stepping into and dwelling as ancestral
spirit with the Yolngu women. All three kinds of silent knowing had coalesced
and actualised in the dancing, and in the embodying of the stories in the land
and of the land that had birthed them.
I left Garma with the dust of that place, Gulkula, on my feet.
‘We are here now; we are the voice of the serpent,’ say the Wagilag Sisters.
‘Now I give you my ceremonies’, says the Snake, with their voice. 36
Endnotes
1  At a conference on ‘Writing the Sacred’, The Australian National University, October 2002.
2  Commonly called in the southern areas of Australia, ‘didgeridoo’ — a long hollow log instrument
with a deep wind sound.
3 Dulumunmun, Yuin Elder of the South Coast of New South Wales.
4  From Tranby Aboriginal College in Sydney.
5  I could find no written source for this information.
6  P. Sutton, 1988, Dreamings, The Art of Aboriginal Australia, New York: Viking/Penguin, p. 19 (my
emphasis). Sutton is writing of Cape York, but the same idea applies for Arnhemland.
7 W. Caruana, and N. Lendon, 1997, The Painters of the Wagilag Sisters Story 1937-1997, Canberra:
National Gallery of Australia, p. 9.
8  Ibid., p. 9.
9  Nigel Lendon, Djon Mundine, Alan Fidock, Allan Marrett, Sophie Creighton — experts on different
aspects of Aboriginal and Yolngu culture.
10  H. Morphy, 1991, Ancestral Connections: Art and an Aboriginal System of Knowledge, Chicago &
London: University of Chicago Press, p. 98.
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11 Two Canberra-based women anthropologists told me that as the story was in the public domain I
could tell it. (They had not however, worked specifically with Yolngu, but with other Indigenous
Aborigines.)
12  Personal email, May 2006.
13  G. Bateson, and C. M. Bateson, 1987, Angels Fear: Towards an Epistemology of the Sacred, New York:
Macmillan, p. 97.
14  Ibid., p. 97.
15  Morphy, 1991, op. cit., p. 77.
16  Ibid., p. 96.
17  Gulumbu Yunipingu, personal communication, August 2004.
18  Rita Gross, 1977, ‘Menstruation and Childbirth as Ritual and Religious Experience in the Religion
of the Australian Aborigines’, Supplement Journal of the American Academy of Religion, vol. 45, no. 4,
pp. 1147-1181, p. 1147, 1150.
19 There are exceptions, e.g., Deborah Bird Rose and Dianne Bell’s work in Central Australia, Fiona
Magowan and Franca Tamisari in Arnhem Land, Catherine Berndt.
20  H. Verran, 2002, ‘Discussion of the Philosophical Issues for Sciences and Scientists engaging with
Indigenous Knowledge’, Unpublished paper from talk, Garma (my emphasis).
21  H. Morphy, 1989, ‘From Dull to Brilliant: the Aesthetics of Spiritual Power among the Yolngu’, Man,
(N.S.), vol. 24, p. 28.
22  R. Marika-Mununggiritj, 1991, ‘How can Balanda learn about the Aboriginal World?’ Batchelor
Journal of Aboriginal Education, July, no.6, pp. 17-23, p. 24.
23  Dr Tony Swain (Sydney University), expert in both Indigenous and Chinese religions and art,
maintains that there is no ‘transcendent’ in Aboriginal religions.
24  Caruana and Lendon, op. cit.
25  Franca Tamisari, 2000, ‘Dancing the Land, the Land Dances through us’, Writings on Dance, no. 20,
p. 31.
26 The Wagilag Sisters Story, version in Caruana and Lendon, op. cit., p. 9.
27  From bon and bun’kumu kneecap or knee; the knees of the performer moving up and down in the
dance stepping are said to be talking (bonwanga). Tamisari, op. cit., p. 35.
28 These are wood and bark-covered areas with sand on the floor.
29  Ancestral figure associated with re-configuring of knowledge.
30  Or cleansing.
31 Tamisari, op. cit., p. 39.
32  Ibid., p. 33.
33  Ibid.
34  Ibid., p. 3.
35 The canoe is part of the Djang’kau Sisters story, not the Wagilag Sisters, but it has an in-between,
liminal quality which seemed part of my experience at the time.
36 The Wagilag Sisters Story, version Lenore, Mirelle, Balanda poet who lived in the Northern Territory
for a time with Indigenous people. She was unable to locate the sources she used for her more extensive
poem when I phoned her in Adelaide.
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